I. Executive Summary

In modern times, where women have established themselves in society, the world still sees a plethora of “first women,” including the swearing-in of the new Prime Minister of Japan. Unseen in all of Japan’s history, Sanae Takaichi was chosen as the forefront face of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, contradicting the lag that women have in this country. This “lag” for women can be referred to as the country ranking 118th out of 148 in the 2025 Global Gender Gap Index, demonstrating the struggle women still face in one of the most progressive countries in the world. Though endorsing the new Prime Minister, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan contradicts women's ideals and progressive gender-related policies. She has put herself in office with extremely conservative ideals, leading Japan into massive changes relating to economic and social issues. Takaichi and her party represent an entirely underrepresented minority in politics, but have no plans to help anyone affected. Feeding into Japan’s “representation without a progressive agenda,” this first woman Prime Minister is doing nothing for herself and her own gender.

‌II. Historical Context

In the post-Abe era of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), one particular figure, Sanae Takaichi, has risen to claim the center stage. For years, she was dismissed as an uncompromising extremist; once, even mocked as “Taliban Takaichi” by former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, she now stands as the self-proclaimed heir to Shinzo Abe’s national legacy. Her project, known as the Takaichi Doctrine, extends Abe’s conservatism into an applied ideological framework that incorporates historical revisionism, economic nationalism, and cultural conservatism [1].

A. Lineage from Abe to Takaichi

Takaichi’s politics were aligned with Abe’s, as were those of her predecessors; she advocates for constitutional revision, closer ties with the United States, and rebuilding Japan’s military power. 

Serving as a long-term member of the Nippon Kaigi, a primary national organization in Japan, Takaichi embraces its vision of restoring “traditional values” and rejects the idea of what it calls decades of national self-doubt [2]. Where Abe’s nationalism was pragmatic, Takaichi’s is more moral and revisionist. She believes that Japan’s wartime actions were to “oversee advances,” not special invasions, and that they were unfairly condemned after defeat in the post-war period in 1945. Reasoning that “if Japan had won the war, it wouldn’t be blamed now,” Takaichi provides more insight into her perception that the nation’s history is not a story of guilt but of misinterpreted sovereignty [2].

Specifically, Takaichi brings something that Abe rarely ever displayed openly: a goal to rewrite Japan’s postwar identity itself. Shinzo Abe built his politics around a careful balance of nationalism and pragmatism. Abenomics attempted to revive the Japanese economy via monetary easing and reform. Takaichi inherited this framework while exerting more emphasis on economic nationalism. She calls for larger-scale government spending and strategic industries like semiconductors and defense for state investment; she claims this is “bold action” even if it requires issuing more government bonds [3].

For her, the prosperity of the nation is inseparable from sovereignty. A nation that is dependent on others economically, as she argues, can never be truly politically free. That argument links her fiscal policy directly to her national identity, arguing that Japan must be economically independent to stand tall and rise both diplomatically and militarily.

On social issues, Takaichi represents the more conservative orthodox of the postwar right. She opposes same-sex marriage, supporting more of maintaining a surname for married couples while insisting that imperial succession should remain male-only [4]. Her repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a place where war criminals are honored, are deliberate signals of defiance towards Japan’s postwar remorse [1].

B. “Taliban Takaichi” and Intra-Party Tensions

Inside the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Takaichi has taken the lead in the Abe-aligned conservative area, which raises concern for the previous Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s centrist leadership. Kishida himself once jokingly referred to her as “Taliban Takaichi,” a nickname that captured both her hardline reputation and the internal friction she provoked [5].

For the LDP’s moderates in belief, Takaichi’s ideological purity threatens the party’s tradition of coalition pragmatism. For its conservative approach, she represents a retreat to clarity and conviction after years of cautious technocracy in the party. This divide reflects a deeper question within the conservatism in Japan of whether the party should prioritize stability or moral renewal.

Takaichi’s emergence mirrors, in various ways, Margaret Thatcher’s rise from the ruins of Edward Heath’s weary Tory establishment in 1970s Britain. Both women built their leadership on conviction rather than the overall consensus, shifting ideological certainty into their own political strength. However, there are limitations to this comparison as Thatcher inherited a parliamentary majority with the aim of a party needing to be reshaped, while Takaichi inherited something closer to rubble [5].

C. Emerging from Electoral Ruins

From years of economic stagnation and political fatigue, Japan’s ruling coalition has fractured. The collapse of the long alliance between the LDP and its partner Komeito has left the current party without a parliamentary majority [6]. With new populist movements rising, there seems to be a waning of public confidence in these establishment politics.

Takaichi then leads not from a position of power but from a position of weakness itself, and her doctrine must function as both a political strategy and a cultural narrative. This way should aim to restore legitimacy through moral clarity rather than solely institutional strength.

Takaichi frames the current Japan crisis as a choice between pride and prevention. As she states. “When we act ambiguously, the other side climbs up.” This highlights how ambiguity is a weakness, and the solution to this is assertion through reclaiming agency by redefining the past. This revision language she holds to about Japan’s wartime “advances” becomes a medium for national renewal with self-confidence [2].

D. Implications and Contradictions

The Takaichi Doctrine carries appeals and risks simultaneously. Internationally, her historical revisions could heighten tensions with South Korea and primarily China, both of which view Japan’s past aggression as unresolved [1]. Domestically, her messages resonate with older conservatives who yearn for national pride, but it seems to be alienating more younger voters worried about inclusion and quality of life in Japan. 

Her economic populism may induce industry gains but further strain Japan’s already heavy debt burden [4]. With no stable majority in parliament, she faces potential gridlock unless she softens her rhetoric or constructs new alliances. Yet in a political landscape marked with uncertainty, her conviction seems to stand apart. Where Kishida’s centrism often appears marginal, Takaichi offers moral purpose. To her supporters, she appears as the last defender of Abe’s vision; while to her critics, she is a polarizing ideologue who could both isolate Japan at home and abroad.

III. Current Political Crisis

Takaichi’s rise in the LDP party has happened under extraordinary circumstances. Globally, her policies and goals threaten to strain Japan’s relationships with other East Asian nations. Within the LDP, she must work to recover after the party’s loss of the Diet majority and grow the new LDP-Ishin coalition. As the new Prime Minister of Japan, Takaichi’s policies need to quell public dissatisfaction over Japan’s cost of living crisis and re-earn their trust in the LDP.

A. Geopolitical Volatility

Takaichi has well established herself as a staunch nationalist, having chosen to invest in defense spending, and is expected to push for enhanced missile deterrence (Sasmita, 2025). However, Takaichi’s hardline policies, including her pro-Taiwan stance, might be difficult to balance considering the geopolitical volatility of the area and Takaichi’s own history. 

Takaichi has been known to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, a controversial shrine honoring those who died in service of Japan, including 14 “A-Class” convicted war criminals from World War II (Al Jazeera, 2025). Although she had visited many times while serving as a minister, Takaichi has abstained from visiting the shrine during the 2025 Autumn rite, likely in an effort to avoid tensions with China and South Korea, instead choosing to send an offering at her own expense (Hasegawa, 2025). However, even the offering has had a bad reception with Japan’s East Asian neighbors, with South Korea’s foreign ministry issuing a statement conveying “deep disappointment and regret” towards Takaichi’s actions (Yonhap, 2025). As the PM of a former empire responsible for much suffering, Takaichi’s previous visits have consistently been seen by Beijing and Seoul as a “sign of a lack of remorse for Japanese aggression” (Yamaguchi, 2025).

Japan’s connections with Taiwan have increasingly strained relations with China. Although Japan has never announced any official diplomatic ties to Taiwan, the country has been a strong non-official ally. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te congratulated Takaichi on her win of the LDP leadership race, adding that he hopes Taiwan and Japan could deepen their cooperation (Reuters, 2025). 

China recently protested Takaichi’s meeting with a former senior Taiwanese politician at the APEC summit in South Korea. Takaichi had posted photos of herself on social media meeting the official, and in the comments had said that she hoped that “practical cooperation between Japan and Taiwan will deepen.” China’s foreign ministry stated that its actions had “severely violated the one-China principle” and that the “actions are egregious in nature and impact” (Zhang, 2025).

B. Rebuilding the Liberal Democratic Party

In October of 2024, the LDP coalition, led by PM Shigeru Ishiba, lost the majority in the lower house of the national Diet. Less than a year later, the coalition would also lose its majority in the upper house, marking the first time that the LDP had lost its majority in both houses during the postwar period. Although Ishiba initially swore to remain in office after his loss in the lower house, he would resign in August of 2025, leaving a leadership vacuum that Takaichi has now filled (Debates, 2025).

Furthermore, the party continues to struggle with a multitude of unresolved scandals. In 2023 and 2024, a slush fund scandal was uncovered after members of the LDP failed to report up to over 600 million yen (~ 4 million dollars) in campaign funds (Takashi, 2024). The party’s relationship with the Unification Church, described by some as a cult, has also weighed down on the party’s reputation (Jain, 2025).  

The LDP’s lack of response to the slush fund scandal has also effectively ended the party’s long-term relationship with Komeito, its smaller coalition partner, after 26 years of partnership (Komiya and Kelly, 2025). On October 20th, 2025, the LDP signed a formal coalition agreement with the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), securing Takachi’s position as PM. However, Ishin is expected to play a much different role than Komeito had. Ishin elected not to join Takaichi’s cabinet and would not be held responsible for any of the new administration’s decisions.

As a staunch nationalist, Takaichi has advocated for constitutional reforms to allow Japan’s military to normalize. However, with the LDP controlling neither house of Japan’s Diet, Takaichi must rely on opposition votes to pass any legislation. Moreover, many Japanese voters simply do not see national security as a top concern, with over 60% in a survey citing the economy and living costs as priority concerns instead (Jain, 2025). Voters have also started to stray from mainstream parties like the LDP, as seen when the populist Sanseito party rose from just 2 seats to 15 in the last upper house election (Jain, 2025). 

Despite the LDP’s loss of majority control, opposition parties still stand divided (Khalil and Ng, 2024). The largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), won 148 seats in the last lower house election but had an approval rating of only 6.6% before parliament was dissolved (Khalil and Ng, 2024). With no majority party or coalition in the Diet, Japan is headed towards a legislative gridlock that threatens more than just Takaichi’s policies. 

Further, the LDP’s partnership with Ishin has so far proved to be on unstable grounds. The coalition has been described as a “confidence and supply arrangement” as a result of the high reform demands Ishin presented to the LDP (The Business Times, 2025). Ishin knows that the LDP no longer has the luxury of being picky, with Ishin co-leader Jujita Fumitake warning that failure to meet objectives like passing a bill to reduce the number of Diet members will result in the party’s withdrawal from the coalition (Nishimura, 2025). While partnering with Ishin certainly guaranteed Takaichi’s victory, it is still uncertain whether the LDP and Ishin will be able to collaborate successfully in spite of their varying policy priorities. 

C. Public Dissatisfaction and Trust

Other than the monumental task of rebuilding the LDP, Takaichi must also regain the trust of the public in the LDP and quell the public anger that has been rising. 2024 saw Japan’s debt rising to over 260% of its GDP, and its first cost-of-living crisis in decades. The jumps in prices, caused by higher import costs stacked upon a global increase in price of raw material and energy post pandemic, are especially problematic given that average salaries have barely risen in over three decades (Oi, 2022). Japan has also been facing an ongoing rice shortage as a result of increasing wheat prices caused by the Ukraine war and a poor 2023 harvest (Yamaguchi, 2025). The shortage has led to a staggering increase in price (up 49.1% from 2024), further inflated by panic buying, and the Japanese government has had to release rice reserves (Wolf, 2025; Yamaguchi, 2025). Public anger culminated in outrage after Ishiba’s Agriculture Minister, Taku Eto, joked that he “never had to buy rice,” because his supporters gave it to him, leading to his resignation (Shan, 2025). Household spending is up 1.8% from last year, and consumer confidence hangs at 35.8, down 6.3% from last August (Sugiyama, 2025; Cabinet Office, 2025; Wolf, 2025). Although Japan had made some gains in August, Takaichi is inheriting a less-than-satisfactory economy, and it is unclear how her policies will benefit or calm the public.

The LDP continues to be haunted by its past scandals. It must recover the trust it lost from the Slush Fund scandal and Ishiba’s resignation and deal with the scandals its new coalition partner, Ishin, is facing. An Ishin member of the Upper House, Akira Ishii, resigned in August 2025 after allegations that he collected a salary from a government-funded aide who “did not actually work.” Ishin’s co-leader, Fumitake Fujita, has been revealed to have paid 21 million yen, of which 19.65 million came from public funds, to his secretary’s company to print political pamphlets (Shimbun, 2025; Johnston, 2025). However, Takaichi does not seem to care much about the scandal. She appointed seven members of the 2023-2024 Slush Fund scandal to vice ministers or parliamentary secretaries posts (Shimbun, 2025). 

IV. Policy Challenges 

In 2024, Japan’s Gross Debt to GDP ratio exceeded 235% (Trading Economics, 2025). In other words, the national debt of the nation was more than double the total monetary value of all goods and services produced in the country during 2024. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund predicts that Japan’s national debt will exceed 250% of its GDP before eventually descending to 245% by the end of the decade (Reinecke, 2024). This level of indebtedness, which is unprecedented among nearly all developed economies, leaves Japan susceptible to national crisis as a result of rising interest rates and limited fiscal flexibility. In addition to worsening debt, Japan’s working-age population is predicted to decline to about 57.1 million by 2050, which is a nearly 35% decrease from 1995 (United Nations, n.d.). Hence, with a decreasing demographic that can create economic value, ideate strategies to alleviate the debt crisis, and be a source of tax revenue, Japan is left in a precarious position. Against this backdrop of fiscal fragility and an aging population, Japan’s leadership continues to opt for an Abenomics-esque stimulus–seeking growth via spending even as its potential for productivity shrinks.

In order to understand Japan’s internal contradictions, it is necessary to clarify the five core pillars of Japan’s current economic policy quandary: Abenomics, fiscal stimulus, structural reform, demographic constraint, and evidence-based policymaking. First, Abenomics, which describes the economic strategy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, combined monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reform to counteract the deflationary stagnation that Japan experienced in 2013 (McBride & Xu, 2018). Specifically, fiscal stimulus is an economic policy strategy in which the government cuts taxes or increases state spending to boost demand and counteract weak growth. On the other hand, structural reform refers to supply-side changes – like shifts in labor laws, deregulation, immigration openness, trade liberalization – to improve growth potential in the long run. Next, demographic constraint refers to the increasingly disadvantageous workforce conditions that plague Japan. As its population continues to age, Japan’s potential labor force comprises just over 59% of its population, which is a drop from 70% in 1991-1993 (Hong & Schneider, 2020). Of course, aging and population decline constrain economic growth, as there are fewer workers, there is less opportunity for innovation, and there are more dependency burdens. Furthermore, the median age in Japan is one of the highest on the global stage – at about 48.4 years – and population projections suggest that the nation’s total population will shrink by a large magnitude (IMF, 2020). Subsequently, evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) is the practice of crafting policy that is founded upon empirical data, rigorous analysis, and transparent reasoning. On the contrary, populist policymaking refers to policymaking that is grounded in emotional narratives, anecdotes, or social-media-derived claims – often at the expense of integrity and rigor. The paradox in Takaichi’s platform, though, is that she invokes fiscal stimulus while rejecting the doctrine of structural openness (most notably in relation to immigration) – which puts labor supply at risk. In addition, she replaces EBPM with populist sentiment and anecdotes, hindering her legitimacy. 

This section argues that Japan’s economic strategy – and by extension Takaichi’s – is an ‘economics of contradiction’, as it combines demographic contraction with expansionary fiscal ambition and populism-based policymaking with technocratic posturing. In recent years, Japan has faced a serious cost-of-living crisis, in which inflation has risen, real wages have fallen, and households have faced the heat. In response, the government has revived stimulus measures through large fiscal packages, stimulus payments, and consumer subsidies. Concurrently, the leadership has reintegrated Abenomics into their rhetoric as a template for economic revival (McBride & Xu, 2018). Nevertheless, the structural reform component has been neglected and reversed. Hence, the stimulus has been deployed without adequate support on the supply side, which would work to stabilize and improve growth. As a consequence, the stimulus efforts have become less effective, fiscal risks have deepened, and the logic behind the policy has become increasingly contradictory and absurd. Utilizing a selective interpretation, Takaichi exemplifies the broader notion of an “economics of contradiction” – growth via spending in a continually shrinking economy and credibility through technocratic branding without the necessary institutional reforms to back it up. This conflicting dynamic sets the stage for exploring how the government’s stance on immigration and the labor market further conveys policy fraught with contradiction.

B. The Paradox of Abenomics Without Openness

Originally, Abenomics was built to balance stimulus and structural reform – two policy stances that are interdependent in order to maintain economic growth in a climate like that of Japan; Takaichi’s version preserves singular spending while discarding the component integral to maintaining supply reform. 

Shinzo Abe, a longtime prime minister of Japan, instituted a three-pronged economic plan dubbed Abenomics in 2013 to combat Japan’s prolonged economic slump. Briefly, the three components – or arrows – are fiscal stimulus, unorthodox monetary policy, and structural reform (McBride & Xu, 2018). Fiscal stimulus, in this case, refers to the building of infrastructure and increased government spending; Unorthodox monetary policy refers to the large scale increasing of the supply of money to lower interest rates and combat inflation; and structural reform refers to the discarding of some business regulation, lowering corporate taxes, and increasing the diversity of the workforce – all of which work to make Japan more competitive on the global stage (McBride & Xu, 2018). 

While Takaichi’s stance works to continue Abe’s tradition of stimulus, she advocates for closed borders and fiscal populism. In practice, this means the structural reform arrow of Abenomics is limited in its reach as closed borders limit labor supply. The crux of this issue, though, is that Abenomics’ success is dependent upon both demand and supply-side synergy: stimulus was supposed to increase demand, and structural reform (which critically includes immigration openness) was supposed to increase supply capacity (the workforce, productivity, and innovation). Hence, when openness is removed, the stimulus just raises prices and debt without causing growth. From an economic perspective, without labor inflow or a stimulus of productivity, the fiscal multiplier shrinks (a measure of how much GDP changes in response to a $1 change in government spending) – which can be attributed to supply constraints that bottleneck the economy. Consequently, debt-to-GDP rises, inflation grows, but GDP likely stays flat or even decreases. 

Delving into the specifics of Japan’s immigration and labor policy exposes this contradiction in the most evident way. Despite persistent labor shortages, Japan has one of the lowest proportions of foreign population in the OECD, with only 2.2% in 2021 (OECD, 2024). As a result, employers have expressed concerns about worker-shortage impacts, with Reuters reporting that nearly two-thirds of Japanese firms are experiencing a serious strain from a shortage of workers (Reuters, 2025). Still, the nation’s government is hesitant to allow immigrants, no matter the economic burdens that emerge from a paucity of labor supply. A Korean publication examines even further impacts, asserting that Japan has had a record number of companies go bankrupt for two years running as a result of the nation’s aging population and declining birth rates (Kim, 2025). Looking at the root of the issue, though, it is evinced most clearly through the legal precedent in Japan. The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act of 1951 serves as the main law governing the entry, residence, and departure of foreign nationals in Japan, laying the foundation for restricted immigration. Even when reforms are introduced, as they were in 2018, they are highly controlled and fraught with a plethora of restrictions (Chiavacci, 2025). Hiromi Mori explains further, noting that despite Japan’s labor-shortage pressures, policy changes did not create opportunities for unskilled foreign workers. Rather, the government exploited various channels, temporary statuses, guest-worker schemes, and controlled visas (Mori, 1997). Thus, the structural reform component of Abenomics never truly implied a broad, sweeping immigration openness in Japan; instead, it alluded to a narrow, high-skill, and temporary model, which is incongruent with the other notions of Abenomics and is exacerbated by Takaichi’s efforts. Ultimately, the crux of the issue comes from an ideological rather than policy layer of the socio-political scene in Japan: Japan’s reluctance to open borders is a question of self-image, social stability, and institutional culture (Takaya, 2025). 

In sum, the misalignments between Japan’s economic aspirations, economic policy, immigration policy, and institutional ideology create a policy laden with logical contradictions – ultimately hindering the revival of the nation’s economy and labor demographic.

C. Populism, Conspiracy, and Evidence Decay

The contradiction in Japan’s economic strategy does not come from uninformed trade policy and diplomacy; instead, it stems from a deeply embedded culture of populism and the decay of evidence within the current administration. The most prominent example of this in recent years is the “deer-kicking” conspiracy. In 2024, Takaichi cited a viral video in which she claimed that foreign tourists were kicking deer. Ultimately, she utilized this “evidence” to call for a tightened immigration policy – despite the clip being unverified and anecdotal in nature. Furthermore, this nationalist conspiracy has further fueled anti-immigration sentiment inside Japan. Aside from the foreign policy, which is purported by this point of view, the crux of the issue is that Takaichi and her constituents continue to make decisions based on sentiment rather than fact or economic data. Consequently, an “economics of contradiction” is created as a result of an ideological block that will not allow the entirety of Japan’s fiscal policy to be in alignment. Hence, as emotion-based policymaking continues to supersede evidence-based policymaking in practice, Japan’s economic outlook looks bleaker than ever. 

The “deer-kicking” narrative is not simply an instance of political sensationalism; rather, it reflects a broader decay in which social media virality increasingly substitutes for empirical evidence. As populist leaders seek to mirror online outrage as opposed to managing it, the boundary between public sentiment and official policymaking breaks down. Historically, Japan’s policymaking has been bolstered by formalism and technocracy – through ministries, white papers, and rigorous analysis. Under Takaichi and her constituents, this tradition is eroding at an alarming rate. Decisions are being rationalized through post hoc emotional validation in place of data-driven debate. This pattern reflects an increasing sentiment among global populist movements, in which national identity is prioritized over national success and analytical coherence. 

The death of evidence-based policymaking in Japan carries far-reaching, material consequences. Policies that are rooted in anecdote and outrage cause the misallocation of resources, the distortion of economic priorities, and corrode both public trust in government and hope for a more stable future among the youth. In other words, Takaichi’s administration underscores how post-truth populism maps into economic inefficiency – the emotional basis of policy erodes the analytics foundation that sustained Japan’s postwar stability. 

Japan’s crisis is far deeper than that of faulty fiscal policy – it reaches to the core of the nation's political sentiment. A nation that was once known for its precision, planning, and deep-seated pragmatism now finds itself wrestling with contradictions derived from emotion-based governance. Hence, the previously outlined imbalance between spending and openness parallels a deeper imbalance between evidence and sentiment. 

For the next generation of policymakers, Japan offers a stark warning: when ideology replaces rigorous analysis, a tradition of excellence becomes as tenuous as the reasoning in which the policy is being made. The durability of the economy lies not only in fiscal discipline, but on intellectual fortitude – that is, the ability to let data and principle, not dogma, guide national decision making. 

Japan’s domestic challenges reflect how economic contradictions are never purely fiscal in nature – they are deeply rooted in institutional and cultural dissonance. The state’s dependence on spending without openness, and sentiment without evidence, has not merely halted growth but eroded faith in effective governance. 

As demonstrated, Japan’s current economic contradiction lies in three key components. First, fiscal populism – or stimulus without reform – which, in short, is Japan’s willingness to invest in public works and economic drivers without the reform necessary to realize the stimulus’s full effects. Next, immigration paralysis serves as a major supply constraint to Japan’s success. As the population of Japan continues to age, and the workforce continues to shrink at an increasing rate, policymakers need to work with celerity to address Japan’s monumental national debt and poor economic outlook. 

The collapse of evidence-based policymaking in Japan weakens far more than the economy; it is injurious to the very process through which public trust is crafted. When policymaking becomes reactive – driven by online outrage or insecurity – long-term planning gives way to melodramatics rather than a national foundation. Bureaucracies lose legitimacy, ministries lose sovereignty, and cities lose confidence in their government. 

On a broader scale, Japan’s crisis is not an outlier. Across developed democracies, policymakers face the same dilemma – balancing public emotion with analysis-based governance. The question for Japan’s youth – and for the youth of the world – is whether politics can be made rational without losing its moral pulse. Ultimately, as the world becomes further polarized, a reconciliation of emotion and evidence must prevail for civilizational stability and coherence. 

In the end, Japan’s economics of contradiction is not merely a policy failure – it is a moral failure. It evinces what happens when nations mistake emotion for evidence and national pride for prosperity. Its resolution will not come from another misguided stimulus package or trade reform – but from a generation that is willing to reinvigorate the discipline of truth at the heart of policymaking. 

V. Impact on Foreign Policy

Dealing with President Trump has been and will continue to be a rite of passage for new world leaders. Due to his unpredictability in dealing with international relations, leaders are often nervous about their first meeting with the president. Takaichi was no different, but her meeting turned out to be positive. Greeting him with a firm handshake, they quickly bonded over baseball and her willingness to nominate him for a Nobel Peace Prize (Boak & Megerian, 2025).

Shortly before she came to power, Trump negotiated a trade deal with former prime minister Shigeru Ishiba, which included a 15% on most Japanese imports, including automobiles and parts, as well as Japan agreeing to invest $550 billion in U.S. industries and purchase U.S. aircraft and defense equipment. Ishiba resigned soon after, citing the trade deal as a major reason (Douglas & Fukutome, 2025). As Takaichi took power, she pledged to honor the deal, as well as sign a separate framework to cooperate on securing critical minerals and rare earth metals. She does not plan to renegotiate the deal, but given Trump's unpredictability, it may be that he renegotiates it on her behalf.

It is important for a leader to prove themselves to the world by dealing with foreign leaders like Trump, but it's more important to help one's own people directly. In Japan, consumers are struggling with high inflation and prices (Jie, 2025), and any perception of weakness towards the U.S. risks political backlash. However, abandoning the U.S.-Japan alliance or appearing confrontational could cause commotion in markets and unsettle security cooperation at a time when regional tensions remain high.

To navigate this, Takaichi has doubled down on gestures of both strength and independence. She sent an offering to the Yasukuni Shrine, reaffirming her conservative base (Hasegawa, 2025). But at the same time, this has strained relations with Seoul and Beijing, both of which view such acts as historical provocations. Still, she remains pragmatic, courting Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, who called her a “cherished friend,” while quietly attempting to court economic cooperation from China to stabilize trade flows and supply chains (Younger, 2025).

Trump’s return to the global stage represents an interesting and challenging first task as PM for Takaichi. Each meeting is a test of political dexterity, both globally and at home. Between managing tariffs, sustaining Japan’s economic recovery, and navigating the complex power dynamics in East Asia, her first months in office have already proven that Japan’s first female prime minister must operate with both caution and conviction in equal measure.

VI. Structural Challenges

The Liberal Democratic Party-Komeito Coalition plays a significant role in Japanese political history due to its longstanding collaboration and power-sharing. The coalition was first formed on October 5, 1999, as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost its majority in the upper house of the National Diet. Komeito had a stable voter base, which proved crucial in helping the LDP regain and maintain parliamentary control. The formation of the LDP-Komeito Coalition in 1999 serves as a crucial context for understanding the significance of lacking a supermajority and its resultant institutional fragility faced by the current administration. The coalition later dissolved on September 16, 2009, due to its defeat against the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the 2009 general election before regaining power on 16 December, 2012, with a parliamentary supermajority. However, the LDP lost a significant number of seats in both houses of parliament during the 2024 general election, reducing it to a minority government. This led to the resignation of Shigeru Ishiba, the former Japanese prime minister and LDP leader, and the subsequent election of Takaichi Sanae as LDP leader. Due to various disagreements with Takaichi, Komeito withdrew from the coalition on October 10th, 2025, leading to the dissolution of the LDP-Komeito coalition once again.

Consequently, the dissolution of the LDP-Komeito coalition served as the first major obstacle in a series of potential detrimental obstacles towards the soon-to-be Takaichi administration. Due to the dissolution, the LDP needed to find a new coalition partner in order to regain seats lost in the National Diet as a consequence of Komeito’s withdrawal. On October 22nd, 2025, the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin) formalized a coalition agreement. However, the LDP and Ishin still hold only a minority of seats in both houses of parliament, thereby necessitating external support to advance their legislative agenda. This parliamentary configuration created a unique governance dynamic in the Japanese National Diet.

This section examines the situation faced by the Takaichi administration within Japan’s political culture and conditions to evaluate how minority governance constrains policy effectiveness. In particular, this section will examine its ability to manage legislative processes and policy implementation (Park, 2025). The minority composition of the ruling coalition is devoid of a clear path to legislative majorities, which severely constrains the government’s ability to pass critical budgetary legislation, enact new policies, or confirm essential executive appointments requiring Diet approval (Park, 2025).

An understanding of the LDP’s post-war hegemony is crucial to grasping the significance of the Takaichi government’s current structural challenge in governance. Ever since the 1958 general elections, the LDP (both independently or in a coalition) has governed with a majority for most terms. Consequently, this hegemony has institutionalized certain governance norms in Japan. The LDP-Ishin coalition’s current status as a minority government represents a notable departure from these norms, suggesting substantial obstacles to effective governance. Considering the government has to control both houses to ensure smooth policy passage, the LDP-Ishin coalition’s inability to do so indicates that it lacks the basic legislative machinery needed for effective governance. Additionally, Japan has a prevailing political consensus culture, which, when combined with the LDP-Ishin coalition's minority status, exacerbates legislative paralysis by disincentivising opposition cooperation and narrowing opportunities for compromise.

The LDP-Ishin Coalition is effectively “governing without governing” as the government’s formal authority to remain in office is offset by its inability, as a minority government, to control the legislative agenda, approve budgets, or make key appointments. The resultant legislative paralysis is particularly detrimental in Japan’s modified Westminster-style parliamentary system, as it lacks the conventional dissolution threat that typically compels governmental compromise and stability (Sasaki, 2025). Policy stagnation has been one of the main concerns that have arisen from this predicament. Japan currently faces multiple urgent policy-related issues, including fiscal reforms to address mounting public debt, comprehensive economic strategies to revive sluggish growth, and large-scale budgetary commitments to mitigate the aging demographic crisis. Furthermore, Takaichi’s hardline positions on immigration, national security, and gender roles will be particularly vulnerable to partisan opposition. In addition to policy stagnation, the ruling government’s structural weakness fosters protracted political instability. This instability stems from the government having to secure ad hoc support from opposition parties for every piece of legislation, which gradually depletes political capital and undermines public confidence in the system’s functionality. Therefore, the functional efficacy of the Japanese government is under threat as a result of this unprecedented situation. Accordingly, this section of the policy brief will further analyze the constraints imposed by legislative paralysis, budgetary impasses, the absence of the dissolution threat, and Japan’s governance norms and culture, before concluding with a comparative analysis of minority governance and its broader implications on Japan’s political stability.

A. Legislative and Fiscal Paralysis

Legislative paralysis, often referred to as gridlock, occurs when an increase in the number of actors who can veto policy (veto players) and their ideological differences significantly reduce the ability of the government and parliament to produce substantial legislation (Tsebelis, 1999).  This can occur in bicameral systems, when an opposition majority in one chamber is able to block the legislative agenda, which could lead to a heavy delay in the ability to pass emergency legislation (Thies & Yanai, 2014). Notably, Takaichi Sanae's administration holds a minority status in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, which exacerbates this gridlock. This necessitates ad hoc support from opposition parties for any form of legislation to pass. This places the Takaichi administration in a very vulnerable position within the National Diet.

The main reason why this happens is due to the ideology that Takaichi’s administration advocates for. Nationalist conservatism, economic liberalism, traditional social values, emphasizing a strong defense posture, and the preservation of Japan’s cultural and gender hierarchies are all ideologies and policies that have been at the forefront of her political agenda. This can be seen through her advocacy for Abenomics and the prohibition on separate surnames for married couples. These policies commonly come into conflict with the interests of opposition parties in the Lower and Upper houses. This can be showcased by the opposition parties in the Lower House’s interest to stand out from Takaichi’s conservative nationalism, hawkish defense, traditionalist on gender and immigration, and skeptical of social liberalism stances. This is as opposition parties advocate for social spending, pacifism, gender equality, and civil liberties. The contrast between the Takaichi administration and opposition parties in the Lower House shows that there is not only a current lack of incentive for the opposition parties to support Takaichi, but it would also severely damage voter base integrity. Therefore, there is weak to no support from the Lower House. Resultingly, the Takaichi administration’s legislative agenda would not be able to smoothly pass in the Lower House.

Additionally, the Upper House also views Takaichi as volatile and divisive. As the Upper House advocates for fiscal discipline, administrative integrity, and constitutional caution, Takaichi’s aggressive fiscal stimulus and nationalist reforms severely go against what the Upper House advocates for. Councillors view her agenda as too partisan, too fast, and too divisive for Japan’s consensus political culture. The way the Upper House tries to restrain Takaichi’s aggressive policies is mainly through passive resistance via delaying, amendments, and committee stalling. Therefore, Takaichi's policies cannot possibly be considered in the status quo. Rejection from the Lower House and hesitancy of the Upper House will cause a tight gridlock in the ability of the Takaichi administration to actually be able to pass any crucial policies. The policies are viewed as an assault upon established economic and institutional orthodoxy, facing rejection even from the Japanese Central Bank. The lack of alignment between both houses, where one possesses the ability to control ordinary legislation and budget initiation while the other is able to delay, amend, or veto bills, further exacerbates the dire conditions of the ability to pass legislation in Japanese Politics.

In addition to the ideological differences, the current minority configuration of the LDP-Ishin coalition also has to be taken into account. The withdrawal of Komeito from the long-standing LDP-Komeito coalition left the LDP without the parliamentary stability that had previously ensured the smooth passage of bills and confidence motions (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; Nikkei Asia, 2024). This has resulted in severe implications in the House of Representatives, where a simple majority of 233 seats is required to pass ordinary legislation and to sustain the cabinet’s confidence (National Diet Act, 2023; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2024). Even with the new LDP-Ishin coalition, the combined bloc is still short of this 233-seat threshold (NHK, 2024; Mainichi, 2024). As a result, the administration faces structural constraints that make the formation of consistent legislative majorities nearly impossible, leading to policy immobility and elevating the risk of governmental collapse (Tsebelis, 2002; Thies & Yanai, 2014). This will result in even the passage of ordinary laws becoming a matter of intense negotiation and political compromise (Imoto, 2024).

The Takaichi administration now faces various obstacles in the passage of ordinary legislation. Under Japan’s constitutional framework, ordinary bills require a simple majority of 233 seats of the 465 seats in the House of Representatives for approval (National Diet Act, 2023; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2024). Even with the LDP-Ishin coalition, ad hoc agreements with opposition parties still have to be relied on in order to gain a simple majority (Imoto, 2024; NHK, 2024). This results in a dependence on policy-by-policy cooperation, which will transform every legislative attempt into high-stakes negotiation, as delays or blocks by shifting opposition alignments can occur (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; Mainichi, 2024). Imoto (2024) observes that this environment forces the administration to make substantial policy concessions to secure temporary support, often resulting in diluted or incoherent legislative outcomes. When consensus cannot be reached, bills are simply abandoned, leading to what scholars term “legislative death” (Tsebelis, 2002; Thies & Yanai, 2014). Consequently, the ordinary lawmaking process has become a continuous test of political endurance, where governing effectively requires not only numbers but also persistent negotiation and compromise (Nikkei Asia, 2024).

In addition to legislative stagnation, the Takaichi administration also faces severe fiscal obstacles due to Japan’s complex budgetary process. Under Article 60 of the Japanese Constitution, the House of Representatives holds formal precedence in budgetary approval as it is able to override the House of Councillors’ rejection if the upper house fails to act within thirty days (National Diet Act, 2023; Cabinet Secretariat, 2024). However, as the ruling administration does not hold a majority in the lower house as well, this essentially becomes useless. Since the LDP-Ishin coalition still does not hold a majority in the House of Representatives, it is not able to utilize its override power since it does not have enough votes to pass a budget on its own. The ruling LDP cannot advance the budget out of the Budget Committee or secure the initial floor vote, as both stages require a simple majority (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; Mainichi, 2024). Therefore, this paralyzes fiscal governance, delays public spending, and undermines economic confidence (Nikkei Asia, 2024). Notably, Japan’s special deficit-financing bonds, which are used to cover shortfalls and fund large-scale stimulus programs, must be approved by both chambers of the Diet, leading to the opposition in the House of Councillors effectively being able to veto over key fiscal measures the Takaichi administration wishes to pass (Imoto, 2024; Ministry of Finance Japan, 2024). Failure to secure bipartisan consent could threaten government solvency and trigger broader economic instability (NHK, 2024; Tsebelis, 2002).

Economic strategy has ground to a halt, as large-scale stimulus measures that are typically financed through deficit bonds remain trapped in procedural limbo due to the opposition’s control of key committees and its veto power in the upper chamber (Imoto, 2024; Asahi Shimbun, 2024). This paralysis will lead to long-term structural challenges, most notably when it comes to Japan’s rapidly aging population. Without legislative consensus, critical reforms to the social security and healthcare systems will stall, including proposals for pension sustainability and increased medical funding (Mainichi Shimbun, 2024; NHK, 2024). The result is a government that remains administratively active but substantively immobilized as it is able to propose but not enact. As a result, this will erode both public trust and Japan’s policy responsiveness in the face of mounting demographic and economic pressures (Thies & Yanai, 2014; Tsebelis, 2002).

The legislative and fiscal paralysis faced by the Takaichi administration showcases a deeper structural weakness within Japan’s parliamentary framework. In a system designed for stable majoritarian governance, a numerically weak minority government faces intrinsic limits on its ability to function effectively (Tsebelis, 2002; Thies & Yanai, 2014). Without a majority bloc, even routine processes such as budget approvals, legislative debates, and policy implementation become complicated. This functional gridlock is an inevitable outcome of institutional design, where the procedural requirements of Japan’s Diet demand continuous majoritarian backing for routine governance (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2024; Nikkei Asia, 2024). In essence, the government’s inability to act underscores how a parliamentary system’s strength can become its greatest vulnerability when that confidence is absent.

B. The Veto on Cabinet Appointments

For the purpose of political control and political continuity, the mechanism of executive appointments is highly valued. A prime minister is able to maintain cohesion within the bureaucracy and steer national priorities with the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. This is because cabinet ministers are the ones tasked with administrative execution, serving as the operational core of governance (Thies & Yanai, 2014; Samuels, 2023). However, in Japan’s constitutional and procedural framework, it is required for many senior appointments to be formally reported to, and therefore endorsed by, the Diet (Cabinet Secretariat, 2024; National Diet, 2023). In the case of the current Takaichi administration, opposition parties are able to delay or reject proposed nominees as the administration lacks a majority of seats (Imoto 2024; NHK, 2024). Even though executive appointments are supposed to be routine personnel matters, they have been turned into political contests. As a result, the Takaichi administration is forced to bargain with opposition parties for approvals and thereby compromises its ability to maintain an effective cabinet (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; Nikkei Asia, 2024). Ultimately, this will further weaken Takaichi’s authority within her own party and coalition.

Additionally, in Takaichi’s case, executive appointments become political artillery against her campaign and aim to wear and tear her reputation in the eyes of the masses. When opposition parties utilize procedural roadblocks to stall Takaichi’s policies, their aim is to leverage political power and to force concessions on Takaichi’s side, leading to either a concession towards a policy more favourable to the opposition or to break Takaichi’s campaign from more forced procedural blockages. History has shown time and time again that opposition parties have a tendency to opt for procedural roadblocks in order to force a more favourable policy. The LDP-Ishin bloc’s lack of procedural dominance means that even non-controversial appointments can be stalled for weeks, creating leadership vacuums within ministries and undermining administrative continuity (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; Mainichi Shimbun, 2024). Unfortunately for Takaichi, Japan has an opposition ecosystem that prioritizes blocking conservative leadership over advancing coherent policy alternatives, leading to a struggle in passing policies (Nagy, 2025).

Due to the fact that opposition parties hold a majority in several parliamentary committees, cabinet appointments have become a major chokepoint.  Opposition lawmakers will routinely delay hearings, refuse to schedule confirmation sessions, or demand policy concessions in exchange for consent (Imoto, 2024; NHK, 2024). The result would be constant partisan negotiations. This procedural obstruction will result in weakening the Prime Minister’s governing capacity while being masked under the guise of legislative oversight. Therefore, an institutional mechanism designed for accountability can be repurposed as a tool of political leverage (Thies & Yanai, 2014; Tsebelis, 2002).

The obstruction of key appointments has an immediate impact on the functionality of the Japanese government. Most importantly, cabinet and senior agency positions might remain unfilled or be temporarily occupied by acting officials. Therefore, there will be a struggle to coordinate policy implementation and slow decision-making (Imoto, 2024; Samuels, 2023). Policy initiatives will be delayed or watered down because the administration lacks the authority and political backing to advance measures, especially those that incite polarized opinions (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; NHK, 2024). In addition, inter-ministerial coordination will suffer because meetings and committees cannot operate efficiently. This will result in the public perception of an ineffective administration (Mainichi Shimbun, 2024; Nikkei Asia, 2024).  Therefore, this administrative paralysis demonstrates how procedural veto power over appointments leads to stalled governance and highlights the structural vulnerability of the Takaichi administration as a minority government (Thies & Yanai, 2014; Tsebelis, 2002).

Significant political consequences come as a result of appointment blockades. As this will result in repeated failures to confirm or replace senior officials, it also undermines the Prime Minister’s authority both within her party and in the Diet. This is because it signals to internal factions and coalition partners that the government lacks control over core governance functions (Samuels, 2023; Thies & Yanai, 2014). The consequent erosion of executive credibility makes it harder to rally support for broader policy initiatives, as the public perceives the administration as weak and indecisive (Imoto, 2024; Asahi Shimbun, 2024). Moreover, opposition parties will utilize the procedural leverage to make routine appointments a strategic tool for political negotiation (Tsebelis, 2002; NHK, 2024). This means the Takaichi administration will suffer from both administrative paralysis and political vulnerability. This highlights a limitation of parliamentary systems without stable majorities. Even when procedural rules allow the government to propose action, structural realities prevent it from executing policy effectively.

C. Westminster Parliamentarism

A key component of the Westminster parliamentary system is the “dissolution threat,’ which is a mechanism that allows a Prime Minister to dissolve the lower chamber (House of Representatives) and call an election if legislative support falters. This threat can be used to coerce and compel opposition parties to compromise, subsequently maintaining the government’s ability to pass routine legislation (Lijphart, 2012; Bogdanor, 2013). However, this mechanism is not as effective as it seems when used in Japan’s modified Westminster-style system because a dissolution could pose a high electoral risk as the government may lose the crucial seats needed to secure a majority (Stockwin, 2021; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2010). Resultingly, opposition parties have little to no incentive to negotiate or provide ad hoc support in the case of Takaichi’s minority government. This is because the government cannot credibly threaten an election to enforce compliance. Therefore, this absence of a credible dissolution threat will further exacerbate legislative paralysis and reinforce the structural gridlock that is a result of the administration’s minority status as well as the bicameral constraints (Tsebelis, 2002; Thies & Yanai, 2014). In the end, executive appointments will also result in protracted negotiation, leaving the government with severely constrained policy capacity.

Crucially, the erosion of the dissolution threat leaves critical consequences for Japan’s governance under Takaichi’s minority government. Legislative initiatives are left vulnerable to obstruction by opposition parties, and policy proposals will often stall in committee or on the floor of the Diet (Tsebelis, 2002; Thies & Yanai, 2014). In addition, executive appointments will be further delayed because the opposition parties have no incentive to expedite confirmations or support cabinet initiatives (Imoto 2024; Samuels, 2023). The government may be formally in power, but it is substantially constrained in operations and unable to implement coherent policies due to the structural and procedural constraints. Therefore, this further undermines Takaichi’s polarizing policy agenda.

D. Japanese Political Consensus Culture

It is also very important to consider that Japanese political culture heavily emphasizes consensus. Notably, the nemawashi concept, which is an informal process of gathering support and feedback before making a formal announcement, means that the Takaichi administration is expected to have policies discussed and agreed upon before a formal proposal can be made. This consensus culture is designed to minimize conflict and ensure decisions have broad-based support, thereby encouraging compromise. However, this will be detrimental to the Takaichi administration.

While it may seem that this consensus culture will make all aforementioned challenges easier for the Takaichi administration, in actuality, it makes it harder for Takaichi’s administration with its minority configuration. Opposition parties are further disincentivized from cooperating openly, as it would mean they are legitimizing their political opponent and eroding their political leverage (Imoto, 2024; Asahi Shimbun, 2024). Additionally, due to the fact that Takaichi holds hardline positions that are harder to be mutually accepted, the likelihood of compromise on the side of the majority opposition reduces (Nikkei Asia, 2024). Legislative negotiations become even more delicate and policy implementation even more fragile, as the expectation of compromise falls on the Takaichi administration instead.

Even if the coalition could find some ad hoc allies, most opposition parties will stay cautious of cooperating with the ruling coalition. With Japanese consensus culture working as a double-edged sword, Takaichi and the ruling coalition will have to strategically negotiate and hope for the possibility of ad hoc support from opposition parties in order to effectively govern. The administration would also have to strategically negotiate so that the opposition compromises instead of itself. The Takaichi government may survive if it carefully avoids confrontations with opposition parties and relies on limited ad hoc cooperation, but this strategy severely limits its capacity to govern effectively while compromising Takaichi’s policy agenda (Imoto, 2024; Samuels, 2023). The result would be a decline in public confidence, proving the detriment that political consensus culture causes to the Takaichi administration. Given this predicament, it is widely believed that the Takaichi administration would struggle to even endure until 2026, alarming two whole years before the next mandatory elections in the lower house. The only way for governance to go smoothly then is if it secures unexpected cooperation or capitalizes on potential short-term political opportunities. Therefore, this highlights how the norm of Japanese political consensus culture detriments the minority governance of the Takaichi administration, contributing to the structural challenges it faces.

E. Implications on Tenure

With all structural challenges the Takaichi administration will face, its tenure comes into question, with a focus on the administration’s ability to survive and remain effective until the next scheduled election. The legislative and fiscal paralysis it will face threatens its stability as it will be unable to pass even ordinary bills, secure budget approval, or implement key policies due to the opposition’s incentive to reduce its political legitimacy and therefore erodes its political capital and undermines public confidence (Imoto, 2024; Nikkei Asia, 2024). The lack of dissolution threat further exacerbates the administration’s vulnerability, as it will force the administration to avoid overt confrontation with opposition parties even though those confrontations are inevitable when intending to pass key policies part of Takaichi’s agenda (Stockwin, 2021; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2010). Already declining public opinion will continue to decline due to the resultant policy stagnation, no-confidence votes by the opposition, and fragmentation within the party itself as a result of questioning the effectiveness of Takaichi’s leadership (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; Samuels, 2023; NHK, 2024). All of this compounded together suggests a complicated tenure for the Takaichi administration, threatening its survivability before the next mandatory elections in the lower house in 2028.

For this section, the comparative case study of Australia’s Gillard Government can be examined. The Gillard Government was formed after a hung parliament and ruled from 2010 to 2023. It depended on support from the Greens and a few independents, which was a coalition built upon tenuous confidence and supply agreements (Jaensch, 2011; Walter, 2013). Even though the government initially managed to pass major legislation, such as carbon pricing reforms, there were constant negotiations required to maintain parliamentary support. In the end, this severely constrained executive authority, eroding the political agenda of the government. This resulted in public perceptions of instability and the erosion of political legitimacy, and a subsequent decline in approval ratings as well as intra-party dissent (Kelly, 2014). In the end, the government faced an erosion of political capital, an internal leadership challenge, and an eventual electoral defeat. This comparative case study highlights how minority governments will face significant detrimental structural challenges that limit their survival ability, which depends on continuous compromises and ad hoc alliances. In the case of the Takaichi administration, the context of Japan’s parliamentary system and political culture further compounds its structural challenges, posing the question of whether it will even survive until the next election.

It is worth noting that opposition parties can also exploit these weaknesses by strategically coordinating no-confidence motions or leveraging procedural votes, as they know the government cannot credibly threaten dissolution to force compromise (Asahi Shimbun, 2024; NHK, 2024). There is also the ability for opposition parties to publicly criticize the stalled policies. Party factions may also challenge Takaichi’s leadership on the grounds of the inability to effectively govern as well as the prevalence of the consensus culture with Takaichi’s hardline stances (Stockwin, 2021; Krauss Pekkanen, 2010). Therefore, the Takaichi administration is pushed towards a situation of balancing survival against effectiveness, both of which come at consequences undesirable towards the administration and Takaichi’s policy agenda.

Ultimately, the Takaichi administration highlights the precarious situation of being a minority government and the structural challenges it will face, leading to the act of “governing without governing”. The legislative and fiscal paralysis, in which Takaichi’s hardline stances largely contribute to, potential vetoes on cabinet appointments leveraged by opposition parties to undermine legitimacy, the inability to wield the dissolution threat, and a consensus culture that works against the administration all underscore the administration’s ability to be effective and stable. As a result, the administration is left with two choices: either to be cautious in all operations, limiting Takaichi’s political agenda, or follow along with the intended agenda, leading to multiple roadblocks. The structural challenges it faces stem from numbers in the Diet and compound towards larger issues in the Diet as well as Japan’s political scene.

Ultimately, this case highlights the challenges of governance for a minority government in a modified Westminster-style parliamentary system such as Japan’s. All in all, without a stable majority, Takaichi’s political agenda cannot be meaningfully and effectively enforced, while the tenure of the administration lies in a volatile state.

VII. Conclusions

The election of Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s first female leader is a critical and transformative milestone in history, particularly with aspects regarding the breaking of previous gender barriers and a new shift to hard-right policies in Japan. While it seems powerful and formative for many of the female Japanese youth today, Takaichi’s own disinterest in advancing women’s rights and gender equality presents a shadow over any hope for a new, progressive movement in the largely patriarchal society that dominates Japan (Khalil, 2025). Instead, she aims to pursue a conservative agenda, which includes focusing on intense immigration and foreign worker restriction, trying to implement an expansionary fiscal policy, and ultimately, rebuilding public trust in Japan’s politics (D’Ambrogio, 2025). Nonetheless, the fact is that the LDP largely lacks an overall influence, with the party failing to hold an outright majority in both houses of the Diet. This poses the question of how successfully and efficiently Takaichi’s policies will be implemented - ultimately, the future of Japan’s government, policy agenda, and foreign relations remains largely uncertain.

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