Not all that Glitters is Geopolitical Gold: Greenland.

Trump’s Greenland gambit has morphed from flippant musing into actual strategy. Cloaked in the rhetoric of ‘national security,’ it is an unsubtle attempt to unseat China from its position of mineral dominance. Yet this gambit is redolent of neo-imperial hubris: it risks imperilling alliances, flouts international law, and—at its core—treats acquisition as diplomacy. In seeking to mine Greenland’s riches, Trump may impoverish America’s global standing.

Published on  

July 9, 2025

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At YIP, nuanced policy briefs emerge from the collaboration of six diverse, nonpartisan students.

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I. Executive Summary

Trump’s Greenland gambit has morphed from flippant musing into actual strategy. Cloaked in the rhetoric of ‘national security,’ it is an unsubtle attempt to unseat China from its position of mineral dominance. Yet this gambit is redolent of neo-imperial hubris: it risks imperilling alliances, flouts international law, and—at its core—treats acquisition as diplomacy. In seeking to mine Greenland’s riches, Trump may impoverish America’s global standing.

II. Overview

Greenland, the world’s largest island, is caught up in a complicated multipolar battle. As the United States seeks to assert greater influence over the island, and as Russia and China keep a close watch, this brief examines the feasibility and legality of such ambitions. 

A foundational element of this analysis is that international law, unlike domestic law, lacks binding enforcement mechanisms; its authority is normative rather than coercive. This begets a question: can the growing importance of soft power make up for the law’s lack of direct force?

III. Background

Trump's Greenland obsession traces back to August 2019, when the then-president first entertained the idea of purchasing the territory from Denmark. The proposal was swiftly rebuffed, with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen dismissing it as "absurd." Yet Trump's interest never truly waned. A month prior to being sworn into the Oval Office for a second term, Trump revived his interests in obtaining ownership of Greenland, calling it "an absolute necessity." The escalation was immediate and unmistakable. Donald Trump Jr. 's January 2025 visit to Nuuk—ostensibly as a tourist but clearly serving as an advance scout—signaled the administration's seriousness. Trump wrote on Truth Social: “Greenland is an incredible place, and the people will benefit tremendously if, and when, it becomes part of our Nation.” He added, “This is a deal that must happen.”

The rhetoric continued to intensify throughout early 2025. In many ways, the hallmark of Trump’s presidency has been testing the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable discourse, making fringe propositions today's talking point. The strategy echoes Trump's broader approach to international relations: assert maximal positions, create faith through repetition, and force adversaries to submit to American terms rather than partake in mutual compromise.

By mid-March, Trump suggested to NATO's Secretary-General that the alliance might need to become involved in his annexation plans, declaring "we really need Greenland for national security. It's very important. I think that's why NATO might have to get involved in a way, because we really need Greenland for national security."

Trump’s long standing interest in Greenland is primarily due to the extraordinary mineral wealth buried beneath its ice. The territory is one of the world's largest untapped reserves of critical materials essential to modern civilization—from smartphones to military systems, electric vehicles to wind turbines.

According to Greenlandic officials, the island "possesses 39 of the 50 minerals that the United States has classified as critical to national security and economic stability." This assessment is supported by extensive geological data. The European Commission similarly notes that 25 of its 34 identified “critical raw materials” are present in Greenland—many of which are vital for batteries, wind turbines, and electric vehicles. The crown jewel of these deposits is a panoply of rare earth elements. Among these are seventeen minerals, such as neodymium, dysprosium, and lanthanum, that form the backbone of modern technology. The craggy hills surrounding the southern Greenland town of Narsaq are estimated to hold about a quarter of the world's rare earth minerals. The Kvanefjeld project alone, nestled in the Kuannersuit Plateau, represents one of the world's largest known rare earth deposits.

To appreciate the strategic significance of Trump’s goals, consider the market dynamics. Roughly 90 percent of processed rare earths come from China, creating supply-chain vulnerabilities that many countries are now trying to avoid, particularly since China announced restrictions on the export of heavy rare earths in April 2025. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Greenland has 1.5 million tons of rare-earth element reserves, which is close to the 1.8 million tons located in the United States. China, however, leads with 44 million tons of deposits, a significant bargaining chip in the event of a trade war.

This dependency creates acute vulnerabilities. The market for these minerals reached $320 billion in 2022, with demand for some elements tripling since 2017. Every electric vehicle motor, wind turbine generator, and advanced military system depends on materials that flow overwhelmingly through Chinese-controlled supply chains. For an administration focused on maintaining American primacy and countering Beijing’s influence, securing alternative supply chains is a strategic imperative. 

However, Greenland’s geological potential extends far beyond rare earths. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Arctic region has an estimated 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas. Greenland’s strategic location within this resource-rich region makes it a focus for multiple powers aiming to diversify their energy and mineral supplies.

President Trump’s motivations for acquiring Greenland lay partly in its strategic trade benefits and optimal military location, but also in its mineral resources. The convergence of geological wealth and geopolitical position creates what strategists term a "critical node"—a location whose control could shift the balance of power between competing nations.

China's Arctic engagement fuels the fire in the American calculus. Despite lacking Arctic territory, Beijing has declared itself a "near-Arctic state" and launched a charm-offensive across the region. "China really tried to approach the region as a potential partner to say that we're here to help set up joint ventures, we're here to provide potential finance for new economic endeavors," says Marc Lanteigne, a political science professor at the University of Tromso in Norway.

This engagement is far from a letter of interest. Chinese state-owned company Shenghe Resources already has more than a 12% stake in the Kvanefjeld deposit. Kvanefjeld is owned by Greenland Minerals, an Australian company, and China's Shenghe Resources is its largest shareholder and strategic partner. In late 2016, the two companies agreed that Shenghe Resources could acquire up to a 60% stake.

The potential implications of China’s actions extend beyond commercial relationships. For the United States it would be a geostrategic nightmare if China opened a mine in a remote part of Greenland, with a town, communication lines, harbor, and an airfield that could obviously be used for purposes other than resource extraction and export. Such infrastructure could provide China with powerful access to the North Atlantic, positioning it to monitor NATO maritime activities and project power into traditionally Western waters.

China has a well-developed and clearly defined national strategy for Rare Earth Elements (REE), a resource it considers "strategic," of which the Kvanefjeld project is likely to be part. This approach contrasts sharply with Western ad hoc responses to Chinese mineral dominance. Beijing views rare earth control not merely as commercial advantage but as geopolitical leverage—demonstrated by past export restrictions during diplomatic disputes.

The Arctic dimension compounds these concerns. Greenland's proximity to Arctic shipping routes means it could play a key role in managing, securing, and controlling these new trade pathways. The Northeast Passage, also known as the Northern Sea Route, is a shipping route along the Arctic coast of Russia that connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This route is growing more significant due to melting ice in the Arctic, creating permanently usable routes that can reduce transport times and costs between Europe and Asia.

Climate change has transformed Arctic geopolitics, making previously inaccessible areas navigable and exploitable. China sees the Arctic — with its shortage of infrastructure — as ripe for investment. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing offers financing and construction capabilities that cash-strapped Arctic communities find attractive, even as Western governments express concern about Chinese ulterior motives.

Greenland's strategic value transcends its mineral wealth. The territory occupies a unique position in global military geography, serving as a natural surveillance platform for Arctic activities and a potential chokepoint for trans-Atlantic maritime traffic.

Ulrik Pram Gad, senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, noted that Greenland has long been considered vital to U.S. security, particularly as a buffer against potential Russian aggression. The Northwest Passage shipping lane runs along its coast and the island is part of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, a strategic maritime region.

This triangular gap has deep historical roots. Under a 1951 defense treaty, the US received an air base located in northwest Greenland. This facility, known as the Pituffik Space Base,  monitors Arctic skies for incoming missiles and tracks satellite activities, making it integral to American ballistic missile defense systems.

"From the perspective of the Arctic, Greenland is our eyes on everything that's going on, including on the Northern Sea Route, which is controlled by Russia," Amanda Lynch, professor of earth sciences at Brown University, told NPR. This monitoring capability becomes increasingly critical as Arctic ice melts open new shipping routes and military operating areas.

The island's position also makes it central to NATO's northern flank defense. Any conflict involving Russia would likely see Greenland become a crucial staging area for reinforcements to Europe and a potential target for Russian interference with Atlantic supply lines. Control of Greenland thus represents control of critical military geography in potential great power conflicts.

Greenland is bigger than Mexico and has a sparse population of about 56,000 people. Its economy remains heavily dependent on fishing, agriculture, and financial subsidies from Denmark—an economic reliance that poses significant risks. This demographic reality creates both opportunity and vulnerability—opportunity for outside powers to offer economic alternatives, vulnerability due to limited capacity for self-defense.

Despite its strategic logic, Trump's Greenland initiative faces formidable practical obstacles. The most immediate challenge involves Greenlandic and Danish resistance, which has hardened significantly since Trump's renewed interest became apparent.

Greenland's outgoing Prime Minister Múte Egede referred to goals expressed by U.S. representatives as "provocation,” and said his caretaker government would not meet with the group. Responding to these statements, Greenlandic premier Múte Bourup Egede wrote: "Greenland is ours. We are not for sale and will never be for sale. We must not lose our long struggle for freedom".

Danish responses have been equally firm. Denmark's Frederiksen repeated her comments from 2019. Danish Minister of Defense Troels Lund Poulsen, following Trump's comments, announced an increase in spending on defense in Greenland of a "double-digit billion amount" in Krone (between $876mn and $8.7bn USD). The Danish parliament went further, with a Danish Member of the European Parliament, Anders Vistisen, stating: "Listen very carefully. Greenland has been part of the Danish kingdom for eight hundred years. It's an integrated part of our country. It is not for sale. Let me put it in words you might understand: Mr. Trump, f*** off."

Public opinion reflects this political resistance. A January 2025 YouGov poll found that nearly half of Danes view the United States as a significant threat—surpassing concerns about North Korea and Iran. Furthermore, 78% of respondents oppose the idea of selling  Greenland to the United States. Such dramatic shifts in public sentiment illustrate how Trump's approach risks transforming allies into adversaries. As democracies around the world give way to renewed populism, it is increasingly important to be in good standing with not only a country’s establishment, but also its citizens.

The legal and diplomatic obstacles of this initiative are equally daunting. While the actions suggested by Trump's statements are "effectively illegal under international law," says Julie Garey, an associate teaching professor of political science at Northeastern University, "it's really unprecedented in the 21st century for a power like the United States to be saying it's going to be doing these things and then pursue them in any meaningful way."

Even successful acquisition would face enormous practical hurdles. The concentration of rare minerals in the region's ore is relatively low—between 1% and 6%—making extraction costly. The harsh Arctic climate adds another layer of complexity, with ice floes blocking transportation during winter months and requiring complex logistical solutions to store what's mined.

"A good rare earth mine has a content of 3% to 6%, a bad one only 1%," says Flemming Getreuer Christiansen, a geoscientific consultant with experience in Greenland's mining industry. This lower concentration of the desired elements in tandem with fragile ecosystems drives up the costs of extraction and processing. Even setting these concerns aside, experts predict that large-scale mining operations for these metals are about 10 to 15 years away.

Historical precedent offers little encouragement for American commercial success in Greenland. Of the 250 companies that have been granted exploration licenses over the past several decades, only 10 have been American. Of 50 companies from various countries that have been drilling in Greenland, four were from the United States, and of the 15 companies that have applied for an exploitation license, precisely zero were American. So, historically, the U.S. fingerprint on mineral exploration in Greenland is negligible, even though the door has been open for decades.

The question of who will extract these minerals also looms. Greenland has a population of 57,000, yet just 65 were involved in mining as of 2020. The requisite experience simply isn't there. "Labor laws are much more strict than they would be in a Chinese rare earth mine in Mongolia," Lajeunesse said. "All of those things factor together to make Arctic development very expensive."

Trump's Greenland gambit has generated unprecedented strain within the Western alliance system. The spectacle of an American president threatening economic or military coercion against a NATO ally represents a fundamental departure from post-war transatlantic relations.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz rebuked Trump's expansionist remarks and said he had discussed them with other European leaders. "Borders must not be moved by force. This principle applies to every country, whether in the East or the West. In talks with our European partners, there is an uneasiness regarding recent statements from the US. It is clear: We must stand together," Scholz wrote on X (formerly Twitter).

The NATO dimension also creates particular complications. When Trump suggested NATO involvement in annexing Greenland, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg responded that he wanted to "leave that [issue] outside... I do not want to drag NATO into that.” That said, Stoltenberg expressed agreement with Trump on the need for Arctic security cooperation. This is a grim reminder of the events that led to the UK exit from the European Union, as NATO and the EU alike are not as proficient in dealing with internal discord as they are with external threats.

French foreign minister Jean-Noël Barrot warned Trump against threatening the European Union's borders. American allies now find themselves issuing warnings to Washington about respecting territorial integrity, language traditionally reserved for Russia and, more recently, China.

Canadian officials have moved from dismissive humor to serious concern. Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly wrote on X: "President-elect Trump's comments show a complete lack of understanding of what makes Canada a strong country. We will never back down in the face of threats." Canadian Finance Minister Dominic LeBlanc said, "The joke is over," adding that such rhetoric from Trump is "becoming very counterproductive."

Polling data further illustrates the depth of allied alienation. In response to Trump's statements during his second term, Danish residents issued a satirical petition for Denmark to purchase California from the United States, which went viral and attracted several hundred thousand Danish signatures. The petition parodied Trump's rhetoric as president, bearing the slogan "Make California Great Again" and vowing to "bring hygge to Hollywood, bike lanes to Beverly Hills and organic smørrebrødto every street corner."

This deterioration in alliance relationships creates strategic vulnerabilities that extend far beyond Greenland. Julie Garey notes that NATO membership comes with clear advantages for its member nations and for the international order as we know it. "In political science and international relations, we understand, as we do with human engagement, that when states have this shared forum for discussion and debate and issue resolution, they are typically less likely to go to war with one another."

Speaking for the Russian Federation, Dmitry Peskov declared the Arctic "a zone of our national interests" and indicated Russia's opposition to changes in the status quo. The prospect of an American-dominated Greenland unsurprisingly brewed consternation in Moscow.

Russia controls the Northeast Passage shipping route along its Arctic coast, giving it significant leverage over trans-Arctic commerce. Any American consolidation of control over Greenland would potentially challenge this dominance by providing alternative routes for NATO forces.

The Russian reaction also highlights the broader geopolitical implications of Trump's gambit. By pursuing territorial expansion in the Arctic, the United States risks legitimizing similar claims by other powers, potentially destabilizing the entire regional order. Moscow could use American precedent to justify its own territorial ambitions, whether in the Arctic or in its invasion of Ukraine.

Despite the challenges surrounding territorial acquisition, alternative approaches exist that could address American strategic concerns while preserving alliance relationships. The European Union and the United States have signed mining agreements with Greenland, effectively creating frameworks for resource access without sounding the bells of sovereignty.

China has expressed interest in a similar deal, but current geopolitical tensions place it at a disadvantage. Some Greenlandic politicians have floated the idea of a special association, similar to the one the US has with the Marshall Islands, where Greenland has sovereignty but also financial support from the US, in exchange for agreements on certain US strategic interests. This model could address American security concerns while respecting Greenlandic self-determination.

Such arrangements could provide the United States with enhanced access to Greenlandic resources and strategic positioning without the diplomatic costs of territorial acquisition. They would also align with international law and democratic principles, saving what is left of America's moral authority in global affairs, which stands tainted from its perfunctoriness in addressing the bloodbath in Gaza.

Rather than confrontational acquisition, strategic partnerships offer more viable approaches. Amanda Lynch suggests it would be more productive for the U.S. to pursue strong partnerships and support sovereign governments. " If we're positive actors in that space,” she says, “then I think that that's both the more positive and also the more likely path forward.”

The financial requirements for developing Greenlandic mineral resources present substantial challenges that pure market forces struggle to salvage. The growing demand and geopolitical fervor around rare earths could make Greenland irresistible for mining companies, regardless of the logistical challenges. Both Exner-Pirot, of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and Lajeunesse, the public policy expert, project that Western powers could intervene aggressively in the market.

Like China’s state-sponsored rare earth industry, the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the European Union—which forged a strategic partnership with Greenland in 2023 to develop critical raw materials—could collaborate to ensure a steady supply of minerals essential to modern militaries, consumer electronics, and the energy transition.

In other words, successful development of Greenlandic resources may require the kind of long-term state investment that the invisible hand in market economies typically resist. China's dominance in rare earth processing stems from its willingness to subsidize strategically important industries, even when they operate at losses for extended periods.

Significant long-term strategic state or supra-state support is required to challenge Chinese dominance of the REE sector and reduce the vulnerability of European and American energy supplies. In the absence of REE industries in Europe or America, the two REE projects in South Greenland, with their potential to become significant suppliers of REE, will most likely supply Chinese-controlled raw material industries.

Environmental considerations add another dimension to the Greenland equation. 

This unresolved and latent angst has cast a shadow of uncertainty over Greenland's investment climate. "Today, the political risk in Greenland is considered to be higher than in many African countries," says Christiansen. The Arctic University's Vidal notes that while Greenland generally offers a stable environment for companies, the rare earth mining situation has proved to be an exception.

Environmental organizations, including Urani Naamik (No to Uranium, Greenland), NOAH (Friends of the Earth Denmark), Avataq, The Ecological Council, Sustainable Energy and Nuup Kangerluata Ikinnguta, met the Kvanefjeld project with substantial opposition. This reflects genuine concerns about Arctic ecosystem fragility and the long-term environmental costs of large-scale mining operations.

The possibility of a referendum on uranium mining has been widely debated. Based on a survey conducted by WWF Denmark, "the Greenlandic population is fairly evenly split over the question of whether to allow the mining of uranium, however with a slight majority in favour." Any mining initiative must, therefore, steer through the dichotomy of economic development and environmental protection.

Amid the great power competition over Greenland's future, the voices of Greenlanders themselves are often drowned out. Greenland still relies on a roughly $500 million annual grant from Denmark, which has proved a major sticking point to independence.

This raises interesting questions about Greenland's future options. "What would Greenland do if Trump offered, say, $1 billion a year to have a different kind of association?" asks Klaus Dodds, a geopolitical expert. As we noted earlier, some Greenlandic politicians have been floating the idea of a special association, similar to the one the US has with the Marshall Islands, where Greenland maintains its sovereignty and receives financial support from the US in exchange for agreements on certain strategic interests.

The Greenlandic government has been looking to boost its independence by diversifying its economy away from fishing. It opened a new airport in Nuuk in November as part of plans to increase tourism. These efforts reflect legitimate aspirations for autarky and political autonomy that any external engagement must respect.

Before Vance’s visit to Greenland that almost led to a complete breakdown in diplomatic relations, it appeared that Greenland was at least slightly interested in partnering with the US. Kuno Fencker, a member of the parliament in Greenland, said months prior that a COFA with the United States and Denmark was possible, stating that "Greenland's economy needs to be diversified ... So Donald Trump Junior, and even his father and other (members of the incoming) administration from the US are extremely welcome here in Greenland as visitors ... and also maybe more officially in the future."

By March, the tone had completely changed. On March 14, 2025, leaders of all five parties in the Inatsisartut issued a joint statement rejecting Trump's repeated comments about annexation. This unity across party lines is but a testament to the fact that while Greenlanders may be open to symbiotic relationships with various powers, they remain committed to self-determination.

IV. Historical Parallels

Trump's Greenland initiative fits within what some advisors describe as a "Monroe Doctrine 2.0." This concept extrapolates the 19th-century American assertion of hemispheric influence for 21st-century realities, making up not just the Western Hemisphere but strategic territories like Greenland that fall well outside its historical purview.

National security advisor Mike Waltz, and others close to President Trump, suggest that legislation adjacent to the Monroe Doctrine is imminent. This framework would see the United States wielding control over  a sphere of influence that includes Greenland, the Panama Canal, and possibly Canada as a 51st state.

The difficulty with this approach is that it plays right to the Chinese argument that they, too, have a sphere of influence— most of the Pacific. By legitimizing spheres of influence as acceptable international behavior, the United States risks undermining the rules-based international order it helped create and has long championed.

This represents a fundamental shift in American foreign policy philosophy. On a deeper level, Trump's threats of war and annexation speak to a way of thinking about power in the world that goes back to the nineteenth century—power through territorial conquest—and turns away from modern US strategy, where emphasis has been more on soft power rather than the use of brute force. The invasion of Iraq was admittedly an outlier, and so is the one brewing in the Middle East today.

V. Looking Forward

Scenario One: This outcome, while legally and diplomatically challenging, will provide the United States with direct control over Greenlandic resources. However, it would likely come at enormous cost to alliance relationships and international legitimacy. The precedent would encourage other powers like China to pursue territorial expansion and Russia to justify the one it’s currently embroiled in: Ukraine.

Scenario Two: A more likely positive outcome involves expanded cooperation agreements that provide American access to Greenlandic resources and strategic facilities without territorial transfer. This approach would address security concerns while preserving alliance relationships and respecting Greenlandic autonomy.

Scenario Three: Continued pressure for territorial acquisition could permanently damage relationships with Denmark and other NATO allies, potentially leading to reduced cooperation on Arctic security and mineral development. This would leave the field open for Chinese or Russian influence while diminishing American strategic position.  This represents perhaps the worst outcome—costs without benefits.

Scenario Four: The status quo remains unchanged. Positions are held as they are.

For Greenland, the challenge involves leveraging its strategic position for maximum benefit while maintaining autonomy. The territory has the enviable advantage of, should it wish to do, diversifying partnerships with multiple powers so that it can reap handsome benefits from them all, rather than depending on one.

VI. Conclusion

As the Arctic thaws and rivals rise, U.S. power should prove that it still derives not from coercion but consensus. Strategic heft lies not in annexing territory but in anchoring alliances. To forfeit soft power for short-term gains is to trade a compass for a cudgel. If Washington wishes to lead in a multipolar, mineral-hungry world, it will be better off choosing persuasion over provocation. Greenland is in many ways a mirror that prods the American establishment to reflect on  whether America should remain a builder of coalitions or morph into a caricature of the hegemons it once famously and obstinately opposed.

Policy Brief Authors

Sanjay Karthikeyan

Foreign Policy Lead

Sanjay Karthikeyan is the Foreign Policy Lead at the Institute and a law student at LSE. He cut his teeth writing for the Institute as a high school student.

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