In all the coverage of the war in Iran since February 28th, one superpower has been noticeably absent from the conversation: China. The United States and China occupy perhaps the most important bilateral relationship of this century, and this conflict has the power to stress-test and reshape that dynamic. If the cards are played right, a U.S. war with Iran could and should expose a rare opening for an unprecedented era of cooperation between the U.S. and China. 

The reality of globalization is the creation of energy interdependence that automatically transforms any U.S.-Iran conflict with the U.S.-China issue. Nearly 80% of oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz goes to Asia, which includes approximately half of China’s oil imports.  China is the largest purchaser of Iranian crude oil. China has also invested heavily in Iranian infrastructure and long-term development through the Belt and Road Initiative. It is through this level of diplomatic engagement that China has fostered influence in Iran. Threats to the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor are not abstract. They carry direct economic consequences for Beijing. There are high stakes for China here, meaning there is potential for an escalation of the conflict between these two superpowers if instinct defaults towards the rivalry rather than clear-eyed strategy.  

Under the current U.S. presidential administration, geopolitical and ideological tensions in the Sino-American relationship are taut. When considering the conflict in Iran, it is imperative to think of the long-term goals of the U.S.-Chinese relations. Both are competing for global hegemony.⁹Iran can become a de facto battleground for that struggle, or a chance to merge interests. Unless these strategic rivals can traverse this narrow opportunity to define a new world order together, Iran will inevitably be pushed towards aligning with one side; tipping the scale undesirably. For U.S. interests, this could mean pushing Iran further into China’s orbit, deepening existing geopolitical divides. Efforts to circumvent the U.S. dollar in energy transactions could accelerate, gradually weakening a cornerstone of American economic influence. 

Do not mistake this discussion as a promotion of continued U.S. involvement in Iran and the Middle East–conflict is not how I would have pursued improving Sino-American affairs. Yet it is the circumstance that we are operating under. It is imperative to take advantage of what is an otherwise objectionable situation to create lasting, positive relations. 

Neither country can afford prolonged disruption, regardless of politics. This is not about ideology, it is about shared vulnerability to instability in the Middle East region. Admittedly, there is alignment on outcomes for stability but not on motivation, methods or leadership. It would behoove ambassadors and international security ranking members to explore this unprecedented possibility for partnership. Globalization requires looking at all angles, even the improbable, for creative solutions. 

China’s multilateral role in brokering April 7th’s ceasefire is a critical first step, demonstrating that cooperation might not be far-fetched. In practice, bilateral actions would not take the form of a formal alliance, we’re away from that. Instead, it would be a part of establishing a framework for improved relations. It would likely look like rather parallel efforts to stabilize the region through coordinated diplomatic pressure on Iran to avoid disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, backchannel communication to prevent miscalculation, and mutual restraint in military posturing. It will be difficult but worthwhile for China to walk the line between supporting their ally, Iran, and protecting their own interests of economic security in the region. 

In this crisis, where the effects have global reach, cooperation is not idealistic nor naive. It is practical. This conflict with Iran may not bring Washington and Beijing together by design. But it may leave them with little choice. Even manufactured crises have a way of exposing interdependence in stark terms. In that constraint lies a possibility that neither side can afford to ignore. 

References

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Bradsher, Keith, and Farnaz Fassihi. 2026. “China Pressed Iran toward Cease-Fire, Iranian Officials Say.” The New York Times, April 8, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/08/world/asia/china-iran-cease-fire.html. 

Brown, Kerry, and Shefali Shah. 2025. “US-China Relations under Trump 2.0 Reset or Restart?” https://www.kcl.ac.uk/lci/assets/2025/us-china-relations-under-trump-2.0.pdf. 

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Fourreau, Valentine. 2026. “Infographic: China Is the Biggest Buyer of Iranian Oil.” Statista Daily Data. Statista. March 9, 2026. https://www.statista.com/chart/35945/countries-that-buy-oil-from-iran/. 

Garcia, Zenel, and Ali Oskrouchi. 2025. “Beyond Geopolitics: The Domestic Drivers of China-Iran Cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative.” Thediplomat.com. The Diplomat. May 22, 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/beyond-geopolitics-the-domestic-drivers-of-china-iran-c ooperation-on-the-belt-and-road-initiative/. 

Gore, D’Angelo. 2026. “How Iran Blocking the Strait of Hormuz Affects the U.S. - FactCheck.org.” FactCheck.org. March 13, 2026. https://www.factcheck.org/2026/03/how-iran-blocking-the-strait-of-hormuz-affects-the-u s/

Medeiros, Evan. 2026. “A New and Dangerous Era for US-China Ties.” Globalaffairs.org. February 19, 2026. https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/new-and-dangerous-era-us-china-ties. 

Prétat, Harrison, Monica Sato, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Matthew P Funaiole. 2026. “No One, Not Even Beijing, Is Getting through the Strait of Hormuz.” Csis.org. March 6, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-one-not-even-beijing-getting-through-strait-hormuz

Rolland, Nadège. China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017. 

Tugendhat, Henry. 2026. “China’s Middle East Ties Go Far beyond Iran.” The Washington Institute. 2026. 

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/chinas-middle-east-ties-go-far-beyond-iran