I. Introduction 

Autonomous warfare systems are the weapons which once activated can identify selected targets and engage without human interference. Using artificial intelligence and sensor-based navigation, these systems provide greater accuracy, simplified logistics, precision strikes, and reduced risks of friendly-fire incidents. Their low cost-to-benefit ratio, military effectiveness, adaptability, and reduced collateral damage have attracted militaries all over the world. 

While earlier autonomous warfare systems used to require close human oversight and interference, modern militaries increase autonomy in weapons for efficiency, precision and avoiding personnel damage.  

Today, loitering munitions are used against radar systems, armored vehicles, tanks, troop convoys, and the protection of personnel. They can be launched from ground, aerial and naval platforms.  

II. History of Loitering Munitions 

The concept of loitering munitions emerged when the Israeli military recognized the threats posed by the Syrian air-defense systems. During the Vietnam War, the United States ultimately lost more than 2,000 aircrafts to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). This demonstrated the need for more effective defensive capabilities. Earlier US projects, like the AGM-136 Tacit Rainbow, were ultimately unsuccessful. 

Israel’s IAI Mini Harpy became the first successful loitering munition, significantly helping the military in suspension-of-enemy air-defense (SEAD) missions against the Syrian SAMs. As a fire-and-forget munition, Harpy could loiter over an area, search autonomously for targets, and attack. Loitering munitions served as cheap alternatives to destroy SAMs without any human personnel risks. 

However, loitering munitions only accelerated in prevalence in the 2010s, with the development of better sensors and smaller drone sizes. Israel unveiled IAI Harop in 2009, and the US unveiled its first loitering munitions in AeroVironment Switchblade 300 in 2011. Other countries soon followed.

III. Military Effectiveness 

On October 13th, 2024, two Mirsad-1 drones were launched by Hezbollah from Lebanon. One of the drones was intercepted, but the other was able to bypass Israel’s Iron Dome system and hit the Golani Brigade near the town of Binyamin, killing 4 IDF soldiers, injuring 61 military personnel, and severely injuring 7 personnel.  

Hezbollah in a statement described the attack as “complex” and using “squadrons of various drones.”  

On October 22nd, 2024, in another drone attack, Hezbollah targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s holiday home in that coastal city of Caesarea, the drone striking a bedroom window. Due to his absence, no casualties occurred. 

Despite having one of the strongest and most advanced defense systems, the Iron Dome’s failures to intercept drones and provide warning sirens have raised questions among military experts of the overall effectiveness of the system.

This is not the first incident in which loitering munitions defeated air defense systems: previously during the Syrian Civil War, Israel used IAI Harop to destroy the Pantsir S-1 (SA-22) system.   

During the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh War, the use of unmanned combat vehicles was employed extensively by the Azerbaijani military. Azerbaijan used Bayraktar UCAVs as well as Israeli loitering munitions vastly. On October 9th, 2020, Azerbaijan used IAI Harop to destroy a Russian-made air defense system being used by Armenia. IAI Harop was also used to strike Armenian tanks, radar systems, and electronic warfare systems.  

The use of drones and its benefits for Azerbaijan during the War attracted experts and militaries worldwide. Their usefulness was also praised by the government of Azerbaijan. A foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev praised IAI Harop as “very effective.”  

However, no conflict has seen kamikaze drones used as widely as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War.  

IV. Cost Effective 

The relatively low costs of loitering munitions have rendered them capable of being utilized in swarm attacks, as a cost-effective alternative to traditional missiles. Iranian HESA Shahed 136s are low-cost, less deadly loitering munitions costing around $50,000 per piece. This makes them easy to be used in swarms against targets of far greater value. According to analyst Samuel Bendett, the cheap price makes defending against these drones "stressful" and "expensive."  

Russia has used Shaheds extensively in Ukraine. According to leaked documents, Russia paid $1.75 billion in gold for 6000 shaheed drones, which brings down the price per drone at approximately $193,000. The Kalibr cruise missile, in contrast, which Russian has also widely used in the war, costs $1 million per piece. 

An OSINT analysis by Molfar found that between September 13 and October 17, 2022 Ukraine shot down one-hundred sixty-one Shahed-136 drones, one Shahed-129 and four Mohajer-6 drones, which ultimately cost Ukrainian forces more than $28 million.  

Ukraine, in response, has been using US-made Switchblade 300s and 600s in massive quantities. The Switchblade 300 costs roughly $6000, which is significantly cost-effective. During the Wars in Syria and Afghanistan, the US military has extensively used hellfire missiles raining down from predator or reaper UCAVs. The price of the switch blade is a fraction of a hellfire missile, which costs around $150,000, each excluding the cost to make the reaper or predator remain airborne. This makes using Switchblades more cost-effective than a reaper or predator.

Russia is also using domestic ZALA Lancet loitering munitions, priced around $35,000, to destroy Western equipment such as Leopard 2 Tanks and a Caesar Self-Propelled Howitzer. 

V. Conclusion 

Because of their small size and low weight, many loitering munitions are man-portable and some can even be carried in backpacks.

Systems like the AeroVironment Switchblade 300 Block 20, Uvision Hero Series 30/90/120, Elbit SkyStriker, IAI Harop, IAI Rotem, STM Kargu and Alpagu are man-portable and can easily be launched from a canister or rocket-assisted take off. These systems do not require much maintenance and can easily be locally produced.  

The low cost of maintenance and localised productions makes countries less dependent on the international supply chain. These systems can be launched from aerial, ground and naval platforms and provide real-time data, pinpointing their value in modern warfare.  

VI. References

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 What to know about Shahed-136 drones, which Iran used against Israel. (2024, April 16). Washingtonpost.com.                                      https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/16/iran-israel-drone-attack-shahed-136/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIf%20you%20can%20get%20your,specific%20military%20or%20civilian%20targets. 

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Dilanian, K., De Luce, D., & Kube, C. (2022, March 15). Biden admin will provide Ukraine with killer drones called Switchblades. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/ukraine-asks-biden-admin-armed-drones-jamming-gear-surface-air-missile-rcna20197 

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