The Yemen Crisis
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In July 2025, the Houthis, an Iran-aligned militia group controlling Yemen, started threatening to attack vessels crossing the Red Sea, which are linked with Israel, demanding Israel end its invasion and lift the blockade on Gaza. Previously, the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea caused severe economic losses. Yet, the ferocity of the Houthis’ harassment of vessels led to an international intervention, led by the United States and the United Kingdom. Eventually, the United States and Houthis brokered a ceasefire that ended the Houthis’ attacks.
Now that the ceasefire has been signed, the Houthis will seek new reasons to remain important in the region. Either the Houthis will resume internal conflicts with the Yemen government, restart their attacks against Saudi Arabia, or find a new reason to disrupt global shipping lanes.
However, attacking the Saudi Arabia or the Yemen government could lead to a loss of regional neutrality, which the Gulf countries sustain toward the Houthis after their failed intervention in 2016. On the other hand, a resumption of attacks in the Red Sea could again disrupt global trade and Saudi tourism along the west coast.
The Red Sea serves as one of the most crucial routes in international maritime trade. Connecting the Suez Canal to the Bab al Mandeb Strait, the 2,250 km (1,400 mi) long canal forms a significant choke point at the strait, where its width is reduced to 26 km. Nearly 12% of global maritime trade and 30% of global containerised trade transits through the Red Sea, carrying goods valued at over one trillion dollars annually. In 2019, roughly one billion tonnes of cargo and 19,000 ships passed through the Red Sea.
Due to sanctions imposed by the United States and European countries on Russia, the Red Sea is experiencing a substantial increase in oil and energy trade. The northbound trade increased as Europe began importing oil from the Middle East to replace its domestic gas. From 2020 to 2023, this trade increased by 60%.
The southbound trade also increased as sanctions reduced the price of Russian oil, making it more attractive to Asian nations. India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia increased their imports of oil and gas from Russia to generate electricity, store, or re-export, a nearly 75% increase in Russian cargo. The total energy flow rose to 4.5 billion cubic feet per day. iii
In November 2023, Houthis started using a combination of missiles and loitering munitions to target merchant ships. They call it a response to the Israeli invasion of Gaza. They attacked over 90 merchant ships, took control of one, and sank two vessels. iv
The French shipping company CMA CGM, the Taiwanese shipping company Evergreen, the German shipping company Hapag Lloyd, Japan's biggest shipping company NIPPON YUSEN, two of the world’s biggest shipping companies, the Danish MAERSK, Geneva MSC, and many others, suspended most Red Sea route trade and rerouted the vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. v
These attacks threatened international maritime commerce and diverted trade routes from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, thereby increasing shipping costs and creating an imbalance in global trade. Rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope increased the distance by 6000 km, adding 10 days to delivery time and raising shipping costs by $1 million per round trip from Asia to Europe. vi
The volume of trade through the Red sea in first quarter of 2014 saw a reduction of more than 50%, a drop from 5 million metric tonnes in December, 2023 to 2 million metric tonnes by March, 2024 while the volume of trade around the cape of good hope increased from 4.41 million tonnes in December, 2023 to 7.5 million metric tonnes by March, 2024. Sub-Saharan African ports recorded a 6.7% year-over-year decrease in port calls, while the Middle East, Central Asia, and the European Union recorded 5.3% reductions. vii
In May 2025, the Houthis and the United States finally reached a peace deal mediated by Oman. The United States agreed to cease attacking the Houthis' territory, an intervention that has been widely debated due to civilian casualties. The Houthis, in turn, agreed to cease attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea. However, the Houthis' spokesperson made it clear that the deal does not protect ships bound for or associated with Israel, leading to a tense standstill in the crisis. viii
The annual report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen documented 25 attacks on maritime vessels conducted by Houthis in 2025 in collaboration with the Al-Shabaab group in Somalia. Nine of the twenty-five ships that were assaulted at sea were commerce ships.
A planted explosive device destroyed the MV Cordelia Moon (IMO 9297888), the crew of the MV Galaxy Leader (IMO 9237307) was taken hostage who were freed later, and three ships, the MV Eternity C (IMO 9588249), MV Magic Seas (IMO 9736169), and MV Sounion (IMO 9312145) were sunk by the attacks. While the attacks on the MV Minervagracht (IMO 9571521) suggest Houthis are developing efficiency in targeting even fast-moving ships, this raises greater concern. ix
The Houthis understand the importance of the Red Sea trade and how they can hold the world hostage and get a wider recognition as an independent actor in the region, rather than being considered just an Iranian proxy. The Israeli, US, and UK attacks against Houthis have reduced their strength, weapon arsenal, and technical capabilities, but the threat still looms over the Red Sea.
The attacks will also threaten the port city of Jeddah and the Red Sea tourism sector, which Saudi Arabia is promoting to increase tourism revenue as an alternative to oil revenues.