South Asia’s debate on China is often trapped between two extremes. One side presents China as a dangerous power using debt, ports, and infrastructure to dominate smaller countries. The other side presents China as an unavoidable development partner that brings roads, bridges, energy, trade, and investment when others hesitate. Both views are incomplete. The real issue is not whether South Asia should accept or reject China. The real issue is whether South Asian states can negotiate with China from a position of strength.

China is now too important for South Asian policymakers to ignore. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has become a major investor, lender, builder, and diplomatic actor across the Global South. In 2025, Chinese BRI engagement reached record levels, with $128.4 billion in construction contracts and $85.2 billion in investment. Since 2013, cumulative BRI engagement has reached about $1.399 trillion, including construction contracts and non-financial investments.

This matters for South Asia because the region needs infrastructure. Roads, ports, power plants, industrial zones, railways, digital systems, and energy networks are essential for growth. Many South Asian countries also face fiscal pressure, weak domestic capital markets, and limited access to affordable long-term financing. China has filled a significant part of this gap. Pakistan’s CPEC, Sri Lanka’s port and urban projects, Bangladesh’s bridges and energy projects, Nepal’s connectivity ambitions, and the Maldives’ infrastructure expansion all show China’s presence in different forms.

But infrastructure is rarely only economic. It creates political dependency, debt obligations, environmental consequences, and strategic anxiety. A port can support trade, but it can also raise security concerns. A power project can reduce energy shortages, but it can also create long-term repayment pressure. A road can connect markets, but it can also damage communities if land, labor, and environmental standards are weak. The problem is not Chinese financing alone. The problem is weak negotiation, poor transparency, and limited public oversight.

South Asia should also avoid the lazy language of “debt-trap diplomacy.” Serious research has challenged the idea that China always lends with the goal of seizing assets. A 2026 report on China’s engagement in South Asia noted that there is no hard evidence that Beijing has used predatory lending in a systematic way to extract concessions or seize assets in countries such as Nepal, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. But rejecting the debt-trap slogan does not mean ignoring real risks. Debt distress, secrecy, elite capture, cost overruns, weak feasibility studies, and geopolitical leverage remain serious concerns.

Sri Lanka’s crisis is a reminder that debt problems are usually multi-causal. They involve domestic mismanagement, tax policy, corruption, foreign borrowing, tourism shocks, global interest rates, and creditor behavior. Still, the crisis showed how external debt can reduce sovereignty when repayment pressure becomes overwhelming. Pakistan’s repeated balance-of-payments problems also show that infrastructure-led growth is fragile when exports, taxation, and governance do not improve at the same speed.

For smaller South Asian states, the greatest weakness is that they often negotiate alone. China primarily negotiates with each country on a bilateral basis. India, the United States, Japan, and multilateral lenders also engage countries separately. This gives external powers more leverage than the region itself. South Asia has people, markets, geography, ports, minerals, labor, and strategic location. But it lacks collective bargaining power.

The solution is not anti-China politics. It is smarter governance. South Asian governments should publish major infrastructure contracts, conduct independent debt-sustainability reviews, require parliamentary scrutiny for large foreign-funded projects, and apply clear environmental and labor standards. They should also create regional guidelines for strategic infrastructure, especially ports, energy corridors, digital networks, and transport routes.

BIMSTEC can play a practical role here. Its 2025 Bangkok Summit adopted the Bangkok Vision 2030 and emphasized a more “prosperous, resilient, and open” region. It also advanced maritime transport cooperation and disaster management commitments. These areas are directly connected to infrastructure governance. If BIMSTEC wants to be more than a diplomatic forum, it should help create regional standards for connectivity, climate-resilient infrastructure, and transparent financing.

South Asia should not choose between China and the West as if it has no agency. The region’s future will be shaped by how well it negotiates with all major powers. China can be a development partner. It can also be a source of dependency if governments are careless. The difference will depend less on Beijing’s ambition and more on South Asia’s own institutions.

The region does not need bloc politics. It needs bargaining power, transparency, and regional coordination. In a world of great-power competition, weak states are pressured. Smart states negotiate. South Asia must learn to negotiate together.