The topic of North Korean denuclearization has remained one of the most pressing topics on the international level. The threat of nuclear weapons to our entire existence as humans is a threat that cannot be stressed enough. This threat extends past us as individual countries to each person. Therefore, denuclearization is a topic that must be addressed, especially in highly unstable and aggressive regimes like North Korea. North Korean denuclearization can be achieved by addressing the self preservationist fears of North Korea through a process of economic aid and military de-escalation. 

Before denuclearization can be addressed, it is important to understand the survivalist mindset of the current North Korean regime. North Korea prioritizes its military over the welfare of its citizens because of the perceived threat from foreign nations to its sovereignty (Cited One). The heavy investment into the military derives itself from the core North Korean principle of “Juche” which translates to self-reliance (Cited Two). North Korea fears any foreign intervention in its affairs and the best way to prevent that, through its regime’s eyes, is via military build-up. However, this North Korean principle has become the very reason that North Korea remains an isolated state. Since 2006, the UN security council has imposed numerous sanctions on North Korea because of its nuclear program (Cited Three). As part of the UN charter, all member states in the UN must comply with these sanctions. These sanctions make it impossible for North Korea to form international relations and add an international driver to the weak North Korean economy and the demise of the North Korean people. 

When considering North Korean nuclear disarmament, one central question must be answered: What is the extent of North Korea’s survivalist mindset? In other words, can North Korea’s rigidness on Juche be reduced with proper international action? To answer this question, one can look for lessons in past treaties with North Korea. In 1994, North Korea and the U.S. signed a nuclear agreement. The provisions of the treaty were that the U.S. would provide North Korea with light water reactors, fuel aid, and assurances against nuclear weapons usage. In return, North Korea would end its nuclear program by a set date. Additionally, both countries would open diplomatic offices in each other's capitals and work towards better relations. (Cited Four). This framework had numerous benefits. First, worked to recover the North Korean economy with critical energy aid, as North Korea lacks its own energy resources. Second, it would have allowed North Korea to form better relations with other countries, as the isolationism of North Korea is a primary reason for its withering economy and survivalist mindset. Finally, the regular assurances by the U.S. would have relieved North Korea’s survivalist nature resulting from Juche. If this treaty had succeeded, tensions between North and South Korea would have been significantly reduced, paving the way for reunification. However, this treaty was a failure, with a uranium program being discovered in North Korea in 2002, nullifying the treaty (Cited 5). 

At first glance, the failure of the 1994 treaty seems to be entirely North Korea’s fault. However, the U.S. had also failed to meet its end of the agreement. The light water reactors were extremely behind schedule, the U.S. did not provide North Korea with assurances against nuclear usage, and the U.S. did not normalize relations as it continued to impose sanctions on North Korea (Cited Six). Essentially, North Korea’s disobedience towards the treaty likely resulted from the U.S.’s failure to meet the conditions under which North Korea had agreed to nuclear disarmament. 

Drawing on an understanding of North Korea and past lessons, the most plausible path to disarmament would be to create a treaty that addresses North Korea’s central fear— violation of its sovereignty. Juche is the reason North Korea is the way it is. Faced with a weak economy, the only way it ensures its survival is through an arms buildup. These factors were  addressed in the 1994 agreement. Therefore, to achieve North Korean denuclearization, the principles of the 1994 agreement must be reflected, with updates to mirror the current situation. First, North Korea’s self-preservationist fears must be addressed. The main military opponent of North Korea is the United States, which supports South Korea by stationing troops in the demilitarized zone and providing access to its nuclear stockpile. In a new agreement, the U.S. would have to remove these troops along with providing the formal reassurances detailed in the 1994 agreement. Such actions would alleviate some of the fears of the North Korean regime. However, these actions would not be enough. North Korea would also need help rebuilding its crippled economy, therefore the fuel aid and light water reactors from the 1994 agreement would be critical to a new agreement. Additionally, food aid would also be necessary, as North Korea has experienced multiple waves of food scarcity since 1994 (Cited Seven). Finally, international sanctions would have to be gradually lifted to reduce the current hostility and further aid the North Korean economy. Such provisions are necessary for North Korea to disarm, as without a stable economy, North Korea will continue to fear its sovereignty being easily violated. In return for these provisions, North Korea would be mandated to gradually end its nuclear program, with regular inspections. Overall, the framework would be very similar to 1994, with a few updates, as North Korean’s mindset of Juche has remained relatively consistent.

Now, while this article has provided a general framework, negotiations might not be as easy as they were in 1994. The current regime of Kim Jong Un is much more rash and military-focused than that of previous regimes, meaning it may not be as willing to disarm as previous regimes were. Still, analyzing the North Korean ideology and applying past lessons is essential in achieving North Korean nuclear disarmament.