EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Four years after the United Kingdom’s historic break from the European Union, the effects of Brexit have rippled far beyond borders, reshaping political landscapes and economic realities in ways both foreseen and unforeseen. Whilst the numbers tell one story, the real tale lies in the flame of populism that Brexit has kindled—a fire now steering democracies across the globe. This brief uncovers the profound implications of Brexit, not just for the UK and the EU, but for the future of political messaging worldwide.

OVERVIEW

Relevance

          The withdrawal of the UK from the EU has led to several detrimental effects on the British economy. London Mayor Sadiq Khan, a member of the then opposition but now ruling Labour Party (which also supported the Brexit deal albeit a softer one) has called on the new Starmer government to construct stronger ties with the EU as the UK grapples with rising living costs that trample the lives of its citizens. The economy has produced, thus far, 4% less than what it would have had it been a member of the EU. In the wake of growing outcry, Prime Minister Starmer vowed to make better what he calls a ‘botched Brexit deal.’ Beyond Britain’s borders, Brexit has intensified Euroscepticism across several nations under the EU, most strikingly in France, Greece and Spain in addition to the United Kingdom. It has prodded other member states to mull about similar referendums, with Germany in particular facing euroscepticism at a dangerous level. Several German and Danish political figures on the radical right (within the EU) have advocated for a Brexit replication. It seems that Brexit has had a  huge impact on other European nations as the preponderance of Eurosceptic leaders such as Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, and Matteo Salvini has seen an uptick within many EU countries. This could push more EU nations to rethink their positions vis the shared umbrella. 

    Further exacerbating friction within EU member states is the ongoing war in Ukraine. Countries such as Germany and France, two of the EU’s biggest contributors, are increasingly discontent with an EU consensus that mandates sanctions and even embargoes on goods and services originating from Russia in a bid to support Ukraine. As two of the largest economies in the EU, this hurts them the most. 

     Pivoting to the American political arena, President Trump had explicitly supported Nigel Farage, the leader of what is often dubbed the ‘Brexit Party,’ the Reform UK. The two even posted a selfie together that took the internet by storm - after Trump was sworn in as US President in November 2016. 

   Trump’s penchant for Brexit is lucid in some of his flagship policies that mirror the underlying principle of UK’s Brexit i.e strident emphasis on national sovereignty rather than on multinational unions. For instance, Trump directed the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a twelve-country, Asia-focused trade agreement the United States had championed under the Barack Obama administration. In 2020, he also pulled the USA out of the World Health Organisation (WHO), which was later annulled by his successor President Biden in 2021. 

   If Trump wins the upcoming 2024 Presidential election, his administration could limit American intervention and engagement with the EU via NATO. According to his former National Security Advisor, Trump would try to get the USA out of NATO during his tenure as president. Trump seems to endorse the notion that the US need not be bogged down in a medley of crises across the pond. His ‘pullout from NATO’ policy could take the form of a partial reduction or total elimination of aid to both Ukraine and Israel, although the latter is unlikely given the great grip of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a Pro-Israeli lobby group, over the US Congress. 

   On the global chessboard, Brexit has also emboldened Russia and China against the West. As internal divisions appear to be rife in the EU, Russian and Chinese forces see Brexit as a portent for them to sway more individual EU states to their side, best evidenced by Italy’s increasingly oscillating position with China and the EU. After vowing to withdraw from the infamous Belt and Road initiative promoted by Beijing, Meloni seems to have taken a U-turn in her quest for closer ties with Beijing. 

   As for the EU at large, the seemingly never-ending contributions to a protracted war in Ukraine in tandem with plummeting economic growth, has pushed citizens to seek refuge in the camps of increasingly radical leaders who promise hope and lean to the right. This could foment and validate more anti-EU qualms as nations veer toward nationalism. Indeed, eerily similar to how Brexit unfolded.        

 HISTORY 

Brexit, or “British Exit”, was the result of several causes, all of which lead to one main root: discontent. The mishandling of issues such as immigration and the United Kingdom’s (UK) 2008 recession riled up political tensions. Britons held concerns over British vulnerability as well; EU combined power has historically been a global voice in international affairs.  Left-leaning parties like the Labor Party and Liberal Democratic parties generally leaned towards ‘remain’ but did not actively speakout against Brexit, At one point, then Labour Party spokesman but now leader Keir Starmer had called for a softer version of the Brexit that the Conservatives proposed. 

   The controversy was not split evenly within parties. The intimate issues of the future deal brought conflicts of opinion within parties. For example, the Labor Party’s Starmer (later leader) argued in 2016 that immigration needed to be curbed by the Brexit deal; something the Labor Party Leader, Jeremy Corbyn, had claimed months earlier, was “not an objective”. The Conservative party seems to have capitalized on the willingness of the voters to push for the ‘leave’ deal, with Conservative leaders such as Boris Johnson, running for Prime Minister to champion British independence and the sovereign right to control trade. More specifically, conservatives promulgated Euroscepticism: a political doctrine that advocates against ‘succumbing’ to the powers of the EU and supports disengagement from the union overall. Euroscepticism is often propagated with the vignette of a Britannia that ruled that seas all by itself.

    Brexit was finalized on June 23, 2016 with a national referendum, a vote won unexpectedly with 52% of Britons favoring an exit from the EU. David Cameron had reluctantly held the referendum to quell the voices of the dissenters in his own party. There are other veritable arguments that will be discussed in the later sections of this brief. A hopeful Cameron had not expected the referendum to go through; in his memoirs, Cameron claims to have believed an EU negotiation was possible, combined with political stability. Whatever his motive, Cameron had failed to sufficiently convince members of his own party that sought an exit from the EU, and the prospect of a referendum had exacerbated rather than quelled the dissent. Other members of the same Conservative Party were able to mobilize mass voters by bringing attention to the economy and immigration. 

   Nigel Farage, current leader of the United Kingdom (UK) Reform Party, pitted voters against EU membership by stoking largely inflated fears of “excessive immigration” and the need for more British control. Eurosceptic movements rose alongside the calls for a “leave” deal, most commonly within the right-leaning voters of the UK. Common posters and other propaganda units featured hitbacks on immigration, with Farage’s “Breaking Point” migration poster leading the way.

TRIED POLICY

In the aftermath of the world wars and its associated period of decolonization, those former great powers that suffered the greatest loss of global hegemony were left with no option but to turn to collective governance. Despite the objective failure of the League of Nations and the continued peripheral importance of the so-called Old World states relative to the United States and the Soviet Union, both the United Nations and European Union appeared as the only participatory conduit for sustained geopolitical relevance in the latter half of the twentieth century. Yet no other fall from influence was more substantial or well documented than that of the United Kingdom. In the span of four decades, the British Empire disintegrated from controlling over a quarter of the world's population to losing such international credibility that sovereign claims such as the Falkland Islands were challenged by third-world powers, destroying any brand of global dominance once possessed. With this loss of dominance also came a shift in the motivation of their foreign policy - no longer were security and territory of paramount importance in evaluating the strength of a state, as borders became increasingly static over time. Instead, the markets supplanted the markers, so to speak, and the primary motivation of global governance shifted from that of collective security to neoliberalism. 

   To illustrate such a point, consider the vast contrast in the responsibilities and activities of the European Union and its most distanced conceptual ancestor in the League of Nations. The latter was initially conceived as a direct response to nationalism in Europe; the former less as a response to nationalism and instead as an expansion of internationalism. More notably, the League of Nations directly involved itself in essentially any territorial dispute involving a member state - partially as an effect of the unresolved fallout of the Paris Peace Conference, and partially because international governance was initially seen as requiring a far more interventionist approach than that adopted by later organizations. The history of the League of Nations provides both successes and failures in providing for international welfare. Border disputes such as those of Upper Silesia, the Aland Islands, and Corfu among others showed the efficacy of transnational arbitration, yet the League’s overall legacy is irreparably tarnished by the failures to effectively handle true security threats such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria or Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Regardless of the rate of success, the League obviously had an eminent interest in directly maintaining international peace. In principle, the European Union shows no such interest - having resolved all border disputes is a prerequisite for any state seeking ascension, signaling that geopolitical conflict is now entirely divorced from the organization. In as many words, the EU’s shift away from peacekeeping mirrors the larger shift in first-world foreign policy away from territory and power projection to trade and market manipulation. 

    As such, modern British politicians are obviously not measured by the same standards of success of their predecessors. Whereas Benjamin Disraeli was famed for his diplomatic treaties, David Lloyd George for his imprudence in Paris and failures in Ireland, and Winston Churchill for his triumph in war and failure in holding together an empire, modern PMs are evaluated by entirely different metrics on entirely different scales (with some notable exceptions). Margaret Thatcher will be remembered far more as the architect of the Big Boom and bane of coal miners than as victor at the Falkland Islands; and despite having been Foreign Secretary from 2016 to 2018, Boris Johnson will be remembered far more for Brexit than anything done regarding strategic diplomacy. In an era of general worldwide peace, the world of trade and economics becomes unquestionably dominant in both the private and public eye, and an action as economically volatile as Brexit assumes the same magnitude of a declaration of war may have possessed in the 19th-century. The best way for a people to express a surging nationalism is no longer to march to the drum of war as it was for centuries of European history: clearly, it is to announce that one’s country is no longer subservient to a larger economic order. 

    Yet in this changed world of European foreign policy, one concept rules above all others: neoliberalism. Although not to an absolute extent, most government organs of finance have almost entirely shifted towards a neoliberal approach since the 1980s - in short, acting under the principle that a free market is the best kind of market, thus inspiring all brands of deregulation, privatization, and globalization, a necessary political shift to create a world where the EU could be so dominant in the first place. Ironically, neoliberalism in Europe is largely of a British origin, as Margaret Thatcher’s aforementioned economic policies served as the inspiration for much of Europe’s later shifts towards aggressive capitalization. Specific tenets of Thatcher’s brand of neoliberalism include monetarism (prioritizing the monetary regulation of inflation rather than the government regulation of unemployment to relieve economic woes), capital over labor (strong opposition to trade unionization), and a supposedly Christian morality that justified all capitalism - Thatcher once quoted St. Paul to explain her policies, stating that “he who does not work shall not eat”. Yet while by original design the natural conclusion of neoliberalism appeared to be a grand, deregulated economic order such as that seen under the EU (Thatcher fervently supported staying in the European Economic Community in 1975), Thatcherism would eventually evolve to oppose wider economic communities by the late 1980s, arguing that successes of deregulation in Britain could not be replaced by new barriers from Brussels. Specifically, Thatcher was concerned by the proposed policies of French socialist Jacques Delors such as a single European currency and central European bank - a sentiment that explains why Brits never went on the Euro. Ironically, in the eyes of Thatcherites the terminus of the liberation of British markets was the maintenance of certain national barriers to trade - in a British free market, the first word would always be more important than the second in the eyes of many conservatives. 

   Under this new reference frame, Brexit is just as much an act of social defiance as it is an act of market interest. At the heart of any great national change is a motile group of voters disturbed by a greater motive - in this case, a large group of working-class Brits ready to use the EU as a scapegoat for their various economic plights. Many of Thatcher’s neoliberal sentiments were directly transformed into more overtly nationalist ones championed by Boris Johnson and UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage, including the xenophobic. A key component of the EU’s framework is the free movement of labor between European states, which, in tandem with the ongoing migrant crisis in southern Europe, led to a rapid rise in anti-immigration sentiment in the United Kingdom during the early 2010s. Increased EU-facilitated immigration placed substantial pressure on real wages for low-income workers between 2008 and 2014, which, along with a perceived decline in the efficacy of housing and social services in the United Kingdom, mobilized large swathes of white, lower-class Brits to become the vanguard of the Brexit movement. This so-called “left behind” demographic developed a natural alienation toward the socially-liberal, college-educated, wealthy ruling class of British politics, converting them and the grand global order with which they were associated as the source of their daily plights: a populism reminiscent of the “Drain The Swamp” elements of Donald Trump’s early MAGA movement. Yet the two phenomena aren’t entirely analogous. The nationalism at the root of Brexit is not entirely social: many Brexit supporters apparently viewed the creation of a new economic system for the United Kingdom with the same passion and excitement that may have once been adopted for the announcement of a victory at war. In a widely publicized example, Brexit was seen as a vehicle for rescuing a declining British fishing industry plagued by international conglomerates dominating English waterways, showing the economic nationalism behind Brexit. Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond coined the idea of a post-EU UK as a “Singapore-upon-Thames” in 2017, promoting England’s global economic competitiveness through a lack of corporate regulation, lower corporate tax rates, and greater freedom to pursue bilateral trade agreements, all modeled off of Singapore’s success amid an otherwise homogeneous greater Asian market. This vision reveals a central fact of the Brexit movement - while many of the intentions of the EU are aligned with the economic outcomes of Brexit supporters, the EU would always be rejected simply for the reason of preventing the United Kingdom from deciding its own destiny. As put by academic Eric Kauffman, Brexit was the ultimate clash between nationalism and globalization, order and openness, authoritarianism and neoliberalism: and to put it simply, the former won out in all cases. 

   Now eight years removed from Brexit, the initial wave of support that allowed the referendum to pass has undoubtedly diminished due to its consequential realities. As was universally expected, departing the EU has added substantial red tape to all sectors of trade in England, burdening supply chains and slowing economic growth relative to the rest of the EU. Due to increased cultural distance, England’s STEM and medical sectors have declined due to diminished intellectual investment and exchange with continental Europe. England’s economic woes have also spurred inflation, which, along with increased barriers to entry, have made the United Kingdom a less appealing destination both for tourists and for immigrants, ironically creating a labor crisis in many of the industries that spurred Brexit in the first place. Bilateral trade agreements with the United States and India, once heralded as the crown jewels of Britain’s  economic plunder, never materialized, and Brexit has complicated relations between England and other members of the United Kingdom. 

   By forcing Northern Ireland to develop new trading protocols with the EU distinct from those of Great Britain, the sudden reappearance of a so-called “Irish Sea Border” within the United Kingdom has inflamed nationalist sentiment throughout Ireland. Similarly, many Scottish nationalists nostalgic for the economic benefits of an EU membership have seized the opportunity to call for a second referendum for Scottish independence (the last referendum in 2014 received only 55% support to remain in the United Kingdom). None of these outcomes can be attributed to Brexit in isolation – they should be read in conjunction with COVID-19 and geopolitical turmoil throughout the early 2020s that complicated the United Kingdom’s situation, but Brexit’s idealized benefits are still yet to be realized. With the Conservative Party voted out after 14 years of continuous government following the 2024 General Election, it seems that the age of Brexit nationalism in the British Isles is nearing its conclusion. It must be noted, however, that no opposing party has spoken against Brexit. 

   Much of continental Europe has unquestionably experienced similar rightward shifts to that which preceded Brexit since 2016, primarily led by the same “left-behind” demographics discussed above. Nationalist movements have experienced unprecedented success in postwar Central and Western Europe in the last eight years primarily due to a surge in xenophobia, Islamophobia, homophobia, and nationalism. These trends are most evident in right-wing leaders Marine Le Pen of France and PM Girogia Meloni of Italy, the latter of whom won election in 2022 and the former still aiming to usurp Emmanuel Macron’s centrist coalition. Le Pen also exemplifies the growing isolationist movement in Europe, having been a strong critic of the seemingly endless flow of aid to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion - aid that has become the tacit expectation of the EU and NATO for all its member states. Along with Viktor Orban of Hungary, they are the most prominent faces of Euroscepticism in Europe today, although none have successfully preempted a referendum on EU membership. Instead, each has vilified globalization in some manner to create new scapegoats for their respective national ailments, whether social, economic, or strategic. Even beyond Europe, Javier Milei of Argentina shows the growing power of populism: while not as socially conservative as his European counterparts, Milei is far more economically conservative, with few global leaders capable of rivaling his penchant for deregulation. Argentina doesn’t experience anywhere near the controversy of globalization in continental Europe, but has turned to Mieli after decades of economic stagnation: anywhere in the world, populists are guaranteed to do the best with angry voters. 

   But in the span of eight years since Brexit, populism in Europe has shifted from questions of economic philosophy to questions of racial coexistence and geopolitical alliances of a strategic nature. Questions of national security that were apparently irrelevant throughout the 1990s and 2000s have suddenly soared into continental concerns, creating a more aggressive and polarized zeitgeist that begets controversy and violence anywhere it takes hold. The immigration irrevocably tied to Brexit is still just as relevant in the United Kingdom, with race riots breaking out in August 2024 following a stabbing of three children in Southport by a British citizen of Rwandan descent. Perhaps Brexit should not be seen as much as the toppling of some grand keystone in the European order but the breaking of a sacred seal: not that the success of a right-wing movement suddenly plunged Europe into chaos, but that it mobilized populists around the world by revealing the power of their agency. 

     Brexit was never just about corporate taxes, lower wages, or even just migration: it was about fear. The fear that the United Kingdom would decline by a power not within its own borne, about the infiltration and subjugation of a society by subterfuge masquerading as globalization. The realities of politics are rarely explicable by simple questions of human psychology, but populism creates a different paradigm. In times of fear, entire civilizations can be directed by questions of yes or no.

‍‍

POLICY PROBLEM

Stakeholders

‍The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, its key economic and political partner, has started a chain reaction of consequences that stretch well beyond its borders. This seismic upheaval has altered the global economic and geopolitical environment, resulting in new fault lines and possibilities. As a pillar of European unity, the EU has faced unprecedented challenges in the aftermath of Brexit. Trade, the lifeblood of interregional development, has declined dramatically, affecting both businesses and consumers due to its GDP share being 12 per cent less since 2019. The complicated economic interdependence network, supported by accords such as the Single Market and Customs Union, has been disturbed, requiring the EU to rethink its financial strategy and policy goals. The Northern Ireland Protocol, a critical component of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, demonstrates the substantial problems that arise from separating strongly integrated economies. Designed to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland, the protocol has established new economic hurdles between Britain and Northern Ireland, affecting commerce and increasing worries about Britain’s integrity to other members of the United Kingdom: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.   

Beyond Europe, Brexit has sparked a deeper global realignment. The United States, the UK’s second-largest trading partner after the EU, has been forced to rethink its economic relationship, inducing ramifications for both economies. The bilateral and multilateral accords link that premised the UK-US economic relationship is currently being restructured in efforts to reinstate previously strong ties.. Moreover, non-Western states, seeing an opportunity in the apparent breakdown of Western unity, have taken strategic positions. Russia, a long-time contestor in European affairs, sees Brexit as a tactical success, and China aspires to increase its economic and political influence in a divided Europe. These shifts within the balance of global powers manifest in the fight for market access, technology, and vital infrastructure, as the race for broader access to 5G networks and artificial intelligence intensifies. Although powerful nations such as France and Germany may benefit from an European union without Britain by virtue of having more say on matters, they must nevertheless deal with increased risks induced by sharply reduced economic leverage. Additional components like the Russo-Ukrainian war tie unequivocally in the progression of the UK-EU relationship status. Russia’s 2021 invasion in Ukraine prompted efforts to reestablish collaboration in international policy between the United Kingdom and the EU under the aegis of a shared NATO membership.    

The United Kingdom’s steadfast support to Ukraine, taking the form of over $24 billion to fund Kyiv’s defenses perhaps thawed the ice after an exit from the EU, kindling hope that Brexit was not tantamount to an abdication of security for the European Union. The global economy, currently grappling with the difficulties of globalization and technological turmoil, now finds itself in a new period of uncertainty. As the world is still adjusting to this new reality, the long-term repercussions for international commerce, geopolitical stability, and the future of European integration remain unclear.           

Non-partisan Reasoning   

For the UK, the implications of BREXIT are miscellaneous. Economically, the UK’s departure from the EU single market and customs union means it faces new trade barriers with its closest neighbors, potentially disrupting established supply chains and increasing costs for businesses, evidenced by the 56% of businesses that are still attempting to adapt to post-Brexit conditions. The UK does have the prerogative to structure its own trade deals independently of EU constraints, but that is an uphill battle with demanding stakeholders that seek concessions to be operating in a country that is no longer a part of the EU single market.Politically, BREXIT has rekindled debates about the integrity of the UK itself, particularly regarding Scotland, where calls for independence have gained momentum as the last referendum failed to bring in independence by only a margin of 10%, and Northern Ireland, where the new customs arrangements under the Northern Ireland Protocol pose challenges to the peace process established by the Good Friday Agreement. The need to transition from EU regulations involves significant administrative adjustments and natural compliance costs, reshaping how the UK governs various sectors. A British business would ultimately need to adhere to EU regulations should it wish to sell its products/services to customers in the EU. Likewise, an EU business would need to adhere to any novel British legislation. For the European Union, Brexit signifies a significant change. Additionally, the financial services sector, a cornerstone of the UK’s economy, faces uncertainty as it loses its “passporting” rights, which allowed firms to operate freely across the EU. Some financial institutions like Goldman Sachs, Barclays and Morgan Stanley have relocated parts of their operations to EU cities like Frankfurt and Paris, potentially denting London’s status as an important global financial hub. As a result, the EU has lost a major financial contributor and a key member of its single market, which could affect its economic stability and trade dynamics. But the impact so far has been far smaller than expected with other powerful nations, Italy, Germany and France stepping in to fill the void that the United Kingdom’s exit had left.   

This shift may prompt internal reforms to address issues exposed by the UK’s departure, aiming to bolster the EU’s future stability and cohesion. Brexitmay also be a future reference of political and economic misjudgment; countries may learn from the UK’s mistakes and veer from considering leaving the union or embarking on protectionist policies. In the plethora of economic woes surrounding Brexit, it is perhaps an advantage that Brexit allows the UK to set its own environmental standards and climate policies. The British government has committed to ambitious targets, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 78% by 2035 compared to 1990 levels. However, environmental groups express concerns about potential deregulation that could undermine ecological protections previously under EU law that all member-states were required to follow. Balancing economic growth with environmental stewardship remains a priority for the UK.    Notably, the United Kingdom is experimenting with innovative environmental initiatives, such as rewilding projects and the development of carbon capture and storage technologies, which could serve as models for other countries. Interestingly, British Universities have stepped up: In 2021, the London School of Economics was named the first carbon-neutral university in the UK. However, more than 400 experts have written to the House of Commons relating to environmental protection that they say will have to be turned up to address pressing issues. On the international stage, Brexit has prompted the UK to redefine its global role. The “Global Britain” strategy aims to strengthen ties with non-EU countries and assert the UK’s presence in global affairs. This includes a focus on joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), home to a market of over 500 million people. Charm-offensives, such as those leveraging historical Commonwealth connections and promoting English-language education abroad, are central to this strategic repositioning. In addition to the aforementioned points, Brexit's ramifications extend into numerous other domains. These include altered access to Horizon Europe, changes in intellectual property rights, and shifts in governance within the creative industries. The impact on environmental policies and agricultural practices is significant, as is the effect on cross-border cooperation, border security, and regional development funds. The regulatory landscape is also evolving in the realms of the digital economy and data protection. Furthermore, educational exchanges beyond Erasmus, workforce and supply chains in healthcare, and the regulatory environment for FinTech are all experiencing transformations.

 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Across the globe, populism is often depicted as an unrelenting yet misguided outcry from disillusioned citizens against democratic governments that have failed them. It is frequently viewed in stark contrast to the transformative ideals of the French, American, and Haitian revolutions—an erratic reaction driven by the whims of the masses. Critics frequently blame ordinary people for succumbing to this ‘frenzy.’ Brexit, for instance, is commonly cited as a testament to populism's perilous consequences. Yet, upon closer inspection, it appears that the fault may not lie with the people but with the very elitist structures they challenge. This article traces the origins of populism with references to Brexit in the UK, the rise of Donald Trump in the USA, and the surge of Hindu nationalism in India to argue that populism's roots point to politicians, more than they do to people.

   For long, at least in Britain, there has been an overarching consensus that officeholders should be sufficiently qualified to hold the most important offices in the country. 45 of all 58 British Prime Ministers have attended either Oxford or Cambridge. This posh background was once a marker of effective governance. Clement Atlee pioneered a generous welfare state, Harold Macmillan ushered in the ‘British Golden Age’ and Margaret Thatcher deftly fused British nationalism with a staunch commitment to free markets. All of these Prime Ministers were extolled during their terms in 10 Downing street. Yet the enchanting promises of the educated elite succeeding PM Thatcher induced in place of enchantment, considerable disenchantment. The British economy was booming with the average annual growth rate exceeding an average of 4.5% since 1990, however, this growth was not doled out. It was concentrated in the hands of the crème de la crème of the country. OECD figures say that the UK has among the highest levels of income inequality in the European Union (as measured by the Gini coefficient).Wages have essentially stagnated since the 2008 recession and borders were precariously porous in the years preceding Brexit.
  As is agreed upon by academics, the chief source of populism is the lack of trust in the ability of highly-educated, jargon pablum politicians to drive meaningful progress. Stunted progress induces disillusionment. Disillusionment induces populism. Such elites are increasingly perceived as perpetrators masquerading as well-wishers; it seems that they are being held culpable for ‘bulldozing’ the foundational ethos of their nations in their pursuit of realizing neo-liberal globalization. However whilst the traditional definition of populism holds true for a bottom-up populist movement led wholly for and by the citizens of a country, it does not hold true for Brexit. Brexit exhibits characteristics of a carefully constructed veneer of populism that has not people but politicians in command.

   Yes, the seeds of populism were sowed by the elite in the case of Brexit. Brexit emerged as a spark from the upper echelons of Britain that set ablaze a populist fire. It was whispered first among factions of almost all parties in the House of Commons. Soon, it became ingrained in the parliamentary discourse as a portent of good times. In 2013, David Cameron’s Prime Ministerial election campaign was undergirded on an ‘in-out’ referendum to ‘finally’ decide the future of the UK’s relationship with the EU. Whilst Cameron, a proponent of stronger ties with the EU, later writes in his biography, For the Record, that he had misjudged the extent of support for Brexit, it seems that he too wielded Brexit as a weapon to win the 2013 general election. There really is nothing more than expediency that can explain calling an ‘in-out’ referendum. Politicians from most parties in Britain knew that Brexit was politically expedient. Why? Citizens sought change and a good way to create a facade of change was to propose a radical aberration from the status quo. To that end, politicians worked around the clock to present Brexit as a potent antidote for the nation’s many problems. This was in spite of warnings issued by prolific economists, including a collective of 10 Nobel Laureates.

   The undeniable educational pedigree of the politicians — most of them went to elite universities in the UK — gives us very strong reasons to believe that Brexit was a smokescreen to deflect from key problems encumbering Britons. Governmental ineptitude had been brushed under the carpet and atop lay a blunderous EU versus Britain battle. The stakes hit the sky when Prime Minister Cameron had yielded to holding the Brexit referendum in a bid to placate the more radical members of his Conservative party. Even though the ‘in-out’ referendum was his promise to win the Conservative Party nomination for the Prime Ministerial race in 2013, it was hoped that he would dispel the anti-EU feelings within his party by persuading fellow members at both Westminster and at the grassroots as their Leader and Prime Minister. 

   It was hoped that he would set the record straight on the gravity of Brexit, a term that was so casually thrown around - in stark contrast to its magnificent implications. His decision to hold the referendum appears to have been founded on a certain political expediency that pricked the hornet's nest. Tim Bale, a Professor at Queen Mary University of London, puts it well, “Cameron chose to commit to a vote, not because the country’s population was clamoring for one but because a significant minority of his own MPs, many of them frustrated by the constraints of coalition, were demanding that he do so – some because they feared that UKIP [UK Independence Party] would cost them their seat (or the seats of too many of their colleagues) at the next election, some because they wanted out of the European Union and were more than happy to leverage that fear to their advantage.” Cameron had given an idea that was floating around proper governmental legitimacy. 

   The rescript of a referendum and its subsequent holding likely entrenched Brexit in the public parlance and made it sound like a promising solution. One after another, Politicians jumped on the Brexit bandwagon and began to parade the idea around Britain’s streets. Iconic English red buses were plastered with misleading advertisements such as those stating that leaving the EU would allow the UK to recoup around £350 million a week that would all be reinvested into the nation's besieged health service. The costs of staying in the EU were widely inflated and benefits sharply discounted. The overarching aura around Brexit was so up-beat and enticing that it was hard not to fall prey to such a narrative. The EU was the purported source of inundating immigration, unemployment and cultural ‘decadence.’ The supposedly prudent solution was, therefore, leaving it.

   When British elites had failed to do their jobs properly and endorsed an idea as the end-all and be-all for short-term political gain, ordinary Britons bought into a dangerous radicalism that did not bode well for Britain in the long-term. Brexit’s exquisite assortment of nationalism, racism and exceptionalism was ephemerally effective in soothing deep cuts derived from governmental inefficacy but those cuts have since deepened with immigration apexing to levels far higher than what Pre-Brexit waves entailed, citizens still grappling with a beleaguered National Health Service (NHS) and an economy teetering upturns and downturns. OECD forecasts show the UK will be the worst-performing G7 economy in 2025. In an official release, the NHS has 7.5 million people waiting to be treated. In 309,300 cases, the patient was waiting more than a year to be treated. As for immigration, 40,000 people have entered the UK illegally since March 2023.

   Brexit, once the kingmaker in the 2019 UK General Elections, found not even a cursory mention in the manifestos of leading political parties in the run-up to the July 2024 elections. This reluctance to take on Brexit further substantiates the argument that Brexit was a political ploy rather than a policy that emerged from a veritable consensus in the public sphere. It is for this reason that we make the case that populism has to do with politicians more than it has to do with people. The recent literature on the causes of populism has converged on two main explanations: the economic insecurity thesis, which underlines the role of financial stress and the cultural backlash thesis, which underlines fears of cultural displacement: two sensitive topics that must be treaded on with caution because of the strong passions that they can inevitably arouse.

  Any discourse relating to these subjects should involve not impulsive innuendos but care, poise and civility. There is a world of difference between ordinary citizens espousing an idea that could be considered racist, sexist or culturally insensitive in public (including on online platforms) and a prominent politician echoing the very same sentiments. Take Indian Prime Minister Modi for example, his incendiary rhetoric often maligns India’s 200 million Muslims. On the road to India’s 2024 elections that were held in May 2024, Modi had said to a large crowd in the state of Rajasthan, “Do you think your hard-earned money should be given to these infiltrators?” Calling Indian muslims ‘infiltrators’ is nothing new — that goes back all the way to Pakistan’s botched resection from India along religious lines in 1947 —  when 18 million people betted on life to enter either India or Pakistan. Yet the very same rhetoric has now made Muslims in India feel palpably out of place. Why? The endorsement of fringe Hindu-nationalism by the Prime Minister of a nation carries significantly more weight than some random person on the street patronizing it.

   Political analysts like Shekar Gupta from the Print concur that Hindutva politics have become India’s defining zeitgeist post 2014, going so far as being a reliable harbinger of the nation’s forthcoming state elections. The means to shift a fringe element into the mainstream is not just exclusive to India or Britain but applies to democracies around the world. Donald Trump is perhaps the American equivalent, constantly hammered for wielding radical rhetoric as a weapon to beget unnecessary anxieties and win over voters. Some might argue that citizens are at fault for buying into polarizing propaganda as every human being has the faculty for rational thought. That sounds right but lest we forget how the very formation of electoral will is blighted with even democratic elections in place. When politicians control what people see and think, they control people’s will. An analysis by Gallup and the Knight Foundation revealed that only 26% of Americans hold a favorable opinion of news media

Even then, voters have no choice but to rely on news media that they do not particularly like. Pew Research found that 70% of Americans still get political information from the news media.

   It is a truism that non-partisan media is the exception rather than the norm. CNN is for Democrats and Fox News for Republicans. It is also a truism that news media is the only option for an overwhelming majority of voters to know what’s going on in the country. The product: People end up believing in different facts and live different lives as is argued by Harvard Professor Michael Sandel in Democracy’s Discontent. Instigating rhetoric in conjunction with a docile and other times designated media houses can challenge and subvert the very foundations of a democracy, validating repugnant beliefs and paving the path for what is construed populism, although its true origins have little to do with people. Insofar as populism is concerned, a state should be complicit in stoking populism even when it ‘merely’ endorses a radical idea, rather than creating that idea. Brexit brazenly impinges on both of these criteria i.e the state not only created the idea but also endorsed it. The term ‘populism’ in its connotations appears to categorically hold people culpable for partaking in ‘decadent’ politics but draws a blank to politicians. 

The apparatus and workings of a state have a certain sanctity attached to them; the leaders who sit in parliaments are the drivers of something much larger than themselves and as a result have cardinal ideals to uphold. Politicians should work to come up with practicable and actionable solutions that their constituents can make sense of rather than partake in electorally expedient blame-games that only end up convulsing their countries. Politicians have been given a mandate, and that mandate is to solve problems. As Plato suggests in his Republic, a true politician has the decency to distinguish between the art of getting hold of the helm of a state and the act of steering, which alone is statesmanship. It is perhaps arm-chair thinking to hold politicians to account but we rest our case.

CONCLUSION

Brexit's promised gains of prosperity, security, and control have dimmed as trade barriers strain UK-EU commerce in tandem with increasing labor shortages, faltering key investments and denteing citizen morale. As Britain seeks to reassert its global influence, we witness the microcosm of a greater globe strife with increased trends toward truncated multinationalism.‍

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Institute for Youth in Policy wishes to acknowledge Eli Solomon, Anagha Nagesh, Nolan Ezzet and other contributors for developing and maintaining the Policy Department within the Institute.

REFERENCES

1. Clarke, Harold D., Matthew Goodwin, and Paul Whiteley. Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
2. Geddes, Andrew. "The European Union's Response to the Brexit Vote." Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 8 (2017): 1158-1177.
3. Hobolt, Sara B. "The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent." Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 9 (2016): 1259-1277.
4. Menon, Anand, and Stephen Weatherill. "Transcending the Common Market: Divorce and the European Union." Modern Law Review 79, no. 6 (2016): 1019-1059.
5. Oliver, Tim. "European and International Views of Brexit." Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 8 (2017): 1163-1181.
6. Curtice, John. "Why Leave Won the UK's EU Referendum." Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. S1 (2017): 19-37.
7. Sampson, Thomas. "Brexit: The Economics of International Disintegration." Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 4 (2017): 163-184.
8. Sloat, Amanda. "The Brexit Negotiations: Making Sense of Political Disruption." Foreign Affairs 96, no. 6 (2017): 54-67.
9. Freedman, Lawrence. "The Meaning of Brexit." Survival 58, no. 1 (2016): 63-72.
10. Dougan, Michael. "An Airbag for the Crash Test Dummies? EU-UK Relations after Brexit." European Law Review 41, no. 4 (2016): 451-470.
11. Glencross, Andrew. Why the UK Voted for Brexit: David Cameron's Great Miscalculation. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
12. Portes, Jonathan, and Giuseppe Forte. "The Economic Impact of Brexit-induced Reductions in Migration." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. S1 (2017): S31-S44.
13. Curtice, John, and Sarah Tipping. "Brexit and Public Opinion." British Social Attitudes Survey 35 (2018): 1-14.
14. Jessop, Bob. "The Organic Crisis of the British State: Putting Brexit in its Place." Globalizations 14, no. 1 (2017): 133-141.
15. Dhingra, Swati, and Thomas Sampson. "Life after Brexit: What are the UK's Options Outside the European Union?" London School of Economics Centre for Economic Performance Report (2016): 1-31.
16. Shipman, Tim. All Out War: The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain's Political Class. London: William Collins, 2016.
17. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Benjamin Martill. "Brexit and the Populist Style." Journal of European Public Policy 28, no. 2 (2021): 145-164.
18. Hall, Ben. "Brexit and the Future of the European Union." Financial Times, March 29, 2017.
19. Bulmer, Simon, and William E. Paterson. "Germany and the European Union: Post-Brexit Hegemon?" German Politics 28, no. 1 (2019): 33-51.
20. Hirsch, Afua. "The Real Reason for Brexit? British Racism." The Guardian, November 28, 2016.
21. Evans, Geoffrey, and Anand Menon. Brexit and British Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017.
22. Goodwin, Matthew, and Roger Eatwell. National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. London: Pelican Books, 2018.
23. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, Catherine E. De Vries, and Ben Rosamond. "Brexit and the Future of Europe." International Affairs 95, no. 6 (2019): 1265-1283.
24. Owen, John. "Brexit, Trump, and the Future of Liberal Order." Foreign Affairs 96, no. 6 (2017): 54-66.
25. Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig. "Global Competition and Brexit." American Political Science Review 112, no. 2 (2018): 201-218.
26. Skinner, David. "The Remains of Brexit: Race, Postcolonialism, and the Future of the Left." New Formations 89, no. 1 (2016): 120-139.
27. Hunt, Jo. "The Legal Implications of Brexit: The Constitution, Devolution, and the Judiciary." Commonwealth Law Bulletin 42, no. 3-4 (2016): 583-589.
28. Buchan, Russell. "Brexit: Legal Aspects of the Withdrawal of the UK from the EU." Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 16, no. 1 (2017): 17-29.
29. Curtice, John. "Brexit and Public Opinion: Five Lessons." UK in a Changing Europe, November 21, 2018.
30. Menon, Anand, and Brigid Laffan. "The Conservative Dilemma: How Brexit Tore the Party Apart." Journal of European Integration 40, no. 3 (2018): 349-365.
31. Hobolt, Sara B., and James Tilley. The Brexit Effect: How Voter Values Transformed the Political Landscape. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
32. Vines, David. "The Economic Consequences of Brexit." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. S1 (2017): S1-S13.
33. Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash." Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, August 2016.
34. Fox, Benjamin. "Brexit, Euroscepticism, and the Politics of Disintegration." Journal of European Public Policy 26, no. 7 (2019): 1007-1023.
35. Fitzgibbon, John. "Brexit and the Contested British Political Tradition." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 4 (2018): 711-726.
36. Henley, Jon. "Brexit: How It Happened and What Comes Next." The Guardian, March 29, 2017.
37. Parker, George. "Theresa May’s Impossible Brexit Task." Financial Times, December 19, 2018.
38. Tonge, Jonathan. "The Impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland: The End of the Beginning?" Political Quarterly 89, no. 4 (2018): 621-630.
39. Clarke, Harold D., and Paul Whiteley. "Voting in the 2016 Brexit Referendum: The Roles of Values and Information in Shaping Attitudes towards European Integration." European Journal of Political Research 58, no. 4 (2019): 1019-1037.
40. Dustmann, Christian, and Ian Preston. "Brexit: The Economic and Social Implications." VoxEU.org, March 31, 2016.
41. Allan, Duncan, Ian Bond, and Chatham House. "A New Russia Policy for Post-Brexit Britain." Chatham House, 2022. 
42. Broadbent, Meredith. "U.S.-UK Trade Agreement: Now Is The Time." July 2, 2024. 
43. Bruegel. "Assessing China’s Post-Brexit Globalization Strategy." July 19, 2016. 
44. Allan, Duncan, Ian Bond, and Chatham House. A New Russia Policy for Post-Brexit Britain. Chatham House, 2022.
45. Broadbent, Meredith. "U.S.-UK Trade Agreement: Now Is The Time." July 2, 2024.
46. Bruegel. "Assessing China’s Post-Brexit Globalization Strategy." July 19, 2016.
47. Cabinet Office. Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. GOV.UK, July 2, 2021.
48. Congressional Research Service. CPTPP: Overview and Issues for Congress. June 16, 2023.
49. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. "UK Enshrines New Target in Law to Slash Emissions by 78% by 2035." GOV.UK, April 20, 2021.
50. GMFUS. "China Is Not 'The Winner of Brexit.'" n.d.
51. The Independent. "Navigating Five Years of UK Fintech Amid Brexit and Covid-19." June 19, 2024.
52. Landow, Charles. "Moving Past the Troubles: The Future of Northern Ireland Peace." Council on Foreign Relations, February 16, 2024.
53. Prikhodko, O. V. "Brexit’s Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship." Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, no. S2 (June 1, 2022): S133–41.
54. Ataman, Joseph. “Marine Le Pen Promises French Far Right Will Rein in Aid to Ukraine, Slams Soccer Star Mbappe.” CNN, July 5, 2024.
55. Chean, Bryan. Singapore-On-Thames: What the UK Can Learn from the Lion City. Adam Smith Institute.
56. Cliffe, Jeremy. “The Rupture Between Margaret Thatcher and Jacques Delors Lives on in Brexit.” The New Statesman, January 6, 2021.
57. Ford, Rob. “Older ‘Left-Behind’ Voters Turned Against a Political Class with Values Opposed to Theirs.” The Guardian, June 25, 2016.
58. Hay, Colin. “Brexit and the (Multiple) Paradoxes of Neoliberalism.” Society for the Advancement of Socio Economics, 2018.
59. Holden, Michael, and Andrew Macaskill. “As Europe Turns Right, UK Voters Reject Conservative Populism.” Reuters, July 5, 2024.
60. Kaufmann, Eric. It’s NOT the Economy, Stupid: Brexit as a Story of Personal Values. London School of Economics and Political Science, July 7, 2016.
61. Kelmendi, Tefla. “Separate to Integrate: EU Enlargement and the Trouble with Bilateral Disputes.” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 8, 2024.
62. Lloyd, Lorna. The League of Nations and the Settlement of Disputes. Department of International Relations at Keele University, 2001.
63. Malet, Girogio, and Stefanie Walter. “How British Brexit Policies Reshaped Europeans’ Views of the EU.” UK In a Changing Europe, December 7, 2023.
64. McDonald, Andrew. “Missing EU: Scotland’s Nationalists Make Fresh Pitch to Undo Brexit.” Politico, November 17, 2023.
65. O’Brennan, John. “Brexit Is Fuelling Tensions in Northern Ireland.” Al-Jazeera, April 14, 2021.
66. Olusoga, David. “There Can Be No Excuses. The UK Riots Were Violent Racism Fomented by Populism.” The Guardian, August 10, 2024.
67. Outhwaite, William, ed. Brexit: Sociological Responses. Anthem Press, 2017.
68. Poulsen, Regin Winther. “Fishy Business: How Brexit Failed to Help a Dying Industry.” Pulitzer Center, May 28, 2024.
69. Pylas, Pan. “Britain’s EU Journey: When Thatcher Turned All Eurosceptic.” AP News, January 23, 2020.
70. Restle, Benjamin. “How Has Brexit Affected Britain’s Tourist Sector?” DW, January 30, 2023.
71. Sandford, Alsadair. “Post-Brexit Guide: What’s Been the Impact—and How Did It Happen?” Euro News, December 29, 2022.
72. Schatz, Joseph. “No, Donald Trump Doesn’t Explain Brexit.” Politico, June 23, 2016.
73. Thatcher, Margaret. "Sermon on the Mound." Speech, General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh, Scotland, May 14, 1988.
74. Tilford, Simon. Britain, Immigration and Brexit. Center for European Reform, January 2016.
75. Tilley, James, and Sara B. Hobolt. “Brexit as an Identity: Political Identities and Policy Norms.” PS: Political Science & Politics 56, no. 4 (2023): 546-52.
76. Winkler, Matthew A. “Brexit’s Lasting Damage Is Looking Inescapable.” Bloomberg, March 19, 2024.
77. Wood, James. “The Political Economy of Populism in the United Kingdom.” Promarket, May 17, 2024.
78. Zabala, Santiago, and Claudio Gallo. “The Neoliberal Populism of Milei and Meloni.” Al-Jazeera, May 21, 2024.
79. Zak, John M. "The Great Wave: Margaret Thatcher, The Neo-liberal Age, and the Transformation of Modern Britain." Student Publications 791, 2020.
80. BBC News. "EU Referendum Results." BBC, June 24, 2016.
81. European Union. "History of the European Union." European Union, n.d.
82. European Union. "1945-59: The Beginnings of Cooperation." European Union, n.d.
83. Hope, Christopher. "EU Referendum: Campaigning Resumes as Jeremy Corbyn and Michael Gove Make Speeches." The Telegraph, June 19, 2016.
84. UK in a Changing Europe. "Why David Cameron Called the 2016 Referendum." UK in a Changing Europe, April 22, 2019.
85. European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI). "What Is Euroscepticism?" EAVI, n.d.
86. Elgot, Jessica. "‘This Is the Battle of Our Times’: Labour Will Fight against a Hard Brexit, Says Keir Starmer." LabourList, December 15, 2016.

Politico Staff. "Jeremy Corbyn ‘Relaxed’ about Immigration Numbers." Politico, August 28, 2016.