Policy Problem

Nonpartisan Reasoning 

Despite withdrawing from Kyiv, Russian forces still continue to occupy significant parts of Ukraine. Top Moscow defense ministry official Alexander Fomin claims that Russia will “dramatically” scale back its military activities in Kyiv following talks with Ukraine in Turkey.²³ While Ukraine reports a withdrawal of Russian forces from Kyiv, an increased Russian presence is seen moving into the Mariupol city center and other parts of Ukraine.³⁷ Furthermore, on April 2nd, Russian missiles struck the cities of Poltava and Kremenchuk, causing damage to critical oil infrastructure.^37,1

In recent days, satellite images over Bucha reveal bodies of dead civilians on the streets.³⁷ While Russia’s Ministry of Defense has denied involvement in the massacre, video evidence shows that civilians were killed when Russia’s military controlled the town – more than three weeks prior. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg asserts that Russia is merely regrouping in Ukraine, but not scaling back.²⁰ Russia’s outward commitment to de-escalate, hence, is met with skepticism from the U.S. and NATO, raising questions of whether Russia is negotiating in Turkey in good faith.

Risk of Indifference 

The raging conflict threatens the lives of millions of civilians. According to the Red Cross, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians lack food, water, heat, and medical assistance due to the destruction of vital infrastructure such as water supplies and heating facilities.²⁵ Already, more than 1,000 civilians have died and thousands of others are severely injured.²⁷ Ukrainian authorities have accused Russia of violating temporary cease-fire agreements by shelling humanitarian corridors.

Russian attacks have also forced the closure of the Odessa port — where almost all of Ukraine’s imports by water arrive. Furthermore, the United Nations estimates that 10 million people, including more than half of Ukrainian children, have fled their homes to neighboring countries – primarily Poland.⁴² All of these issues are only compounded by the ongoing pandemic. With only 35% of the Ukrainian population vaccinated prior to the Russian invasion, experts claim that COVID-19 transmission is bound to increase in Europe amid the refugee crisis. ^6,24

Policy Options

In navigating the conflict, the U.S. and its Western allies must find ways to adapt to present challenges while pushing for a resolution to the violence. The most pressing concerns are three-fold: 1) diversifying Western oil imports, 2) increasing economic pressure without military confrontation, and 3) learning to live in a post-invasion world. 

Diversifying Oil

Having put a total halt on Russian oil, both state-based and private, the West has faced soaring gas prices. At the same time, the move has helped to limit Russian expansion by complicating supply chain difficulties. For the Biden administration in particular, however, this trend cannot continue, with “70% of Americans [disapproving] of Biden’s handling of gas prices.”³⁶ As prices at the pump continue to soar and the Biden administration prepared to release 1 million barrels per day from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, diversification is both an economic and political necessity. The options are limited, as oil-producing powerhouses Venezuela and Iran lead the pack despite their tumultuous diplomatic relationship with the United States. 

Venezuela

As the Biden administration renewed talks with Venezuela over oil imports, the intrinsic complications have begun to mount considering the U.S.’s maximum pressure sanction regime against the Venezuelan oil industry and its refusal to recognize the presidency of Nicolas Maduro. These barriers are not easily surmounted, as domestic opposition expresses concerns that a U.S. partnership with Venezuela “would prop up an autocratic regime that is a close ally of Russia.”⁹ The U.S., both logistically and in order to entice Venezuelan participation, would have to tie increased oil imports to sanction relief.⁸ 

If the Biden administration can pull the political strings, an oil-for-sanctions deal with Venezuela may incur an unexpected win-win. While sanctions were initially placed on Chavez (and now Maduro) in order to inspire regime change within the country, those efforts have largely failed. Even historically, U.S. sanctions are less than 5% effective in initiating legitimate regime change.³⁵ Experts suggest they may have the opposite effect, giving the Maduro administration a scapegoat on which it can blame the country’s dire economic conditions.⁴⁴

In the meantime, sanctions have crippled the Venezuelan economy: inflation spirals out of control as the country cannot engage in international debt restructuring, the largest consumer of the oil-rich country’s largest industry is absent, and a humanitarian crisis has unfolded leaving 300,000 Venezuelans lacking access to medicines.¹²

If passed, the controversial and doubted partnership could kill two birds with one stone – resolving a crisis in Venezuela and slowing domestic inflation – all while allowing the U.S. to maintain maximum economic pressure on Russia. 

Iran

The second of the relationships that the Biden administration now seeks to mend in its effort to offset Russian oil is Iran.²¹ The situation with Iran, despite its considerable historical differences, is effectively similar to that of Venezuela – an oil-producing powerhouse having strained relations with the U.S. that has been battling the effects of U.S. sanctions for years. 

As the Biden administration looks to intensify talks over reviving the Iran Nuclear Deal, any preemptive sanction relief in order to jumpstart oil importation from Tehran significantly limits U.S. leverage in the deal. This comes as there is increasing concern that a newly formed Iran deal may lack the enforcement mechanisms needed to make it effective.⁴⁰ Add in a newfound Iranian understanding of the leverage its oil holds over the U.S. in a post-invasion world, and the deal may devolve into an agreement too weak to justify strategically.

Preferring Economic Solutions to Military Solutions

Targeted sanction programs, cutting off of Russian oil, and, in particular, the Swiss breaking of neutrality have served to significantly limit Russia’s warfighting capabilities – but there is more to be done. President Zelensky continues to demand, on the international stage and on the floor of the Senate, that the Biden administration increase its efforts to help Ukraine both militarily and economically. In focusing on the economy, President Biden can counterbalance Russian efforts and appease the Ukrainian demands without turning towards escalation-risking military measures. 

The Treasury has begun to take such additional steps by  “imposing full blocking sanctions on Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-owned bank, and Alfa-Bank, Russia’s largest private bank.”⁴³  There are also discussions regarding the U.S. implementing a full trade embargo against Moscow.” Numerous paths forward exist, as all economic moves are preferable to military moves. Such confrontations, via no-fly zones or otherwise, risk direct escalation or giving Russia the scapegoat and pretext for further military engagement with the U.S., which would be the beginning of a much broader conflict.²

Living in a Post-Invasion World

The successful diversification of oil imports and economic pressure against Russia will certainly hasten the end of the conflict, but we will nevertheless have to learn to live in a post-invasion world. 

This means helping Ukraine defend against the next mounting Russian push. As has been throughout the first stage of this conflict, maintaining high levels of arms sales will be key in countering the “major intensification of Russian military operations” expected to come within the weeks.²⁹