I. Executive Summary

Geopolitical disruptions are an increasingly significant challenge for governments and economies worldwide. Wars, trade disputes, cyberattacks, pandemics, and supply chain disruptions show how quickly shocks in one region can spread through the global economy and affect production, trade, inflation, and economic growth. As globalization has strengthened economic interdependence, countries have become more efficient and prosperous, but at the same time, more vulnerable to disruptions originating beyond their own borders.

In response, economic resilience has become a growing policy priority. Governments are recognizing that economic security extends beyond short-term growth and now plays an important role in national security, supply chain stability, and long-term competitiveness. Recent disruptions have shown that there are weaknesses in important industries, transportation networks, and global supply chains, prompting policymakers to reconsider how economies should prepare for future uncertainty while continuing to benefit from international trade and innovation.

At the center of this discussion is a difficult policy challenge: balancing economic efficiency, national security, and economic growth that can be sustained. Policies that improve resilience usually require greater investment, increased domestic production, or more diversified supply chains, but these measures may also decrease some of the efficiencies created through globalization. Governments therefore have to determine how to decrease strategic vulnerabilities without unnecessarily limiting economic opportunity or international cooperation.

This brief evaluates a range of policy approaches that seek to strengthen economic resilience, including diversifying supply chains, expanding domestic production of critical goods, strengthening economic partnerships with allies, investing in infrastructure and cybersecurity, developing national resilience strategies, and encouraging greater public-private cooperation during future crises. It also considers the consequences of failing to improve resilience, including continued supply chain disruptions, inflationary pressures, greater dependence on geopolitical rivals, and reduced economic stability, especially for younger generations that are just now entering the workforce.

This brief argues that preparing for future geopolitical disruptions requires a proactive, long-term approach to economic resilience. By strengthening preparedness while carefully balancing efficiency, security, and growth, governments can reduce future vulnerabilities and build more stable and competitive economies. The specific policy recommendations presented in this brief seek to advance that objective while recognizing the tradeoffs involved in an increasingly interconnected global economy.

II. Overview

Economic resilience is an economy’s ability to prepare for, withstand, adapt to, and recover from major disruptions while maintaining long-term stability and growth. Over the past several decades, globalization has pushed countries to specialize in production, expand international trade, and build interconnected supply chains. These developments have subsequently lowered costs, increased choice for consumers, and accelerated economic growth. However, they have also made national economies more dependent on one another, meaning that disruptions in one region can quickly lead to consequences around the rest of the world.

Recent geopolitical events have shown just how interconnected the global economy has become. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted manufacturing, transportation, and labor markets, which contributed to widespread shortages and inflation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created significant volatility in global food and energy markets, while attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have delayed international trade and increased transportation costs. At the same time, growing economic competition between the United States and China has created concerns surrounding semiconductors, critical minerals, and other important industries. Although these events have different origins, they collectively reveal the vulnerability of an increasingly interconnected global economy.

Today, the consequences of geopolitical disruptions extend well beyond governments and multinational corporations. Supply chain interruptions can increase prices, decrease access to essential goods, slow down economic growth, and create uncertainty for businesses, workers, and consumers alike. Because of this, economic resilience has become an increasingly important policy priority. Governments must now think about not only how to maximize economic efficiency, but also how to reduce their own strategic vulnerabilities without having to sacrifice the benefits of global trade and innovation.

As geopolitical uncertainty continues to shape the global economy, policymakers are now facing an increasingly difficult challenge: how can economies prepare for future volatility while still remaining prosperous, competitive, and globally connected? This brief will examine the evolution of economic resilience, evaluate current policy approaches and their limitations, and explore potential strategies for strengthening long-term economic stability in an increasingly uncertain world.

III. Policy Problem

A. Stakeholders

Striking the balance between economic resilience and disaster preparedness requires various calculations for every party involved. National governments, on the one hand, are subject to the whims and priorities of their people. Choices on manufacturing policy, trade, energy usage, and defense spending all exist as factors that can make or break consumer and business confidence in a government. For governments like the US and the European Union, popular backlash to any policy misstep risks unraveling any plans they had to bolster readiness. 

Businesses and manufacturers are charged with monitoring not only government policy, but also consumer sentiment and global markets. In the post-COVID era, supply chain disruptions contributed to runaway inflation, as rapid increases in the price of oil have repeatedly pushed overall prices up and consumer confidence down (Harapko, 2024). Despite obvious financial pressure, many economists, policymakers, and activists point to record-high corporate profits, executive bonuses, and stock prices to indicate that the economic pain businesses feel may be partially self-inflicted (Sherman, 2025). 

In the post-COVID employment boom of the early 2020s, unemployment plummeted to some of its lowest levels ever recorded (Svenja Gudell, 2026). In classical economics, falling unemployment often corresponds with rising inflation. This pattern, exacerbated by government spending, serious supply chain disruptions, geopolitical threats from multiple concurrent wars, and political and economic discontent, pushed inflation in the US and Europe to its highest levels ever. Workers, feeling the squeeze, have started to demand higher wages. In the economy, workers find themselves at the uncomfortable junction between being consumers, subject to the whims of corporations hoping to maximize profits, and as producers, attempting to sell their labor in one of the most difficult job markets in recent history. To compete with other workers, they accept lower wages. By accepting lower pay, they often find themselves having to work paycheck to paycheck. The combined pressures of exorbitant costs and insufficient wages have significantly depressed consumer confidence, which in turn has propelled political backlash around the world ( Earle, 2025). 

For international allies and trading partners, political backlash adds to an ever-growing list of global challenges to remedying worldwide economic and security challenges. Many nations have experienced complete turnover in their governments (Wike et al., 2024). For these nations’ allies, negotiations on trade, energy, and security become even more difficult when the longevity of the governments they are negotiating with is in question. 

Young people are at the crossroads of all of these challenges. As stakeholders in the future, the action or inaction of current governments, international organizations, and corporations will have long-lasting implications for young people that won’t be realized until long after many of those forces are gone. 

B. Risks of Indifference

Although today’s challenges seem insurmountable, the risks of indifference pose a much greater threat than any current misstep. The global supply chain remains one of the most vulnerable structures at risk today. Unless swift, comprehensive actions are taken to end various global conflicts, negotiate improved trade policies, and ensure a more robust global supply chain. It is also imperative that price stability across all sectors of the worldwide economy is achieved. For consumers and businesses alike, volatility in pricing, especially for essentials like heat, water, energy, and food, has led to growing economic suffering and serious political dissatisfaction. 

Price instability also plays a central role in continued vulnerability to foreign adversaries. Powers like China, Russia, and Iran are key players in the global supply chain. Their trading partners, mainly the US and Europe, are left making imperfect deals that sometimes require looking the other way to human rights abuses, democratic repression, and even war. Without action to address the lack of accountability stemming from dependence on hostile nations, the US, Europe, and others will be unable to secure trade deals that prioritize both economic development and humanitarian considerations. 

Attacks on the energy grid, the supply chain, or other parts of the broader economy damage the public’s confidence in their institutions. Popular anger in response to rising prices, seemingly incompetent governments, or outside aggression further reduces public trust in institutions. 

C. Nonpartisan Reasoning

In times of crisis, economic stability, above all else, should be the main priority of parties and the government. For conservatives, economic stability through increasing domestic production is an appealing and noble goal. For progressives, emphasizing worker protections and reducing wealth inequality also play a hand in keeping the economy stable. For businesses, the government must be consistent and predictable so they can weather future economic headwinds. No matter your political or economic affiliation, achieving economic stability, especially in times of crisis, is the best way to ensure continued confidence in the government and continued growth for businesses.

IV. Current Stances

In each country, the approach to economic resilience will differ depending on its past, the risks they face, and the priorities they set for the economy. The U.S. policy emphasis has been on supply chain security and the resurgence of domestic manufacturing, including critical-to-national-security industries like semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. This practice has been combined with the term "friend-shoring," which was coined by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, referring to the diversification of supply chains with "a variety of trusted allies and partners" to enhance "economic resilience. The concept is similar to previous reshoring/nearshoring strategies; however, unlike reshoring, it does not involve the return of production to the country of origin, but rather focuses on a trade and investment strategy among politically aligned countries with no single country dominating critical goods (CSIS, 2023). U.S. Department of the Treasury

The European Union has followed a similar but different route in its quest for ‘strategic autonomy', also known as ‘open strategic autonomy'. It is a principle that is widely believed to imply the ability of the EU to take action independently, without relying on other nations in strategic policy areas. This concept has gradually transitioned from an abstract vision to a more tangible plan since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the EU has further concretised and formalised the vision in its European Economic Security Strategy launched in June 2023 (European Commission, 2023), which has established a framework for economic security risk assessment and management at EU, national, and corporate levels. In effect, this has meant less dependence on any single source of energy, raw materials, and technology, yet an effort to maintain the economic advantages of free trade.

China has taken its own path to resilience, however, through its “dual circulation” strategy, which was implemented in 2020. The policy rests on two objectives that complement each other: domestic demand and innovation, both of which are the primary engines of growth; and staying connected to the global economy on its own terms. The plan is designed to build self-sufficiency in major industries through innovation and to gain access to key inputs by expanding supply chains and investing in certain industries, as one analysis says. This is not a coincidence, as it is part of China's more ambitious industrial goals, such as the “Made in China 2025” initiative, and an ongoing drive to de-dependence on foreign technologies, particularly following the tightening of U.S. export controls (Bruegel, 2021).

Despite the variations in tools and language, there is a thread that connects all three approaches: now, economic security is considered an integral part of national security. The impact of disruptions to energy, technology, or critical goods is no longer regarded as a commercial issue but as a risk that can have a direct impact on a country's stability. Taking measures to make systems more resilient has revived the economic discussion of the limits of government intervention in promoting resilience rather than efficiency from globalization, as measures such as reshoring, stockpiling, and export controls typically entail higher costs and slower growth, at least in the initial stages.

A. Tried Policy

In recent years, and more recently, because of the shocks, governments have experimented with various policies to strengthen economic resilience. Strategic reserves: oil stocks, medical supplies, and food have always been a buffer against sudden shortages, and one of the most familiar examples is the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

A more recent trend is the availability of explicit measures to incentivize investment in domestic manufacturing, and semiconductor investment is a particularly salient example. In the U.S., this was manifested as the CHIPS and Science Act, which included U.S. subsidies, along with an international semiconductor partnership fund, including a notable investment partnership with Vietnam (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2023).

In addition to domestic investments, many governments have been diversifying supply chains by employing techniques of friend-shoring and other measures, as an alternative to relying on a single source of supply. Coordinated effort and multilateral cooperation, including the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, have aided these efforts and minimized the potential for countries to work at cross-purposes. But there are costs to this approach, too, as critics note. Even friends can be avid economic competitors, as this one analysis illustrates, and relying on a "friend" is not always as secure as it may seem: Take this case of America's continued dependence on Taiwan for cutting-edge semiconductors, for example.

Lastly, emergency economic measures (such as during COVID-19) demonstrated the speed at which governments can move when a crisis strikes, whether in the form of increased unemployment benefits or emergency production orders for medical products. Most of these responses were reactive rather than part of any long-term resilience plan, and this is part of what has contributed to the recent trend of more forward-looking and deliberate economic security policy.

V. Policy Options

A. Tried Policy

As the previous section emphasizes, the risks of continued supply chain fragility, dependence on hostile nations, and eroding public trust are too costly to ignore regardless of where you fall politically. The harder question is where to actually start, and what kinds of policies are realistic given how complicated the global economy already is. The options below do not represent a perfect solution. Rather, an actionable set of reforms that target specific weak points in the current system.

B. Expand Supply Chain Diversification

The COVID-19 pandemic made one thing brutally clear: when the world gets its goods from a handful of places, a single disruption can bring entire industries to a halt. The global response since then has largely centered on three strategies — reshoring, which means bringing production back home entirely; nearshoring, which moves it to geographically close countries; and friendshoring, a term coined by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, which redirects supply chains toward geopolitical allies rather than adversaries. By 2022, analysts estimated that up to 26% of global exports (roughly $4.6 trillion) could be reshored within five years as companies started genuinely rethinking their exposure (IMPRI, 2025). None of these strategies is a clean fix since reshoring raises costs, nearshoring adds regulatory complexity, and friendshoring depends on political relationships staying stable, which is not something any government can guarantee. However, the goal is to stop betting everything on one region. Most companies are doing exactly that by adding suppliers in new locations without abandoning their existing ones, and policy should support and accelerate that shift rather than mandate a wholesale overhaul that the market cannot absorb.

C. Increase Domestic Production of Critical Goods

Some goods are too strategically important to leave entirely to the market. Semiconductors are the clearest example. By the time the U.S. passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022, America's share of global chip manufacturing had fallen from roughly 40% in 1990 to just 12 percent — meaning the country's cars, defense systems, and consumer electronics were all running on chips made mostly abroad, a significant chunk of them in Taiwan, which sits in one of the most geopolitically volatile regions in the world (PwC, 2022). The CHIPS Act directed $52.7 billion toward reversing that, and as of December 2025, more than $630 billion in total investment across 140 projects and projections of 500,000 new jobs across 28 states (Wikipedia, 2025). The same logic applies to pharmaceuticals and natural minerals, where concentrated foreign production creates leverage that adversaries can and do exploit. This kind of industrial policy isn’t efficient or cheap, as factories take years to build and skilled workforces do not appear overnight. Yet, discovering the gap only when a crisis makes it impossible to ignore is far more expensive.

D. Strengthen Economic Partnerships With Allies

No country is going to produce everything it needs domestically, and nobody is really arguing that it should. What countries can do is be much more deliberate about who they depend on. Right now, as the prior section notes, the US and Europe are regularly forced into imperfect arrangements with nations whose behavior they otherwise oppose, precisely because economic dependence limits their ability to push back. The G7 has increasingly treated economic security as a collective responsibility, and agreements like the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council represent steps toward coordinating industrial policy between major allies. The challenge is durability. Allies need to trust that the agreements they sign today will still mean something under the next administration, which recent U.S. trade policy has made it harder to keep such promises. That instability is itself a policy problem worth addressing because the value of allied partnerships as a resilience tool depends entirely on their reliability.

E. Invest in Infrastructure and Cybersecurity

Supply chain resilience doesn’t mean much if the infrastructure that supply chains run on can be taken offline by a cyberattack. Energy grids, financial systems, water treatment facilities, and shipping networks are all targets of state-sponsored digital disruption, and the economic consequences of a successful attack on any of them ripple outward fast. The Biden administration acknowledged this in April 2024, issuing the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience— the first comprehensive federal update to infrastructure protection policy in over a decade— requiring agencies to establish minimum security standards for critical sectors rather than continuing to rely on voluntary compliance (Congress.gov, 2024). The FY2025 federal budget backed it up with nearly $13 billion in civilian cybersecurity funding, including $3 billion for CISA specifically (Industrial Cyber, 2024). These numbers reflect a belated but necessary recognition that geopolitical resilience is also about whether the systems the economy runs on can take a hit and keep functioning. An economy that can’t protect its own grid is not resilient regardless of how diversified its supply chains are.

F. National Economic Resilience Strategies

One of the more honest critiques of current U.S. policy is that it is reactive and piecemeal since the CHIPS Act addresses semiconductors, the Inflation Reduction Act addresses clean energy, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law addresses physical infrastructure. Each of these is meaningful, but they don’t have shared targets, and there is no overarching framework that maps the country's full range of critical economic dependencies and sets priorities for addressing them. A dedicated national resilience strategy would require the government to identify which sectors carry unacceptable concentration risk and coordinate across agencies and with allies before a crisis forces improvisation. The EU's strategic autonomy framework and Japan's economic security legislation both point in this direction, treating economic resilience as something that requires long-term planning rather than immediate responses to whatever disruption just happened. For businesses especially, that kind of clarity and predictability from the government can provide the foundation they need to make long-term investment decisions with confidence.

G. Public-Private Cooperation During Crises

In the United States, most critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated, which means that no amount of federal policy translates into resilience without private sector contributions. COVID demonstrated what cooperation can achieve— Operation Warp Speed compressed a vaccine development timeline that normally takes a decade into under a year— but it also showed what breaks down when government and industry have not already built the relationships and frameworks needed to work together fast. According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, every dollar invested in resilience before a crisis saves four to seven dollars in response and recovery costs after one (UNDRR, 2025). Yet the majority of spending on both sides still flows toward fixing things after they break rather than strengthening them in advance. Genuine public-private cooperation means pre-negotiated information-sharing agreements and clear protocols for surge production during emergencies. FEMA's 2025 guidance on private-public partnerships puts it plainly: these relationships are infrastructure themselves; they have to be built and maintained before they are needed, not assembled in the middle of a crisis (FEMA, 2025).

None of these options requires abandoning globalization or retreating from international trade; What they require is building the kind of institutional, industrial, and diplomatic infrastructure that lets economies stay open and competitive while also being able to absorb shocks without collapsing. Diversification, domestic production, allied partnerships, cybersecurity investment, a coherent national strategy, and real public-private cooperation all serve as beacons to support the same broader goal.

VI. Impact on Young People

Young people’s experience of geopolitical disruption is both lived and objective. Events such as wars, trade conflicts, supply chain breakdowns, and cyberattacks translate directly to metrics such as the cost of living, the availability of entry-level jobs, the price of housing, and the long-term stability of the industries that Gen Z is training to enter. For a generation that came of age during the COVID-19 pandemic and now faces a labor market shaped by automation and geopolitical fragmentation, the stakes of getting economic resilience policy right are immediate and structural.

A. Labor Market Already Under Strain

Youth unemployment in the U.S. reached 10.8% in July 2025, more than double the overall rate of 4.3%, as young workers faced a structural slowdown in hiring and the threat of automation, both during a broader situation of economic uncertainty and rising geopolitical tension. The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Future of Jobs Report 2025 projects that geopolitical and geoeconomic factors will create business model transformation across one-third of surveyed global employers in the next five years, with increased restrictions on trade and investment among the top factors reshaping hiring and operational decisions (WEF, 2025). For a generation entering the workforce at such a time, these trends are key considerations.

The effects aren’t limited to hiring, either. Since 2019, cumulative inflation has climbed by 26%, and the income required to afford a median-priced house has jumped 70%, from roughly $67,000 in 2019 to $114,000 in 2025, forcing many Gen Z adults to delay moving out of their parents’ household or abandon homeownership aspirations entirely (Whitney, 2025). Moreover, from 2020 to 2024, typical U.S. rents increased by nearly 29% while median household income rose far more slowly, leaving nearly one-third of American households burdened by the costs (Gyourko, 2026). These conditions are connected to geopolitical disruptions. Crises such as supply chain shocks or price volatility – for example, those caused to energy and food prices by the Russia-Ukraine war – feed directly into the cost pressures on Gen Z households.

B. The Opportunities of New Industries and Demands

Economic resilience policy, if designed well, can actively expand the sectors in which young people will find stable and livable careers, rather than simply allowing them to hold their heads above the water.

The most obvious of these opportunities would be domestic manufacturing. In response to geopolitical risks and supply chain fragility, the U.S. has seen a significant wave of reshoring. The Reshoring Initiative’s 2024 annual report found that 244,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs were announced through reshoring and foreign direct investment, with 88% of those jobs in technology-intensive sectors such as computer electronics, electrical equipment, and transportation, notably including EV batteries and semiconductors (Moser & Kelley, 2025). These are high-skill jobs that require the abilities of digital management and technical problem-solving, which are exactly the skills that young workers graduating from universities and technical programs are positioned to develop. However, as per the National Association of Manufacturers, over 500,000 manufacturing jobs remain unfilled because modern factories require robotics and AI skills that current training systems are proving unable to supply at the scale needed (NAM, 2025). This points towards the policy opportunity of investments in workforce development and apprenticeship programs, aligned with reshoring initiatives, that would connect young Americans to stable and high-paying careers.

Logistics and supply chain management represent a second growth area. As American companies pursue diversification strategies in the wake of geopolitical change, the demand for professionals who can design and adapt complex supply chains is growing. The WEF’s Future of Jobs Report 2025 projects that geoeconomic trends, including increased geopolitical division and trade restrictions, are expected to generate approximately five million additional jobs by 2030, most prominently in fields such as logistics and strategy (WEF, 2025). Young people who combine analytical skills with international business awareness are therefore well-positioned to fill roles that did not exist a decade ago.

Cybersecurity is the third, and arguably most urgent, area for growth. Geopolitical disruption has significantly escalated the frequency and severity of state-sponsored cyberattacks. According to labor market data aggregator Lightcast, there were over 1.5 million cybersecurity or cybersecurity-adjacent jobs demanded in the U.S. in the second quarter of 2024, with only 1.28 million skilled workers available to fill them (Lightcast, 2024). This represents a talent gap of 225,000 positions. The 2025 ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study confirms that a shortage remains acute at the experienced professional level even as the pipeline of new graduates expands, which means that young workers who enter the field now can expect strong and sustained demand through their careers (ISC2, 2025).

C. The Unequal Distribution of Risk

An important caveat to note is that the risks of geopolitical disruption are not shared equally across the generation. Young workers facing skill mismatches and without access to reskilling are disproportionately at risk as the labor market structurally changes. The WEF warns that millions of workers globally are unlikely to receive said reskilling, leaving their employment prospects increasingly at risk (WEF, 2025). For Gen Z workers without college degrees, living in regions not targeted by reshoring investments or CHIPS Act semiconductor subsidies, the benefits of existing economic resilience policy may feel out of reach. For instance, a software engineering graduate in Austin, Texas, positioned to work in semiconductor manufacturing is in a categorically different situation than a young worker in a deindustrialized community where supply chain disruptions mean store shelves are empty and local employers are laying off workers.

More importantly, entry-level employee confidence reached its lowest recorded level in March 2025, with only 43.4% of entry-level workers expressing a positive six-month outlook for their employers (Zhao, 2025). This reflects how Gen Z is experiencing both objective job insecurity and psychological pressure from general economic conditions. This psychological toll affects young workers’ willingness to invest in long-term skills development and make the financial commitments that drive economic growth. If resilience policy creates new industries but fails to build accessible pathways into them, the benefits will only go to those who are already advantaged and deepen existing inequalities within the generation

D. What Resilience Means for Young People

Ultimately, the question of economic resilience considering geopolitical factors is inseparable from whether young people can build financially stable lives. Geopolitical risks remain as a growing threat in today’s world, with increasing political fragmentation and economic conflict, both capable of amplifying economic slowdowns that fall hardest on the generation just entering the workforce. Supply chain diversification, domestic manufacturing investment, cybersecurity infrastructure, reskilling initiatives, and any other number of resilience policies are decisions about whether the jobs available to young Americans in the next decade are stable or precarious; well-compensated or exploitative; and accessible to all or only those born into opportunity.

Getting resilience policy right is a generational commitment that the U.S. must rise to meet.

VII. Conclusions

Economic resilience is no longer merely an economic goal; it has become a strategic imperative. In light of the increasing frequency and interconnectedness of global geopolitical disruptions (pandemics, armed conflict, cyberattacks, etc.), governments need to recognize that future economic growth and stability cannot depend solely on efficiency. Preparedness and continuity planning are also essential components of that growth. Recent events clearly demonstrate how sudden shocks that occur thousands of miles away can rapidly impact domestic price levels, employment rates, trade, and public confidence.

Preparing for this new reality does not require abandoning globalization or retreating from international cooperation. Rather, it calls for building economies that are better equipped to withstand disruption through diversified supply chains, strategic investments in critical industries, stronger partnerships with trusted allies, resilient infrastructure, and long-term planning. While these policies may involve trade-offs, the cost of failing to invest in strengthening economic resilience before the next crisis will likely exceed and outweigh any costs associated with investments required today.

Ultimately, economic resilience is an investment in future generations. Decisions that policymakers make today regarding current economic systems will determine the accessibility and affordability of everyday necessities, the stability of labor markets, and the opportunities available to young people in an increasingly unstable and unpredictable global economy. By adopting policies that balance present economic openness with strategic preparedness, governments can reduce future vulnerabilities while also maintaining the ability to innovate and prosper through international cooperation. Strengthening economic resilience is not solely about being prepared for one specific disaster event; rather, it is about building economies that can adapt, compete, and prosper regardless of future challenges that will inevitably emerge.

VIII. Acknowledgement

The Institute for Youth in Policy wishes to acknowledge Rylan Wang for editing this policy brief.

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