Executive Summary

New Zealand (NZ), a remote nation of just over five million people, might seem poised for a simple foreign policy. Yet, the reality is anything but simple. This analysis traces the roots of NZ’s foreign policy to understand the challenges it faces today. Despite its geographic isolation, NZ’s structural proclivity for coalition governments, dangerous reliance on China and a complicated relationship with Australia have all tragically tamed the fighting spirit of the country’s once famous and much adored eccentrically progressive foreign policy.

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II. OVERVIEW

Relevance

             NZ is often dubbed a pensioner’s paradise, and that is rooted in the right reasons. Verdant groves, lush green fields, a panoply of not so dangerous flora and fauna (unlike Australia), and quite simply, a country that does not have a worthy contender for its breathtaking beauty. Yet, under the garb of this paradise remains a cauldron of simmering stress and anxiety. As more and more Kiwis find that the economy is in tatters, more are headed outward. In August 2024, NZ recorded its highest ever loss of citizens with over 80,000 citizens leaving the country, double the number seen leaving prior to Covid. NZ’s economy is struggling after the central bank hiked cash rates by 521 basis points in its most aggressive tightening since the official cash rate was introduced in 1999. The economy grew 0.2 per cent in the first quarter, unemployment rose to 4.7 per cent in the second quarter and inflation remains high at 3.3 per cent. Where are these Kiwis off to? Australia, a much bigger country that promises a much better lifestyle. At the crux of this analysis, however, is not an assessment of NZ’s economic future. We focus instead on how a poor economy, macro-political structures and trading imperatives can complicate foreign policy as the trinity actually go hand in hand, more often than not.

Current Stances

            The current Luxon administration in NZ has heaved ambitious objectives for its time in power:  economic recuperation, accessible housing, environmental sustainability, social justice, and government services. To recalibrate the economy after the COVID-19 pandemic, the government is dedicating funds to infrastructure, assisting businesses, and generating employment opportunities. To tackle the housing crisis, efforts are being made to boost housing availability, limit foreign investment, and enhance tenant rights. Despite these being critical domestic issues that the new government is seeking to alter, the main subject matter associated with NZ is its foreign partners and trade. NZ is a nation with a relatively short history and sociocultural identity but a main component of its recognition derives from its distinct alliances and relations; especially, when it comes to trade. NZ is a strong proponent for free trade as it is a critical aspect of its economy due to the fact that the sole manner in which the country can pay for its imports is by exporting more products. This is exemplified through implemented policies such as the NZ-European Union Free Trade Agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Although this nation is categorized by its small population, it plays a crucial role in international and internal collaborative matters. In other words, Kiwis enjoy a distinct soft power in the chessboard of international relations. As the first country to rally successfully against nuclear testing, NZ told the world the extent it would go to define its principles. An attack on its principles was tantamount to an attack on the identity of Kiwis. In the context of developing effective and beneficial relationships, NZ has laid out the foundation for subjects relating to potential conflicts within their internal and foreign policy, perhaps coming to terms with the fact that the world is starkly different to what a preordained set of principles can conceive. Nowhere does this play out better than in NZ’s relations with China. 

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      In recent years, there has been a populist recognition of what could call the “China threat,” a grave fear inextricably linked to exorbitant and excessive purchases of NZ properties by Chinese nationals, in tandem with increasing mainland customers for the country’s flagship dairy and beef products. Whilst NZ Prime Ministers have shied away from directly discussing the relationship with China, it is obvious that they eschew pragmatism in favour of principles. China is too big a power for a nation like NZ and it seems better to back down and derive benefits from any meaningful relationship rather than strive to jeopardise and challenge the country’s ever-extending tentacles. A potential change in this direction may manifest in something as little as the Luxon government removing the ban on live animal exports to China. With that being said, the mixed perception of the Chinese government in NZ poses an alarming challenge, even though there have been efforts made to alleviate the tensions. However, there remain three cardinal sources of concern: China's assiduous courting of pacific nations that NZ has historically had a grip over, unscrupulous treatment of minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, in tandem with a flamboyant display of wealth by the Chinese nouveau-riche in NZ. NZ generally recognizes that as a small nation on the global stage, its impact is restricted and it benefits more from nurturing positive connections with all significant countries rather than prioritizing one (USA) and jeopardizing another (China), but that seems always to be at the cusp of change, driven not by rationality but by fear of cozying up to China more and more, at the cost of fracturing a relationship with the world's most powerful democracy, USA. It is reasonable to conclude that any economic or military alliance would be carefully considered to ensure that NZ does not displease China too much, by virtue of China being its largest trading partner. Diplomats, thus far, have veered away from any significant disputes with either China or the USA. Nevertheless, there is a clarion call to move away from China and pivot to the USA.

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III. HISTORY

How it started

             In 1788, NZ was, for all practical purposes, a "de facto part" of the British colony of New South Wales, a designation unilaterally made by Governor Arthur Phillip in an attempt to extend the reach of the British Empire. However, this move was not based on any coherent strategic logic but rather a haphazard imperial assertion, emblematic of Britain’s broader ad-hoc approach to its colonial territories. The geographical distance across the Tasman Sea between NZ and New South Wales left the practical application of British law and governance in a state of ambiguity. This territorial ambiguity would plague NZ’s early history, sowing confusion about its legal standing and fostering the notion that it was a colonial afterthought rather than a clearly defined entity.

          The massacre on the Banks Peninsula in 1831 brought these latent issues into sharp relief. The British authorities found themselves unable to impose legal consequences on the perpetrators, underscoring the fragile grip the empire had on its more peripheral holdings. It was not until 1839, under pressure to resolve these jurisdictional uncertainties, that the Crown reaffirmed NZ’s place within British sovereignty—yet again a reactive move, driven more by necessity than by strategic forethought. New South Wales Governor Sir George Gipps extended his authority over NZ, but this extension was ultimately superficial, with colonial governance proving unworkable over such vast distances. By 1841, the British government abandoned the idea altogether, establishing NZ as its own colony, separate from New South Wales.  

           Yet even with this nominal separation, NZ remained a colonial periphery—functionally an imperial outpost devoid of clear strategic importance, outside of its geographical position relative to Australia. This was reflected in the consideration of NZ joining the Federation of Australia in 1900. The idea was treated with ambivalence by the British and NZ elites alike, not because of any grand geopolitical calculations but due to concerns over social hierarchies and racial purity. Richard Seddon, NZ’s premier at the time, convened a Royal Commission to evaluate the prospect, only to reject it, largely out of fears that joining Australia would compromise NZ’s "white policies" and its relative social purity. The fact that Australia’s population included Queensland’s Melanesian indentured laborers and former British convicts heightened these anxieties, feeding into NZ’s desire to maintain a sense of racial superiority and cultural distinction. By 1907, NZ declared itself a dominion, but this did not imply true autonomy. Like Australia, NZ’s move toward sovereignty followed a piecemeal, reactive trajectory, culminating only in 1947 when it adopted the Statute of Westminster, lagging behind its larger neighbor in asserting legislative independence. This gradual emergence as a self-governing state reflected not a bold strategic vision but rather a cautious navigation of imperial politics, mirroring Australia’s own process whilst maintaining a distinct identity based largely on avoiding direct integration with its larger, more racially heterogeneous neighbor.

The First World War marked the beginning of a more coherent partnership between NZ and Australia, primarily out of military necessity. The formation of the Australian and NZ Army Corps (ANZAC) was less an indication of a shared vision than a reflection of the geopolitical realities of the time. Both countries declared war in 1939, aligning their interests out of sheer  rather than a coordinated strategic plan. Their collaboration was institutionalized in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, a pact driven by Cold War imperatives and a shared concern over regional security. However, the divergence in strategic thinking became more apparent in the following decades, particularly in the 1980s when NZ declared itself nuclear-free. Australia, by contrast, deepened its military alignment with the United States, prioritizing its alliance even at the cost of regional autonomy. The U.S. suspension of its treaty obligations with NZ in 1986 underscored this split, highlighting the different trajectories the two countries had begun to take, particularly in relation to their roles within the broader international system.

              In the contemporary era, Australia remains NZ’s primary defense ally, but the nature of the relationship has shifted. while once defined by military cooperation and colonial ties, the relationship now centers on economic interdependence and shared concerns over global issues like climate change. Yet, beneath this surface of cooperation lies a deeper strategic reality: NZ’s continued reliance on Australia for defense, and Australia’s role as the region’s dominant power. Both countries may champion closer partnership, but the underlying dynamics of asymmetry persist—NZ remains, in many ways, a dependent actor within the regional order, navigating the balance of power between its larger neighbor and the global hegemon, the United States. Their collaboration may endure, but the power differentials that have shaped their relationship from the beginning remain. A novel caveat to consider is, of course, the meteoric rise of China to superpower status in the span of less than two decades. ‍

Tried Policy

         In recent debates, many politicians and analysts argue that Aotearoa NZ’s “independent” foreign policy is under threat. Critics suggest that closer security ties with Australia, NATO, and the potential inclusion of NZ in Pillar II of AUKUS could compromise its ability to maintain a pragmatic and self-determining foreign policy approach. Former Prime Minister Helen Clark and former National Party leader Don Brash have recently set aside their historical differences to voice concerns that joining AUKUS would signify a departure from NZ’s independent stance, aligning it unequivocally with America’s “China containment policy.” They accuse the current government of aligning with U.S. strategies to curb China’s economic rise and constrain it with American military presence. This sentiment is echoed by opposition members of the Labour Party, who view NZ’s potential involvement in AUKUS as an attempt to wedge China and pose a threat to trade. For these critics, such actions represent a concerning ideological shift by the conservative National government, which risks reverting to traditional, restrictive security alliances focused on containing Chinese influence in the Pacific. As Clark remarked during her April 2024 visit to Wellington, an “independent foreign policy” requires navigating relationships with both China and the United States without contributing to polarization or supporting one side’s tensions. Critics argue that increased defense cooperation is ill-suited to NZ’s status as a small Pacific state with unique economic and security challenges. 

           Given the heated rhetoric surrounding Pillar II of AUKUS and the current government's unclear stance, there is a risk that discussions on deeper security cooperation will be overshadowed by debates over historical alliances and NZ’s traditional policy principles. These principles include its commitment to non-discriminatory trade, anti-nuclear policies, and a focus on the South Pacific, which have defined its independent foreign policy since the Lange government era of the 1980s.

        To understand NZ’s “independent” foreign policy, it is essential to trace its historical evolution. NZ’s early international engagement began with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 under the British Empire’s auspices, and it was a founding member of the League of Nations. Its post-World War II foreign policy closely followed Western allies, evidenced by its participation in the Malayan Emergency, the Vietnam War, and multilateral defense agreements like the Five-Power Defense Arrangement and ANZUS.    However, NZ’s pro-Western stance was balanced by a strong commitment to the United Nations and liberal internationalism, which policymakers saw as protective of smaller states and trade. Prime Minister Peter Fraser, a notable advocate at the 1945 San Francisco Conference that established the U.N., argued against the Permanent Member veto in the U.N. Security Council. The 1960s brought significant changes due to evolving domestic attitudes towards race and immigration, Maori activism, and the impact of the Vietnam War. These shifts, combined with economic challenges stemming from Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community, prompted a reevaluation of NZ’s foreign policy, rejecting Cold War binaries and embracing new normative perspectives.The Lange government’s adoption of neoliberal economic policies and a nuclear-free stance further innovated NZ’s policy approach. The nuclear-free policy, in response to U.S. pressures, French nuclear testing, and the Rainbow Warrior bombing, led to the dissolution of ANZUS and redefined NZ’s role in global security. 

            NZ’s foreign policy evolved to address a broader range of security, economic, and environmental challenges. As a small trading nation, it sought to expand trading opportunities through international agreements. It was the first to support China’s WTO membership, recognize China as a market economy, and sign a comprehensive free trade agreement with China. NZ also promoted a Pacific-wide trading regime through the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Despite notable successes, such as the global nuclear-free movement and the expansion of China’s integration into the global economy, the need to reevaluate security relationships with Australia and Western allies is apparent. The rise of authoritarianism and challenges to liberal internationalism necessitate a thoughtful reassessment of NZ’s foreign policy. whilst trade and investment have become more politicized, the notion of “value-neutral” relationships is increasingly complex. The evolving international landscape, including China’s assertive stance and influence, necessitates a pragmatic approach beyond a strictly idealized “independent” policy. Similar to Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership despite their historical neutrality, NZ’s foreign policy must adapt to current realities. The question is not whether a realignment is required but how to navigate it effectively whilst maintaining core principles. An independent foreign policy must balance traditional values with contemporary geopolitical dynamics.

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‍IV. POLICY PROBLEM

 In NZ’s attempts to maintain healthy relations with the United States and China simultaneously, they appear to fuse both the pacifistic idealism of the Bandung Conference and the realpolitik of Otto von Bismarck’s dreikaiserbund - that is, their primary concern is non-alignment, as was popularized in much of the Global South during the Cold War, but also the strategic manipulation of alliances seen in 19th-century Europe to play both sides of a conflict for national benefit. NZ’s policy is first and foremost concerned with their national interest, but other factors can often interfere in the realization of this paramount goal - economy, logistics, or the common conflicts of Westminster-style democracy - and thus NZ’s transition away from a traditional position of quasi-isolationism to a pragmatic blend of relations with both China and the United States is by nature a tempestuous one.

Following the Second World War, NZ’s foreign policy almost entirely focused on a close strategic and economic relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom, a reliance that became increasingly incompatible with the geopolitical realities of the Pacific world in the later years of the Cold War. Attempts at a more independent NZ appear to have originated during the administration of Labour Party Prime Minister N.E. Kirk, who openly prioritized moral and humanitarian considerations over the traditional unwavering loyalty of Wellington to defensive commitments. In 1972, Kirk directly condemned American President Richard Nixon for increased bombing in Hanoi; in 1974, Kirk proposed the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone at a meeting of ANZUS (a defensive alliance between Australia, NZ, and the United States), raising concern from Wellington’s Western security partners; and perhaps most controversially, Kirk oversaw the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and China, lessening Western hegemony over the Pacific. However, whereas Kirk’s attempts to establish a more independent NZ derived primarily from idealism, his National Party successor Robert Muldoon entertained isolationism as a means of creating economic self-reliance. Muldoon’s plethora of protectionist policies known as “Fortress NZ” emphasized the centrality of trade to NZ’s overall foreign stature - owing to the consistently substantive portion of NZ’s gross national product that derives from trade - both by decreasing direct overseas aid spending and through increased borrowing for expansionary infrastructure projects known as Muldoon’s “Think Big” initiative. whilst Muldoon succeeded in realigning NZ with the United States during this key juncture in geopolitics, his policies also precluded later attempts for economic reform by the Labour Party known as “Rogernomics”, emphasizing a greater liberalization of markets in reaction to Muldoon’s protectionism. The legacies of both permeate the economic milieu of NZ today. 

  To preface the present situation, NZ’s present coalition government has operated for just over six months at the time of this writing. It already faces growing opposition regarding both domestic policies and the extent of political resources dedicated to international concerns. During the October 2023 election that promoted the National Party, NZ voters were almost unilaterally focused on the ongoing cost-of-living crisis that many politicians view as entirely deriving from the mismanagement of the Labor Party since 2019 (such as refusing to remove highly protectionist tariffs or invest in declining infrastructure) - drawing attention away from any foreign policy concerns, despite the increasing prescience of NZ’s stances toward Pacific allies. Professor Robert Patnam of the Australian Institute for International Affairs wrote in October that the traditional importance of “bread and butter” domestic issues to NZ voters would inevitably shift toward larger international concerns as foreign and national interests increasingly conflicted. Patnam specifically cites rising food prices in the Pacific and increased market volatility due to the Russo-Ukrainian War, both of which could exacerbate domestic economic struggles. Regardless of international connotations, many of these domestic issues have not improved since the election of Luxon and the National Party in October, leading to plunging approval ratings and greater vulnerability within the new coalition government. In March, polling company Ipsos released a poll that showed the average NZer assessed the government’s performance in its First 100 Days at 4.6 out of 10, due in no small part to an ongoing recession. Despite the expansionary influence of 141,000 migrants arriving in NZ in 2023, the economy has decreased in GDP per capita by an average of 0.8% over the previous five quarters, which both the National and Labor Party bear some degree of blame for. Thus, foreign policy represents an opportunity for the National Party to substantially differentiate itself from its Labor counterparts and ideally distract from economic hardship to secure continued success in future elections. 

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This situation has led to a recent elucidation of the National Party’s foreign policy platform, centered around both idealism and protecting national interests. Contrastively, the website for the Labor Party does not feature a section on foreign policy, corroborating the domestically-centered worldview that many foreign analysts characterize NZ with. Available on the National Party website, key international positions of the present government include both vague generalities such as “strengthening relationships around the world whilst striving to optimize those we already have” and more ideologically pointed declarations such as reaffirming NZ’s connections with the United States and Australia via the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, condemning Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, and aiming to hold China accountable to a “rules-based system” of international order that NZ claims is presently endangered. 

           Although this platform displays a clear inclination toward supporting West-aligned causes and international humanitarian goals, the reality of NZ’s foreign policy is driven by more than simple idealism. Australia is NZ’s only formal military ally, and as such is most directly impacted by their positions, meaning near-constant pressure from Canberra pushes NZ toward greater armament and strategic defense planning. Such pressures also align with the United States and the United Kingdom, who view NZ as a further ally in a Pacific increasingly threatened by Chinese strategic expansion, as seen in China’s 2022 security pact with the Solomon Islands, another Oceanic state. Yet the mutual strategic importance of NZ’s alignment with the West is contrasted by the economic dependence of NZ on China, its largest trading partner. whilst the new Foreign Minister of NZ Winston Peters has displayed an increased willingness from his predecessors to criticize China for human rights violations or aggressive behavior in the Taiwan Strait, the new National Party government is still clearly bearish on irreparably distancing itself from Beijing. Following Chinese cyberattacks against opponents of the Chinese Communist Party in the United States, United Kingdom, and NZ in March 2024, NZ was the only state of the three not to respond with any sanctions against those responsible, reflecting their difficult position in effectively countering Chinese aggression.

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China, the United States, Australia, and domestic politics all represent influential forces presently shaping NZ’s foreign policy - the key issue that will define the international standing of the National Party government is their willingness to prioritize ideology and security over pragmatic necessity. NZ’s emphasis on humanitarian issues occasionally exceeds that of Western allies, including over the Israel-Hamas conflict, but NZ is unwilling to commit to a broader coalition of democratically-aligned powers in the Pacific such as AUKUS for fear of alienating China and the trade that sustains an already dwindling domestic economy. Secondary states such as NZ are forced to reckon with the increasingly mutually exclusive nature of relations with China and the United States, with closer ties with one necessitating a distancing from the other. 

A parliamentary speech delivered by Winston Peters earlier in May seems to indicate that NZ’s grand strategy is the substantial increase of trade volume with non-Chinese parties to facilitate increased independence in decision-making, stating that such agreements will “over time add up and allow our exporters to grow in existing markets whilst also diversifying into new ones.” In that same speech, Peters cited his belief that the world was experiencing an unprecedented shift “from rules to power, from economics to security, and from efficiency to resilience”, apparently describing the increased geopolitical divisions of the 2020s and the perception of ideological distance between the Russia-China axis and the global West, with Peters unmistakably favoring the latter. Yet his concluding statement provides the greatest insight into the determination and ambition of the National Party to create a novel foreign policy that satisfies all requirements in trade, security, and ideology, emphasizing that any changes will be inherently nationalistic ones: “we are steadfast in our belief that NZ’s voice matters, and that within the community of nations, we stand as equals.”

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Policy Options

              It is an age-old adage in liberal democracies that there are only ever a few things that can stop an elected government from exercising its will. This unsurprisingly extends not just to domestic domains but also into foreign policy realm. Yet with utter irony, it is elected governments that are trammeling on their own wills in NZ, whilst simultaneously letting coherence take the back seat. Until 1992, New Zealand embraced a First-Past-the-Post system wherein the candidate with the most votes in a constituency wins the election even if that candidate happens to receive only a minority of votes in relation to the votes that other candidates collectively garner. To visualise this in practice, imagine a contest where several people submit their favorite cake recipes. The winner is simply the recipe that gets the most votes. If the top recipe only receives 35% of the votes, it still wins, regardless of how many people preferred other cakes. The rest of the votes don’t influence the outcome. This is how the First-Past-the-Post system works—whoever gets the most votes wins, even if they don’t have a majority. By the looks of it, it sounds unreasonable and unfair, but there’s a rationale behind countries like the United States, United Kingdom, India and even NZ’s comical big brother Australia employing this exact electoral system. The rationale for such a system was derived from a staunch belief in the power of strong governments in parliament. Indeed, countries with strong governments have achieved much. Be it Germany that experienced rapid industrialization under Otto Von Bismarck, Singapore that switched from being a slum to a first-world country under Lee Kuan Yew or Margaret Thatcher’s opening of British borders for greater investment. Strong governments have the power to drive tangible change. 

         That is not to downplay the successes of countries that have a predilection for coalitions like Sweden, Finland or Luxembourg or to categorically reject the notion of coalitions succeeding ever. However, New Zealand faces a set of challenges unique to itself—an island nation in the middle of nowhere—it does not enjoy the warm security blanket of the European Union’s security arm, NATO nor does it have the power to independently steer clear of forces that seek to obliterate the neoliberal order as we know it. NZ’s distance, size and significance all work together to ensure the nation is not even represented on many world maps. It is often forgotten, often neglected. Upon inspection, New Zealand’s most famous days were under strong governments that could do what they wanted. Julius Vogel ordered the construction of much of the infrastructure that makes up New Zealand today, from colossal dams to well-planned towns and cities. Michael Joseph Savage’s ground-breaking social welfare policies in the 1930s ushered in equitable economic prosperity, David Lange became the poster child of a widely-acclaimed anti-nuclear movement, rising not only his stature but NZ’s stature as a stridently moral country on the global stage. 

    Since the adoption of the Multi-party representation system in 1991 that guarantees equity of views, but also more bluntly, differences, New Zealand has fallen short of leaders who can make things happen. Its political incoherence in conjunction with being a small, remote nation devoid of strong partnerships made it a fertile ground for powers like China and Russia to seep in and sway NZ to their sides. In 2008, New Zealand became the first OECD           nation to enter into a free-trade agreement with China (essentially where there are no taxes on imports and exports for each of the countries) Beijing’s penchant for ties with China is not so much as derived from a quest for global influence than it is to test the depths of an American reaction. In other words, Chinese interaction in the region is a test to see the extent to which the USA still upholds Nixon’s communist doctrine of 1954, that is, will the USA step in to contain China’s influence or let it play out?
          Today, China stands as NZ’s largest trading partner and that has serious political implications: NZ cannot afford to speak out against China on the global stage, drawing a blank to its historically progressive foreign policy. This extends to alliances with other countries of which the United States and Australia are members. Nowhere is this best embodied than in AUKUS, a trilateral security agreement between the USA, UK and Australia. The three powers made it unequivocally clear that the doors were open for NZ to join, yet there is palpable ambivalence for Wellington.  Whilst pillar 1 of AUKUS that calls for acquiring and operating nuclear-powered attack submarines will be ruled out for the island nation because of PM David Lange’s much revered and set-in-stone ‘no to nuclear’ commitment, there is little excuse to eschew joining pillar 2 of the AUKUS that has nothing to do with nuclear but instead with sharing defence intelligence between the USA, UK and Australia. New Zealand’s equivocation about pillar 2 that it should have no reservations about, is perhaps emblematic of Beijing’s stronghold. Former New Zealand PM Helen Clark even admitted this explicitly, in questioning why NZ should join an alliance aimed at countering its biggest trading partner.

            Ambivalence about any ties with China is now an inconspicuous caveat of NZ’s foreign Policy, for ties have deepened and the country cannot afford to work against Beijing. The damage has been done and it is in NZ’s hands to reverse it. Whilst some New Zealanders may argue that NZ is entitled to having its own options and own way of doing things, it appears ultimately to only be a facade of satisfaction for a deep and latent anxiety about being so reliant on China, a country striving to uproot the very international order that NZ depends on. New Zealand’s vulnerable position on the global stage in tandem with a MPP system that favours coalitions complicates foreign policy. The complication is not derived from the system itself but from those who partake in it. There are voices within the current NZ coalition- administration to be critical of China; with others more forgiving. Whilst it is not in our bearing or our prerogative to propose to Wellington what it should do with its foreign policy, one thing that is clear without doubt is the fact that there is an urgent need for coherence. As newer Parties like ACT and Green enter the ruling government, the need for coherence only becomes salient because they lack the poise and wisdom of New Zealand’s age-old, entrenched National and Labour parties in both understanding and responding to international developments in a manner that does justice to both NZ’s legacy and to its contemporary problems. whilst closer ties with China may be far from ideal, they remain a geopolitical inevitability for New Zealand. If Wellington seeks to carve out greater independence in its foreign policy, it must first realign its economic strategy towards the United States by courting foreign direct investment. This should be the precursor to any consideration of a military alliance, which would almost certainly provoke economic reprisals from Beijing. Put simply, the pathway to a military partnership with the U.S. is through strengthened economic cooperation. Reducing dependence on China will give New Zealand the strategic autonomy it desires.

Conclusion

New Zealand’s challenge isn’t about choosing sides—it’s about crafting a foreign policy that endures. whilst hedging may delay tough choices, it ultimately weakens resolve in the long haul. The way forward is clear: reduce reliance on China, strengthen ties with the U.S., and strike a balance between principle and pragmatism. Today’s decisions will define New Zealand’s place in an increasingly divided world.

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