I. Introduction

From its earliest days as a republic, the United States has asserted its role as a dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, mostly clearly through the Monroe Doctrine established under President James Monroe. Initially framed as a warning to European colonial powers, the doctrine evolved into a broader justification for U.S. involvement across Latin America, driven by both political and economic interests. Over the past two decades, this motive has transformed in form but not in intent, oscillating between diplomacy and coercion. Current tensions are not isolated incidents but the latest occurrences in a long-standing struggle over influence and regional stability, now intensified by renewed interventionist policy and strategic competition in the Western Hemisphere.

The modern crisis, illustrated most dramatically by U.S. action against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, has reignited discussions over hemispheric power dynamics and the legality of interventionism. These developments echo earlier confrontations, including the ideological legacy set forth by Hugo Chávez and the rise of anti-American governance models in the region. Concurrently, external powers such as China and Russia have expanded their economic and strategic footprint in Latin America, challenging traditional U.S. dominance and converting the region into a renewed arena of power competition. Examining shifting doctrines, economic rivalry, and military engagement provides insight into today’s diplomatic recalibration and highlights the necessity of balancing security interests with multilateral legitimacy and regional trust.

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II. History

Even before the United States became the global superpower it is today, it established the foundations for tension with Latin America. Dating back to the early Republic era, the Monroe Doctrine created a precedent of U.S. strategic authority in the Hemisphere that has expanded far beyond its original intent. While the Doctrine initially declared an American parental sense over Latin America, subsequent policies were increasingly “guided by self-interest… territorial expansion and hegemonic control over the region,” according to DePaul University.

Through military occupation, economic succession, and neo-liberalism, America has maintained significant influence over Latin American nations, particularly Venezuela. The term "twenty-first-century socialism" was popularized by Hugo Chávez, who served as Venezuela’s President from 1999 to 2013, to describe the massive ideological transformation of the country. His administration consisted of enhanced state control over key industries, and was marked by economic instability, political repression, and a growing humanitarian crisis. Chávez’s explicitly anti-American agenda and rhetoric intensified tensions with the U.S. Like Venezuela, the rest of the Latin American countries have historically operated under the U.S. sphere of influence, and the increasing antagonistic relations grow further through the decades. 

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III. Tried Policy

Latin America has consistently been exploited by American adversaries to establish a presence in an attempt to weaken the United States’ influence. During World War 1, Germany attempted to form an alliance with Mexico against the United States, and during the Cold War, the Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba. Today, China has emerged as the primary geopolitical competitor to the U.S., and its growing presence in Latin America reflects these past trends.

Since China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, its trade with Latin America has grown exponentially, from just $12 billion in 2000 to over $450 billion by 2021. In doing so, China has become a major trading partner for countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela, among many others (Esclusa, 2026). However, trade is not the main source of power that Latin America has granted to China; it is simply the access point. Dual-use infrastructure, meaning infrastructure that can be used by both civilians and the military, is where a core issue lies. Some examples of these types of construction that were built by China in the aforementioned countries include the Port of Chancay in Peru, the Espacio Lejano Deep Space Station in Argentina, telecommunication projects in Mexico, and various satellite and tracking facilities across the region. These developments have caused the United States to grow wary about China’s long-term strategic access in the Western Hemisphere.

In response, the United States under the Trump Administration has implemented sweeping measures directed toward Latin American countries. This effort to counter China’s influence is being pursued as an attempt to bring them back under the American sphere of influence. Measures have included significant tariffs (including a 50% tariff placed on Brazil, 25% tariff on Mexico, and a 15% tariff on Venezuela), as well as a 25% tariff on any country that imports Venezuelan oil (Andreasen, 2026). Although an unusually aggressive move, Trump is attempting to stop any country from trading with Venezuela through attacking its largest export (which includes Russia and China). 

Since Trump has returned to the White House, the United States has ramped up its enforcement and operations against Venezuela. U.S. authorities have seized multiple oil tankers as part of enforcing existing sanctions. In August 2025, the U.S. increased its military presence in the Caribbean, officially claiming that it was an effort to stop drug trafficking. Most significantly, in January 2026, the United States successfully conducted a military operation targeting Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, in which he was captured and taken to the United States (Finely et al., 2026).

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IV. International Responses

After President Donald Trump’s recent military operation that successfully captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the rest of the world has provided a wide array of responses. Notably, geopolitical rivals of the U.S., such as China, Russia, and Iran, have strongly condemned the U.S.’s actions. However, many states in the Western Hemisphere, especially NATO member states, have reaffirmed their support for Trump’s decision, contrasting the largely negative reaction from states in other regions of the world. This highlights the varying viewpoints that different states have shared regarding this geopolitical crisis.

The United States’ current largest geopolitical rival, China, has strongly condemned the U.S.’s “unilateral, illegal, and bullying acts” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, 2026). The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has deemed this military operation a serious violation of international law and of Venezuela’s sovereignty, urging the U.S. to stop what it called hegemonic, illegal actions and to abide by the United Nations Charter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2026; Brasil de Fato, 2026). At the United Nations Security Council, representatives of the People’s Republic of China have also characterized the forced detention of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife as a clear violation of international law, basic norms in international relations, and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2026). This happened despite President Donald Trump asserting that China would not have an issue with this military operation, as he believes that he has a close relationship with President Xi Jinping (South China Morning Post, 2026).

China’s response reflects its longstanding foreign policy rhetoric of non-interference in internal affairs which acts as China’s appeal towards potential trade partners and allies around the globe. Geopolitical irony can be seen in this situation due to tensions between China and Taiwan. However, China has repeatedly framed its conflict with Taiwan as an internal affair due to the Chinese Civil War and warned against external interference while denying Taiwan’s independent status (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2026). Notably, Reform UK leader Nigel Farage stated that he hoped this event would “make China and Russia think twice,” highlighting how the U.S.’s military operation in Venezuela could serve as a warning towards potential Russian or Chinese expansion in their respective regions. This incident in many ways acts as a flashpoint in U.S.-China competition, calling into question China’s growing influence with its foreign policy agenda, namely BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative, in the Latin American region.

The U.S.’s other major geopolitical rival, Russia, also strongly condemned the attack on Venezuela, calling it an act of armed aggression (The Moscow Times, 2026). At the United Nations Security Council. Russia stood with China, calling for immediate de-escalation and warning against externally imposed regime change (Reuters, 2026). Despite President Vladimir Putin’s close ties with Maduro, Russia’s response to the Venezuela crisis has been limited to diplomatic statements (Sabanadze, 2026). This inability to operate concrete countermeasures reflects Russia’s lack of leverage to confront the U.S. directly in Latin America, particularly due to its ongoing military commitments in Ukraine. As compared to China, Russia has significantly weaker influence currently in the Latin American region due to resource constraints.

As for Iran, the capture of President Nicolás Maduro serves as a major setback for Iran’s operational capacity in the Latin American region, given that Venezuela has functioned as a base for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxy, Hezbollah. Maduro’s removal threatens their transnational criminal and drug-trafficking network, which has been essential in financing Hezbollah’s activities (Pelayo et al. 2026). Notably, Iran has invested billions in Venezuelan infrastructure, ranging from car factories to cement plants. With the potential regime change backed by the U.S., Iran is unlikely to recover debts from Venezuela or maintain its preferential trade status, which further disrupts the “Axis of Resistance” logic to undermine the U.S. global hegemony (Pelayo et al., 2026). The U.S. military operation in Venezuela also serves as a signal to Iran that the U.S. would no longer be deterred by fears of escalation when it comes to targeting high-level officials linked to narcotics and terrorism.

At the core of the myriad of responses is the global legal debate surrounding this military operation. While the U.S. has justified their actions as a targeted law enforcement arrest based on long-standing criminal indictments for narcotics trafficking and narco-terrorism, rather than a traditional military invasion or an act of interstate hostility (Pelayo et al., 2026). However, this approach has been viewed as highly controversial as it bypasses traditional frameworks such as humanitarian intervention or collective self-defense and challenges the established assumption that heads of state are insulated from such direct physical interventions (Pelayo et al., 2026). It can be argued that framing Maduro’s capture as a criminal arrest could set a precedent that undermines the law of armed conflict and erodes the principle of sovereign equality. On the other hand, it can also be argued that this operation has established a new model for holding sanctioned and criminalized leaders accountable.

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V. Impact on US-Latin America Relations

President Trump’s recent actions in Venezuela reflect his adoption of the Monroe Doctrine, which warned the old European powers in the early 19th century against further colonization or interference in the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine would later be used as justification for U.S. intervention in various Latin American countries, as well as in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Trump’s interventionist approach, as demonstrated through calling for Canada to be 51st state, pursuing control of the Panama Canal, and kidnapping Venezuelan President Maduro, has led to the coining of the term “Donroe Doctrine.” The current administration’s support of this corollary of the doctrine was reflected in the National Security Strategy released late last year, which outlined plans to “deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere” (Chatterjee, 2026). 

Among the many symptoms of the “Donroe Doctrine” was President Trump’s renewed interest in the Panama Canal. Since January of 2025, Trump has said that he wants to “take back” the Panama Canal from alleged Chinese control (Spetalnick, 2025). Construction of the canal began as a French venture in 1881, but was abandoned in 1889. In 1903, the U.S. gained the rights to restart work on the canal after backing Panama’s breakaway from Colombia (Roy, 2025). In 1904, the U.S. began construction on the canal, with the work finishing in 1913 and the canal officially opening in 1914 (Klein, 2021). The U.S. continued to own and operate the canal from 1914 until 1979, when the Torrijos-Carter Treaty was signed, which gave control of the canal to the Panama Canal Authority, an autonomous government agency of Panama, mandated neutrality, and allowed the U.S. to intervene with military action, if the neutrality was ever breached (Roy, 2025). Trump has claimed that the U.S. has been unfairly treated and overcharged, despite the Torrijos-Carter treaty’s condition of neutrality. On January 29th, 2026, though, the Supreme Court of Panama ruled that the contract held by a subsidiary of a Hong Kong based conglomerate, the Panama Ports Company, to operate the ports at the ends of the canal was a violation of Panama’s constitution. On the 30th, the President of Panama José Mulino transferred control of the ports to Maersk, a Danish logistics and shipping company. This transfer and investigation came within the same month of Trump’s kidnapping of Venezuela’s former President Maduro, and sources like The Economist claim that “it is hard to imagine that any of this would have happened without the pressure applied by the United States” (The Economist, 2026).

Since the raid in Venezuela, countries around the world have voiced mixed concerns about Trump’s actions. Some countries like Argentina have praised it as “excellent news for the free world,” while other nations such as Iran have called it a “blatant violation of national sovereignty” (Linthicum, 2026). American allies in Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Panama, and Paraguay have celebrated Maduro’s ousting, but Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have all condemned Trump’s actions (The Economist, 2026). 

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VI. Effective Policy Pathways

Although previous U.S.-Latin American relations have been shaped by doctrines that have shifted from protecting against European colonial interests to fostering regional dominance, the U.S. must now balance firm resistance to authoritarian regimes with long-term regional stability and legitimacy. Ultimately, overreliance on overt intervention and coercion has allowed distrust of the US to fester, and under-engagement cedes influence to geopolitical rivals. Hence, the strategy regarding Latin America forward must effectively integrate and utilize diplomacy, economics, and calibrated pressure.

Sustained diplomatic engagement serves as the first key pillar of productive foreign policy toward Latin America. After nearly two centuries of doctrine-driven diplomacy, the U.S. must make an effort to normalize high-level engagement with the leaders of various Latin American countries. In practice, this could be accomplished through institutionalizing annual hemispheric summits, maintaining full ambassadorial representation in each Latin American country, increasing regional economic and security specialists within embassies, and separating crisis diplomacy from routine partnership diplomacy. This would prove significant as predictability builds trust, presence limits adversarial influence, and it reduces the perception of crisis-only interaction. Consequently, it is evident that standardizing routine diplomatic engagement in South America will aid in fostering stronger cross-continent relations and regional stability on a broader scale.

Next, competing economically with China in South America will be a seminal part of improving U.S.-Latin American relations. China has recently emerged as a large trading partner of many Latin American nations, with trade growing twenty-six-fold from 2000 to 2020 (Zhang & Prazeres). Hence, offering economically viable alternatives to China in South America would allow for both the improvement of South American relations and the reduction of adversarial influence in South America. Specifically, the U.S. could expand Development Finance Corporation (DFC) investment in infrastructure, prioritize nearshoring supply chains into Latin America, develop digital grade and energy agreements, and offer transparent infrastructure packages as alternatives to Chinese financing. Together, these forms of engagement could foster an environment of improved relations with the added benefit of minimizing Chinese presence in the Western Hemisphere.

Third, strengthening multilateral legitimacy is key to improving relations between the U.S. and Latin America. This end can be accomplished by the third effective policy pathway: working through regional institutions. Through efforts between the US and regional groups, the US should work to expand election monitoring missions via the Organization of American States, coordinate sanctions multilaterally, and support anti-corruption frameworks across the region. This offers a productive option as it would reduce accusations of unilateral imperialism, increase pressure credibility, and share the burden of enforcement with other organizations outside of the US Department of State. Taken together, these actions would work to bring credence and legitimacy to US diplomatic actions across the region as well as normalize cross-national relations.

Further, the US should shift its targets of authoritarian regimes from broad destabilization to targeted pressure. Essentially, this would entail moving to a diplomatic intervention model in which elite coalitions are fractured, but not entire states. This could be best achieved by targeted sanctions of regime elites, the freezing of financial networks tied to corruption, visa bans on officials and families, conditional sanction relief tied to electoral benchmarks, and quiet support for civil society and independent media within a nation. The key change in mentality hinges upon the notion that broad economic strangulation often entrenches regimes, but targeted financial pressure increases internal fracture. Hence, through targeted economic and social attacks on entrenched authoritarian regimes, the US can work towards removing regimes both carefully and effectively, rather than alienating populations and creating further destabilization within an already tense region.

Ultimately, the US cannot restore hemispheric influence and stability through dominance alone. Sustainable leadership requires consistent engagement, economic credibility, multilateral legitimacy, and targeted pressure that promotes institutional reform rather than destabilization. 

VII. Conclusion

The current state of U.S.-Latin American relations is defined by a dramatic return to interventionist policies, now often referred to as the “Donroe Doctrine.” From the historical foundations of the Monroe Doctrine to the recent, high-stakes capture of Nicolás Maduro, the Western Hemisphere has become a primary stage for global power competition felt most by the next generation of leaders, activists, and citizens. In summary, the capture of President Nicolás Maduro via Operation Absolute Resolve on January 3, 2026, represents a withdrawal from traditional diplomatic frameworks, sparking a global legal debate over sovereign equality and heads-of-state immunity. Furthermore, China has significantly expanded its footprint through “dual-use” infrastructure and trade and while Russia’s influence is currently limited by its commitments in Ukraine, Iran has lost a strategic base for its operational capacity in the region due to Maduro’s removal. In response, the U.S. has utilized aggressive tariffs, up to 50% in certain cases, and the seizure of oil assets to force regional alignment and pursue strategic assets like the Panama Canal.

The “chaos” of these shifting events does not just affect current diplomats or politicians; it reshapes the world the next generation will inherit. For young people in Latin America, broad economic strangulation and high tariffs can entrench poverty and limit job prospects, often forcing mass migration as a means of survival (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025). Moreover, as external powers like China build telecommunication and satellite facilities (Greitens, 2020), the digital privacy and technological future of the region’s youth are becoming bargaining chips in a “silent Cold War.” Now this leads to questions about what youth can do about this issue. Currently, youth organizations are increasingly calling for the U.S. to move away from unilateral “bullying” and toward regional institutions like the Organization of American States to restore legitimacy. The youth, through its leverage on social media and digital platforms, can also support independent media and anti-corruption frameworks which may create an internal pressure necessary for reform without the need for external military force. Economically, by prioritizing “nearshoring” as well as sustainable and transparent trade agreements in Latin America, young entrepreneurs can help build an economic alternative to Chinese financing that prioritizes regional partnership over coercion. 

In essence, the U.S currently faces a choice between short-term tactical success and long-term regional stability. While Operation Absolute Resolve successfully removed a key adversary in under three hours, this action does not resolve the deep-seated regional distrust created by a legacy of interventionism. Continuing to rely on coercion and aggressive tariffs risks driving Latin American nations further into the influence of China and Russia, who have already established significant economic and strategic footprints in the hemisphere. True leadership requires moving beyond a “parental” approach toward a strategy rooted in multilateral legitimacy and viable economic alternatives. Ultimately, the U.S. may replace “crisis-only” interaction with consistent engagement to prove it is a reliable partner rather than just a dominant power.

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VIII. Works Cited

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