Policy Problem

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Nevertheless, as China’s mass incarceration of Uyghurs and Muslim minorities has come to light over the last years, the U.S. has responded with vocal condemnation and legislative sanctions before. For instance, the U.S. passed the 2020 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, sanctioning Chinese officials implicated in human rights abuses.⁶ In March 2022, the State Department announced visa restrictions on Chinese officials being complicit in the repression of Uyghurs.²⁷  Additionally, President Joe Biden signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, placing import restrictions on goods manufactured even partially in Xinjiang, citing them as products of forced labor.²⁹ The past precedent was set in 2020 when the US Department of Homeland Security detained shipments containing cotton products originating from Xinjiang.¹¹ The EU, along with the U.S., the U.K., and Canada, have also placed sanctions on China in response to Uyghur imprisonment, which China viewed as an attack on its sovereignty. 

Nonpartisan Reasoning

Nevertheless, nations who are most vocal about China’s treatment of Uyghurs are currently embroiled in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. EU leaders, for one, are occupied with passing a plan sanctioning Russian oil by attempting a compromise with Hungary for the next weeks.³⁰ Similarly, the U.S. has been placing strict economic sanctions on Russia as well. The U.S. has taken no significant policy decisions in response to the leak.³¹ Ultimately, with the West grappling with the Russian crisis, immediate action that would substantially impact China remains unlikely. 

Policy Options

The recently leaked files only add to the mounting pile of evidence regarding China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in the XUAR, and the graphic descriptions of human rights violations laid out in the files have resulted in increased pressure on other countries to respond. In its efforts to do so, international actors, both private and public, must first eliminate the for-profit motive of China’s actions by imposing strict costs on the PRC and then aid in the plight of the Uyghurs. This must occur in three ways: 1) there must be a public and private effort to remove products made in the XUAR from the supply chain; 2) governments, especially those with large economic influence, must increase the scope and severity of existing targeting sanctions by strengthening the sanctions placed on companies funding and/or benefiting from Chinese actions; and 3) global leaders must shape international norms on Uyghur-related immigration and refugee questions to best help escapees.  

Supply-Chain Resolution

The primary objective of a comprehensive international response is to prohibit China from profiting off of the forced labor of individuals in the XUAR. Corporations, however, claim this is easier said than done. This wasn’t necessarily true for the cotton industry, as companies like Patagonia, L.L. Bean, and Victoria Secret were able to rather efficiently remove cotton originating in the XUAR from their supply chains.⁵ But, as levels of intermediary production increase, so does the difficulty of supply-chain management as companies not only have to vet their sources but also their sources’ sources and so on. 

While it is doable, the due diligence required is expensive, which is why many companies have elected a more hands-off approach. Amazon makes clear in its supply chain standards manual that “it expects suppliers to ‘cascade our standards to [their] own suppliers and subcontractors,’” yet it appears uncommitted to the materialization of this outline.²¹ The Tech Transparency Project “found that Amazon continued listing two subsidiaries of the textiles manufacturer Esquel [. . . ] over a year after another subsidiary was sanctioned by the Department of Commerce for allegedly using forced labor.”²¹

As international pressure mounts on the tech industry, companies, like those textile brands sourcing Chinese cotton, will be forced to reform. The difficulty of supply-chain management must no longer be seen as a valid excuse for being complicit in state violence but as an obstacle that businesses have a moral obligation to overcome. 

Sanction Strengthening

The close ties between government and industry in China are apparent, and this relationship makes it harder for sanctions to have their desired effect, as the state supports corporations and vice versa. In attempting to find a resolution over the XUAR, the U.S. and its supporting allies must target China’s technology giants in particular – starting with “Hikvision’s addition to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List via the Global Magnitsky Act.”²² Imposing Magnitsky sanctions on the tech firm that has largely enabled the surveillance state in the XUAR would not only create a logistical disturbance for the PRC, but it would also send a certain message that the U.S. has reoriented itself in a strengthened position against the suppression of the Uyghur population. With its assets frozen and unable to participate in the Western-led global financial system, Hikvision would likely be replaced by another state-backed Chinese firm. The efficacy of this Chinese strategy, however, is limited, as the U.S. would simply add the next supplier of oppressive tech to the SDN list. 

Leveraging Magnitsky sanctions would be a sizable step-up. As oil and natural resources are to Russia, technology is to China – threatening the state’s most critical industry will ignite tensions. The Biden administration must weigh these costs carefully. 

Migration Reform

A key issue in the international attempt to aid Uyghurs trying to flee the XUAR has been China’s aggressive policy of extradition. For escapees who flee to Arab countries – particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE – the risk of deportation is high, as China pressures governments into complying with their demands to forcefully return Uyghurs.¹⁸ Part of the difficulty in resolving the migration challenge is that Western nations are not as readily available to receive escapees as they have been in other refugee situations. It is very difficult for escaping Uyghurs to travel, without facing extradition, all the way to the U.S. Hence why the U.S. has admitted 0 Uyghurs from China.² The West’s role, therefore, is one of counterbalancing. By first reforming their own refugee criteria, the U.S. and its partners can offer explicit political and even economic incentives to nations receiving XUAR escapees to work against the demands of the PRC.