Interview Transcript:

>> Dr. Anon, welcome — it’s a real pleasure to have you with us today. To start off, could you give us an overview of how the Chatham House operates?

>> Thank you. It is my pleasure, Sanjay. Chatham House is an independent policy institute, founded in 1920. So we're a charity. We raise all our money from corporations, and from charitable foundations. A little bit from the UK government. We host meetings and we produce reports. In essence, our job is to try and influence policy. We are not academics. We're not just problematizing something. Our job is actually, to try and work out scenarios and solutions. We sometimes impact policy. Mostly, we're in the mix. So, you know, it is very rare that there is a golden thread of what I say and I see suddenly it goes into policy. The one other big difference between what your tutors might be training you to do is that my job is to get policy makers to plagiarize me. So, my job is to get my ideas adopted and not brag about it. But you are being taught, I think, to cite zillions of footnotes, and show where you have got your ideas from. So it is different in that way. And, actually, reengineering folk that have just come out of a university into Chatham House can take a bit of time. All my colleagues work with Chatham House’s Risk and Ethics committee using software to make sure that it is in fact credible [and publishable]. But when it is about trying to influence policy, sometimes you have to be super humble and very discreet. Thank you for hosting me. I have time for interrogation if that is what you want to do. 

>> Thank you so much, Dr. Anon – that painted a nice picture. We will start off with questions then. I think the most pressing question in this room or for those reading this online would be that Africa as a whole is usually looked at as a monolith. People tend to think of it as one, big country, really. They don't see it as a continent. So how would you put it in perspective to the average person, the great differences that exist between states?

>> It is really mixed. The terrain is vast. And so what happens in North Africa is very different to the South. [A study found that there are over 3,000 languages in Africa]. 

The history of colonialism and its impact does have an influence. Language and law have an influence too. But with the younger generation, that is beginning to increasingly change. And what we are also seeing is that countries that have been colonized by France, for example, are looking to diversify their relationships away from France, and this is a trend across the continent. [Beginning in 2022, France began to withdraw military troops from several West African nations following decades of military presence and interventions, with Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Ivory Coast all terminating their defense agreements].

I was in Algeria recently, for a mission there, and it was interesting how the Algerians want now to make sure that English is taught in primary school and that they want to break out of the Francophone mold, be much more globalized because they feel that they've been left behind on the global stage. They've been looking a bit at their neighboring Morocco and what Morocco has been doing too. So you have this and you have got the same thing happening with the Portuguese speaking countries. Angola has indicated it wants to join the Commonwealth, for example. So, these linguistic boundaries will slowly break down with globalization and, yeah, well, technology also, I think, will help in breaking down those boundaries.

>> Thank you, that was superb. What do you make of the elections and the protests that followed the elections in Mozambique? Was it really a win premised on the youth as is widely believed, and are concerns about election irregularity justified?

>> Ok so the opposition leader, Venâncio Mondlane, was able to really galvanize through social media, youth from Maputo, the second biggest city of Mozambique or first city even, which is Matola and, you know, in the province of Maputo. And, I also think strong concentrations in Nampula, which is where I was for the election. [The violent repression of protests reflects a wider trend as Africa’s young voters lose faith in independence-era parties of the continent]. So Nampula City and, Nakala Port, for example. I think it is wrong to think that right across Mozambique, all the youth followed Venǎcio, it is more complicated than that with regional and ethnic divisions and communities going on. But it was a youthquake, and it was a generational change. And Frelimo, had got very complacent and lazy, and also had gone really over the top on the electoral fraud as far as I can see, and was ill equipped for a younger generation. Chapro [the incumbent president] is still in his forties. But using social media and techniques that have never been used before, he managed to win. The main difference is that, Mondlane immediately, almost, when only 20% of the vote was counted, said he had won and said really deterministically, “I've won.”

Now I do not actually think he has got the evidence to prove that. I just do not think what we know is actually the answer. But he, you know, then really pushed the envelope that way. And then there were killings and things really escalated. It got incredibly nasty. That is over three hundred dead, seven hundred injured. I think Venǎcio has realized that his fortunes are weakening at the moment and so that he does need to come to an accommodation. So I think that is why a conversation took place recently. If he is a clever politician, he should now try and build a party up, go and get it properly organized, and then prepare for the local elections, which are in four years' time, and then the national elections. And he will give Frelimo a really, strong run for its money, and he may do very well. We'll see. One of my concerns is his personality. I'm being very honest with you here, which is that he's not a good team player. And that will play into the hands of the incumbent government, Frelimo, by dividing a ruling. So we'll have to see where this goes.

Frelimo itself has realized that young Mozambicans really want change. I mean, this year is the fiftieth anniversary of Mozambican independence. Imagine that the only government you have ever known, even if you are 50, is Frelimo. And so people really want change. And, you know, that was one of the drivers for what's been going on too. I do believe that Daniel Chapo, I've met him twice, is reform minded, but he is in an organization that plenty of people are not reform minded in now. [There are deep divisions within Chapo’s ruling Frelimo itself]. So it comes down to the role of the individual and the people around him. And can you turn something around after fifty years of being used to being in government?

>> Interesting, that is a lot more complicated than I’d imagined. We’ll keep a close watch on what happens in Mozambique. What’s going on in South Africa, can presidents ever complete their second terms?

In South Africa, ANC presidents never seem to see through their second terms. And so it's even a pattern. I mean, it did not happen to Zuma. Obviously, he was prosecuted. [This happened following a ruling by the Constitutional Court of South Africa that he was guilty of contempt of court]. Mbeki was pushed out [The cause of his disappearance is still widely debated after the split in the ANC], and Mandela, willingly stepped down after one term. I am not sure that Ramaphosa, the current president, is really enjoying the job. And so I wonder if he will also not see through his second term. I do think he is probably not so unhappy with the GNU [National Unity Government] because it allows him to have pushed some of the reforms that he wanted to do that he could not have done. But my suspicion is he will not see it through.

>> Well, Ramaphosa is not going to be pleased to hear that. There has been a lot of chatter about economic integration in Africa. How effective has the africa free trade continental agreement been?

>> The Africa free continental agreement is a really good idea, which is to have, you know, cross continent trade, bring down barriers, and have an open market. So the theory is really good because you're not going to get the internal growth from foreign direct investment into the continent.

So you need that internal growth. It's a long way off, but it's a good idea. And, you know, there are small areas of progress for sure already, but it will take a long time. And all African countries have signed up to it except one. So question to you. Which is the one African country that has never held an election? And they like pasta there too and pizza. No? Who was colonized by the Italians?

<< I’m guessing Eritrea?

<< Yes, Eritrea has never had an election since its independence. [Essentially no elections since 1993]. They don't believe in it. And they're also the one country that has not signed up to the African continent free trade area. So that's why I raised it.

And agenda 2063 has got everyone agreeing to it. I think one of the reasons that everyone agreed to it was that those that agreed to it at the time had kind of made the calculation that they wouldn't be held accountable to it because they won't be around in 2063. But, you know, that's the overarching vision, which I think when you look at it is very reasonable. The problem for the African Union is implementation. So it's got some very good ideas, and ambitions, but the implementation is really patchy.

And the African Union, right at the moment, is in a very weak position. I mean, it was very telling last month in the summit that happened in Tanzania for the Democratic Republic Of Congo, that the East African community and Southern African development community, both regional bodies, the then chairperson was allowed to attend the opening ceremony and then they said he can’t enter any of the negotiations [No reasons or apologies were offered to the chair for what had happened]. The chair of the African Union was excluded from the African Union Commission. So we'll have to see now with a new chairperson, the Djiboutian, what happens.

<< Thank you, so to put it simply, what is written down on paper does not actually manifest in reality?

<< Yes, the theories about Pan Africanism are really good, and make economic sense to me. But the paradox, I think, that I've seen, when I was in Addis for the African Union Summit, is that when African leaders are in Addis, they are the strongest, most convincing pan Africanist that you will find. But when they go back to their home capitals, they become very nationalistic and less pan-Africanist. And, of course, you got that tension between the need to deliver and do things in your own country, and then the whole politics which we also see here in Europe in the European Union. But, the ideas are really good.

And I do think that to get the sort of prosperity that Africa needs, the regional economic communities need to perform better, and you do need an African free, continental trade agreement to work down tariffs and have, you know, easier trade. So I think very long term, I'm more optimistic, but it's gonna be a bumpy ride. Yeah, lots of bumps in the road. 

<< Thank you so much. Let’s address the elephant in the room. What about Trump’s foreign policy and Africa?

<< I was wondering if I would be asked that. The most immediate impact of Mr. Trump on his decisions in Washington and Africa is the abolition of USAID. For a simple fact, let's take the Democratic Republic Of Congo. The DRC’s aid, 70% of it, is from the United States. [DR Congo was the largest recipient of US humanitarian assistance last year]. Nobody's going to be able to gut feel that. And you could problematize governance and some of these other things that the Trump administration is doing. But, you know, the Center for Disease Control works to combat Ebola. I mean, what's the problem with combating Ebola?

Why do you stop money on that? Eventually, Elon Musk reversed some decisions around that, but, initially, he cut it all. Humanitarian delivery for displaced people, stuff like that. 

So, the continent's been badly impacted by this in terms of humanitarian crisis response. Some of the other stuff about building up good governance, whatever, we can have a debate if that is effective? What's the matrix? Should they have ever bothered? You know, big long debates that some of the professors at LSE are probably better than I to enter into.

But the practicalities of crisis response, I don't understand. It's been very, very disruptive. And so, eventually, the US will come back onto crisis response, but they will have to have rebuilt systems and processes. And, you know, the plan, I think, is to embed it back into the state department, their foreign ministry. That takes time.

All these civil servants are incredibly demoralized now, wondering, you know, what's their future. So that does have an immediate impact. So that's impact number one in my view. You know, the tariffs have obviously raised borrowing, so that has a knock on effect including casting a shadow on African economies. So that's an impact. [The IMF cut the 2025 African growth forecast as Trump tariffs disrupt trade].

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<< South Africa could be a big focus.

<< The country impact that I never expected to happen in a way that it did was South Africa. And so, you know, there is a terrible relationship between South Africa and the US. It was never great, but it's nonexistent at the moment. I mean, last week, the South African ambassador to Washington was, you know de facto a person in Russia. And you know the core roots behind this are several.

One is the South African support for the International Court of Justice procedure against Mr. Netanyahu and Israel and the Trump people were really unforgiving on that. [In June last year, a South African delegation to the ICJ had successfully argued in favour of  I don't actually think, given the way Trump's behaving, that South Africa’s behavior around Russia has anything to do with this. 

There is the issue of land also, and Elon Musk has also kind of highlighted that. 

But looking at some of the languages coming out of Washington, I don't think the Trump people want to have, you know, a country like South Africa. They feel a little bit threatened about, you know, the success of multiculturalism.

And so the South Africa project is one that I think that they probably ideologically also are uncomfortable with. And so I have a feeling that's and that's an element to this too that I wouldn't have thought about. I wouldn't have been so sure about it, a few weeks ago, but I'm beginning to wonder whether that's an element in all of this. So where does this not mean that the Trump administration won't completely neglect Africa. One thing that's apparent from the Ukraine emerging negotiations is that strategic and critical minerals, cobalt, copper, iron ore are really important for America.

And so the Americans already said that they would be interested in, possibly, some sort of strategic relationship with the Democratic Republic Of The Congo, for example, which is, the best, richest endowed country in the world for natural resources. The US estimates that there are $24 trillion worth of minerals in the ground of the DRC. [This is according to a report from the US’ International Trade Administration] I don't know if it's true. I think we'll see where there's minerals and things that the Americans want, they'll be more involved.

And so, the Democratic Republic Of Congo, the Lubita Railway Corridor, and as a supply chain will probably survive. And then the final thing that I think we're seeing is that in America the Trump administration will subcontract, to newer, actors on the African continent. So, I mean you will have seen the derogatory comments about Europeans. I'm not very confident about Europe and their relationships in Washington.

But last week, having the Qataris mediate between the Democratic Republic Of Congo and, and Rwanda is a pattern I think we're gonna see a lot more of. You'll see Saudi Arabia, UAE, maybe Oman, Qatar, all a lot more active, particularly in the North Horn Of Africa, but various other parts of the continent too. And I think Washington will be encouraging that. So I think that's a new departure that we see. It was already emerging, but the Trump administration is embracing that. I think there's plenty of opportunity across the African continent for plenty of investment. And this is where there is multipolarity and so triangulation will be an issue. [Countries have already been triangulating like this with, for example, China].

You see this already with Rio Tinto in Guinea with the Trans Guinea Railway. Rio Tinto is a partner, and that's a British-Australian company. Is this you know, it is in partnership with the Chinese. The main beneficiaries in the short term of the Libida corridor are actually Canadian and Chinese companies. So I have a feeling that, kind of Trumpian zerosum-ism in that way, is not going to be a pathway that that necessarily Europe and, you know, other countries that used to regard The United States as an ally necessarily completely follow.

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<< I’ll just add that the Trump administration is famous for not having a set-in-stone, coherent policy, on the converse, they are very ad hoc when it comes to China. Whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing, history will tell.

<< Yes, the paradox of Trump is that, actually, we may end up working closer to China than we expected in certain situations, which is not what Trump has been planning at all. It's not an integral consequence of what he's doing. And then, you know, there are big questions for Europe coming up. I mean, the African continent is near abroad. I flew to Lisbon from Guinea Bissau a couple weeks ago. It was less than a four hour flight. It comes down to how much Europe prioritizes Africa for partnerships and, particularly economic partnerships. 

That's a choice of, you know, where to put resources. The UK at the moment is doing a revised strategy. It's called a ‘New Africa Approach.’ And, the debate will be about if the UK should actually focus more of its resources on Africa, and will there be economic and other returns from it, or should it still believe in a pivot towards Asia, and and elsewhere? I think that study would probably imagine the disruption of Trump in the way that he has.

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<< Thank you. So going back to what you said about the DRC, I was wondering if it's  governmental ineptitude, corruption, the fact that politicians seem to be interested in filling their own pockets that explains the situation in DRC right now? Because we know that it's one of the most resource rich countries in the world, but it's also one of the poorest countries in the world at the same time. So is there something deeper at play here?

<< I mean, there's a political economy there, so the elites have prospered out of this. The elites in Kinshasa have prospered, and don't perceive nation building in the way that you and I do. So they haven't suffered. And the change of presidents in recent years in Congo has that particular logic. The previous president, Mr. Joseph Kabila and now Mr. Tshisekedi. Likewise, I think that the eastern Congo crisis fundamentally has an economic logic to it. There's a bit of the history of genocide there too, but it is in the end.

Rwanda is a tiny country the size of Wales, with very limited resources and very independent, very different from what is available in the Democratic Republic Of Congo. And then a problem peculiar to Congo, I suppose, is that its neighbors, all of them have never wanted a strong Congo because they all want part of the action too. They want to make money out of Congo. So everybody is pulling Congo in different directions. And so even in the mediation efforts to end the crisis in Eastern Congo, You had a Nairobi process. You had a Rwanda process. These have been merged together now. That's a good thing. But behind it was everybody again trying to foresee the future where the Congo, because of its minerals, is already important. But I would argue that the minerals could make the DRC a new Gulf state. It could be that strategic for the world. And so everybody wants action there, including Mr. Trump.

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<< A nation that is being pulled in different directions by its neighbours and others with resources giving substance to much of the underlying motivation for so doing?

Yeah and the issue actually is the Congolese resources at the end of the day. And the Congolese need to get their politics and act together, you know, because if they harness those resources, they could develop that country. I mean, it's enormous. It swallows up a bunch of European countries – it's the largest African country. But politics is designed to feed elites with a fragmented system in the way that we see it. So the corruption and the rent seeking has a sharp logic to it.

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<< Should we be concerned about China's activity in the region, or is it a very Eurocentric, anti-China way of looking at the world?

So we did a big study at the Chatham House on whether there was evidence of deliberate debt trap of African countries by China. And our conclusion of the study was that there wasn't the evidence except maybe, for Djibouti because of its geostrategic position on the Red Sea, and that, actually, African governments themselves have not handled the relationships with China particularly well and found themselves overexposed. Now there is, you know, strictly from a Western policymaker's perspective some fear about China possibly getting a mine for strategic minerals and locking in that supply just for China. If it mines it and it goes to the open market, it's not a problem. But if it is just to go back to China, that becomes a strategic question.

And so that's the kind of debate I think we should be having. We should have nuance on this. And my experience is there are plenty of opportunities to actually partner with China on commercial things. There are some strategic questions. The fear of rising China isn't just a western fear. Some of the most vocal, tabloid commentary on China and Africa comes out of India but also Japan. So it's broader than American [or European] paranoia of the rise of China.

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<< In your view, would a duopoly of China and the USA dominating the world benefit Africa? Could it be in the middle, take sides, and derive some sort of profit?

<< I don't know if that's gonna be the end game that we end up in. So there's a big debate in international affairs at the moment about middle powers and what they can and cannot do. And, I do think at the moment, there is room for multipolarity and not getting pigeonholed as being either pro-American or pro-Chinese and, you know, kind of pick and mix. Whether, ultimately, that will close down, I don't know. But, I suspect that, actually, the world is getting more complex. And so you don't just have those binaries. It's not gonna be like an old cold war, I think it's a lot more complicated than that.

And this is where you get the Saudi Arabias, the United Arab Emirates, in but you see African countries also wanting to make sure that they still offset traditional partners in inverted commerce. So, for example, France is greatly improving its relationship with countries that don't have a form of French heritage. So I think the answer is, it's going to be a lot more mixed in that way. But there will be some hard competition of, over, access to things that people really care about. And you can see China and the United States, particularly in the Democratic Republic Of Congo, working hard to try and lock in some of the mineral deals there.

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<< Our penultimate question. Would it ever be possible for the African Union to transform itself into an organization that mimics the EU?

<< Not in a very long time. I mean, the politics of subsidiarity, the weakness of the African Union Commission, I think my own recommendation would be to help, well, even the building blocks, the regional economic communities, are experiencing trouble at the moment. But I do think that that is the way forward longer term. So I do think that working out common African platforms, and if you can't reach a Pan-African one, regional ones, is really important including in negotiating with internationals. 

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<< Thank you and finally, what can those who are interested in think tanks do to make sure they give themselves the best shot of being accepted?

<< Well, you don't make a fortune, so you don't want to join a think tank to get rich. That's one observation. The skill set the think tank needs is somewhat the ability to team play, the ability to write well, plenty of extracurricular experience. Being out, being involved in student societies is important, that sort of thing, if it's an entry level job that you're looking for. I've had a networking ability to talk to people, ability to summarize complex issues clearly and succinctly. So not lots of problematizing, you know, but these are the action points. I think some of the traditional skills used to be important like literature review, they are still useful. But artificial intelligence is going to  be able to do that just nicely now, so we won't need those skills in the same way. But it's going to be more about the importance of human interaction and insight that you get from humans that you can complement from what you can do by, you know, putting things into ChatGPT and seeing what comes out.

I think the AI revolution is going to just quicken. It's going be very disruptive. Long books and things like that may appear less often because of the tools of AI. What I am also noticing about policy makers is that one or two pages maximum is what they will read; the ability to produce short, succinct analysis of very complex issues will be a marketable skill. Again, it's a bit different from some of the academic training that is offered at the moment. I think that is the way the world is going.

Acknowledgement

The Institute wishes to acknowledge Anagha Nagesh, Tyler Rubenstein and other contributors for developing and maintaining the policy department of the institute.

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