Introduction 

In December 2025, General Saddam Khalifa Hafter-led Libyan National Army, which controls  the eastern part of Libya signed a deal worth around $4 billion with Pakistan which includes  mostly Chinese air, land and sea weaponry, including JF – 17. Pakistan officials denied that the  deals break any arms embargo placed on Libya, with some arguing there is no embargo on  Haftar, while others point out the improving relations between the LNA and its former  adversaries in the US, Europe and Türkiye. ¹ 

However, behind the curtains of military collaborations, the deal puts question on the  ineffectiveness of the arms embargo on Libya, the possibility of the transfer of weapons to RSF  and which may worsen the Sudanese crises along with internally strengthening the dynastic  approach of Khalifa Haftar for the future of Libya. 

Implication for the Regional Security 

Critics have decried the move based on the history of Libya's previous arms support of the RSF in the Sudan conflict, which has been accused of carrying out a rapes, killings and genocide in  Darfur province and the state's own record of violence against its people.² 

Sudanese authorities have also blamed East Libyan authorities for providing a transition route  for UAE-sponsored Colombian and African mercenaries’ groups into Sudan, which both the  UAE and Haftar have repeatedly denied. ³ This support to RSF also causes financial losses for 

the Libyans. Data has shown that Libya loses over $6.5 billion in fuel revenue, which is  illegally smuggled to Sudan to support RSF operations and vehicles. ⁴ 

Haftar has been accused of logistically and militarily supporting the RSF in Sudan by providing  them with fuel and facilitating the transfer of mercenaries and weapons to the RSF.⁵ 

Following the recent clashes between Saudi-led forces and the UAE-backed Southern  Transition Council in Yemen, Sudan has become the next proxy warfare for regional influences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. ⁶ 

Egyptian officials reportedly summoned Haftar’s son, Saddam, regarding their ongoing  cooperation with the UAE in supporting RSF. ⁷ However, despite the rising pressure, Haftar has remained undeterred, and the support for RSF continues from the Libyan side. ⁸ 

Earlier investigations by the amnesty have already revealed that RSF got its hands on Chinese made Norinco GB50A guided aerial bombs and 155mm AH-4 Howitzer. Access to these  weapons was reportedly provided via the UAE, and they have been used by RSF in the  worsening Sudanese conflict. ⁹ 

Implication for the Libyan Politics 

The presence of Saddam Khalifa Haftar in the talks with the Air Marshal of the Pakistan Air  Force and representing the Libyan side during the arms deal is a part of General Khalifa Haftar's attempts to increase the influence of his son in Libyan politics. 

In 2025, the 82-year-old general placed his sons in positions of power, making Saddam Khalifa  Haftar, his oldest son, the deputy commander in chief of the Libyan National Army, his other  sons Khaled Haftar, the chief of staff of the Eastern Libyan Security Forces, while Belgacem  Haftar was made the head of the Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund. ¹⁰

In 2025, Saddam made a visit to Ankara to discuss new military ties. ¹¹ Earlier, in a meeting  between Libyan and US officials in Washington, Saddam led the delegation as an envoy of the  General Commander of the Libyan National Army, ¹² while in June, he met with the defence minister of Italy, Guido Crosetto, in Rome. ¹³ 

With the assassination of the Saif al – Gaddafi, son of former dictator Muammar Gaddafi, a  major opposition that Saddam Haftar would have incurred was eliminated. Saif was considered a problem for all sides in the existing power conflict in Libyan politics; his death, as such, not  only benefits Tobruk based government but also the Tripoli-based government. ¹⁴ 

Conclusion 

What we are witnessing is the collapse of civilian governments and the rise of military regimes.  General Khalifa Haftar and Saddam Haftar, demonstrate the growing alliance between military  autocrats worldwide, who are openly violating the international arms embargo and human  rights laws. For the Maghreb, this can lead to further conflicts and instability. It will also create  challenges for the United Nations in maintaining an arms embargo on Libya, turning it into a  mere formality. 

Through these diplomatic visits to the US, Europe and Pakistan, Khalifa Haftar is cementing  his son’s authority over eastern Libya and gaining allies for his heir successors.

Acknowledgement

The Institute for Youth in Policy would like to acknowledge Kayleen Kim for editing this op-ed.

References 

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