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The Republic of Niger (Nee-Zhair) is a landlocked country located in Western Africa’s Sahel Region, bordering several states such as Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Chad. Niger’s modern history is rooted in colonialism, specifically under the rule of the French, though it was one of the last to be fully incorporated into their imperial sphere in 1922.
Niger was a constituent of the broader federal authority of French West Africa, and was thus controlled by a French dominant civil administration, though Nigerians were granted limited citizenship in 1946 and, thus, gained representation in the French legislature. French colonization had seen the development of infrastructure dedicated to cash crop cultivation, while socially its rule had seen the rise of Islam, both of which would play pivotal roles in Niger’s post-colonial history. Since gaining independence on August 3rd, 1960,
Niger’s economy has remained a principally primary-sector one, reliant heavily on subsistence farming and direct procurement of natural resources in order to generate household income and state revenue; yet due to the encroachment of the Sahara Desert, as well as ongoing climatic changes and lack of access to the Atlantic Ocean, it has been unable to further develop more advanced economic infrastructure and remains one of the poorest nations in the world, with a gross domestic product per head of roughly $542. Its most important export is uranium, which has kept Niger on the map as a source of such a geo-strategic resource.
Niger’s foreign relations, thus, have proven pivotal in order to maintain its economy, relying on foreign exports to maintain its economy. France, up until the coup, had remained Niger’s closest economic and diplomatic ally, as France is Niger’s largest exporter while Niger fuels France’s nuclear power with its stockpile of uranium, albeit at very low profitability.
Moreover, Niger has been reliant on foreign support in containing Islamic fundamentalist groups, aligning with the West, who have also sought to counter the influence of these networks, with key targets being Boko Haram, ISIS/L, and Al-Qaeada, in the Sahel. Consequently, the West, and specifically the United States, have built up its military presence in the country.
The US established an airbase, designation Niger Air Base 201, for its regional operations and has worked closely with the Nigerian Army in order to train and equip its soldiers to combat these jihadists. Politically, Niger has a history of coups and oscillation between military rule and democratic governance. When the last successful coup was orchestrated in 2010, a military government, a junta, was brought into power but was unable to stabilize the country. In 2011, this military government gave way to a civilian government, with Mahamadou Issoufou being elected after a runoff. However, Niger’s nascent democratic regime, as well as its connections to the West, would be severely challenged in the new decade.
In 2021, Niger was due to undergo a peaceful transition of power, with president-elect Mohamed Bazoum due to take office. However, an attempted coup was initiated to prevent this transition from happening, but was ultimately unsuccessful. Bazoum would transition into office peacefully, and further welcomed the West and their military resources in beating back the aforementioned Islamic terror networks. However, in the wake of the coup, this pro-Western stance was criticized and ultimately reversed by General Tchiani, the general who has since secured the presidency of the military junta, and who had, ironically, prevented the coup in 2021 that had jeopardized Bazoum’s transition into the presidency.
Coups, despite their execution, are anything but straightforward. The overthrow of Bazoum’s government and its usurpation by Tchiani’s National Council is no exception. The junta’s spokesman, Colonel Abdramane, had proclaimed that the coup was orchestrated as a means of protecting the security of the Nigerian state, stating that they sought to “put an end to the regime that you know due to the deteriorating security situation and bad governance,” in a release from the junta.
This suggests that the officers believed Bazoum’s government was unable to provide for the people of Niger and that it was unable to contain the security threats found within the Islamic terror groups that had terrorized the Sahel. However, the Guardian reports that one of these factors, the security threat from Islamic terror networks, was not as prevalent to Niger than her neighbors, as jihadist violence was relatively minute when compared to Nigeria or Mali. Yet, the coup has resulted in stiff sanctions from international partners, rolling blackouts, and general strife, further destabilizing Niger’s economy and civil society.
However, Niger’s relationship to the West, particularly France, may play a role in this coup. As mentioned before, Bazoum was an ally of the West, particularly because of the mutual acceptance of democratic values and their mutual goal of removing Islamic insurgents from the Sahel. Tchiani’s junta, however, sees differently. The junta is supported by the M62 Movement, an anti-imperialist, anti-Western organization. M62 claims that the French, and indeed the West, do not have the best interests of Niger in mind, and must therefore look elsewhere for support. Their preferences, thusly, aligned with that of Russia.
Moscow’s influence in the Sahel is not new, as the Wagner Group, a state-backed private military organization led by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, was prevalent in Mali, upholding and expanding Russian hard power in the region for years through military operations. This was prior to Prigozhin’s mutiny against Moscow’s prosecution of the war, yet Wagner’s, and indeed Russia’s, influence in the region has not diminished. In the lead-up to, and following, the coup, pro-M62 protestors have organized, unfurling Russian flags and calling for Wagner to intervene. This follows a broader pattern in the Sahel, as neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso have each aligned closer to Moscow following their own coups.
In the aftermath of Bazoum’s removal from office, reactions from various parties were swift. ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) swiftly sanctioned Niger and strongly denounced the coup. They, and the broader African Union, the supranational organization meant to strengthen political, military and economic ties amongst African nations, sent ultimatums to Tchiani.
They called for Bazoum to be reinstated within one week from the time the ultimatum was sent, stating that military force will be used should the junta not comply. Interstate projects have also been cast into doubt by this coup, such as the Niger-Benin crude oil pipeline, which would be the longest pipeline on the continent and one that would have further strengthened cooperation between Niger and Benin, a member of ECOWAS. France, in conjunction with the EU and the United Kingdom, also severed financial aid to Niger on similar grounds. EU states have already made initiatives to evacuate any personnel in Niger, with France and Italy having already done so.
The United States, though it has strongly condemned the overthrowing of Bazoum, has remained hesitant on taking further action. This is because, in appropriations legislation for the State Department, there is a section, 7008, that prohibits the US from sending military aid to a country that has recently undergone a coup. Likely due to the prioritization of combatting jihadist networks in the Sahel, the Biden Administration has not yet taken further action on an economic front. Like the EU, the US is urging any citizens and government officials in Niger to evacuate from Niger for their safety.
Niger remains in limbo, as Bazoum’s government is now headed by the president’s Foreign Minister Hassoumi Massaoudou in an acting capacity, and is still opposing the junta. However, the military has come out in support of the junta, and all political party activity has been halted by the junta.
The current state of Niger in the wake of this coup remains to be fully studied, for this piece comes only a week after the coup had taken place. What is known, however, is that Niger’s borders have been reopened and delegations from several nations, from those of ECOWAS to Burkina Faso’s, have been accepted by the junta. Moreover, the suspension of Niger’s democracy, one of the few in the Sahel, has further shaken the region’s stability and its ability to develop democratic institutions and more advanced economic infrastructure.
ECOWAS and the African Union’s ultimatum, as of the writing of this analysis, will have elapsed, and Bazoum has not yet returned to office. Moreover, Burkina Faso and Mali both have come to the defense of Niger, setting the stage for greater regional strife, if not outright conflict. Through it all though, the people of Niger now stand at a crossroads for their country’s future, as their homeland becomes not only a significant flashpoint for a renewed East/West rivalry, but also a question of democracy and stability within a region torn apart by coups and terrorism.