Criticism of Israeli policy is normal and often warranted. What’s changed isn’t the criticism itself, but where it’s targeted. Increasingly, the debate isn’t about what Israel does, but whether it should exist at all. The conversation has shifted from a policy disagreement to an outright challenge to Israel's sovereignty, and in geopolitics, challenges to sovereignty carry severe consequences. When Israel's legitimacy is questioned, the result is weakened deterrence, strained alliances, and reduced strategic freedoms.

Sovereignty matters because Israel doesn’t operate in isolation. Its security and alliances depend on being treated as a legitimate state. When that legitimacy is weakened by denying Jewish self-determination, Israel’s ability to politically defend itself becomes constrained. Security isn’t just about military force; it’s about credibility and soft power. When a country’s legitimacy is treated as conditional, its warnings carry less weight, regardless of its military strength.

Zionism emerged because Jews repeatedly learned that safety without sovereignty doesn’t last. For centuries, Jews lived as political outsiders, dependent on others and their societies. Emancipation in Europe promised equality, yet antisemitism persisted even where Jews had full legal rights. The Holocaust proved that promises alone were not protection. Zionism was a response to this reality, aiming to achieve sovereignty and diplomatic recognition as a means of survival. With Israel’s establishment in 1948, Jews became political actors capable of defending themselves. 

Anti-Zionism is often described as separate from antisemitism. That distinction collapses when anti-Zionism denies the Jewish people the right to self-determination. When this antisemitism enters international discourse masked as “anti-Zionism,” the debate shifts. The focus shifts from Israeli policy to Israel’s legitimacy itself, weakening alliances and limiting Israel’s freedom of action in the international system. 

From its beginning, Israel’s legitimacy was rejected by regional adversaries who opposed Jewish sovereignty. Over time, though, much of the international community came to treat Israel as a permanent state. After surviving the wars of 1948 and the subsequent conflicts, debate shifted toward borders, refugees, and security, away from Israel’s existence. The shift became apparent after 1967, when U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 recognized Israel while calling for negotiations over territory. Even Israel’s harshest critics accepted its existence. 

In 1993, the Oslo Accords followed that same logic. Despite their failure, Oslo was built on mutual recognition. Israel and the PLO acknowledged each other as legitimate. Negotiations were possible because Israel’s sovereignty itself wasn’t being questioned. The conflict was about land and security, not whether Israel had the right to exist. When mutual recognition is absent, negotiations like the Oslo Accords become impossible, and without it, there can be no meaningful political progress in the region. Without recognition, the precondition for negotiation cannot be met.

When protesters chant “from the river to the sea,” or when academic institutions portray Israel’s founding as inherently illegitimate or colonial, Israel is no longer treated as a state whose policies are respectfully disputed, but as one whose entire existence is questioned. When Israel’s legitimacy is questioned, adversaries are more likely to push boundaries, assuming international pressure will restrict Israel’s response. 

We saw this in the years leading up to October 7, when Israeli deterrence was widely perceived as weakening. Hamas operated under the belief that Israel’s ability to respond in Gaza was constrained by global opinion, as it was during the 2014 Gaza war. During the 2014 Gaza war, intense international pressure limited Israel’s operational freedoms even as rocket fire continued. Calls for ceasefires and immediate investigations limited Israel’s ability to pursue its objectives. Instead of deterring Hamas, this reinforced the idea that international pressure could weaken Israel more effectively than military resistance. When legitimacy erodes, deterrence weakens, not because military force is unavailable, but because its use is politically restricted. 

Delegitimization also damages Israel’s alliances. Governments are hesitant to openly support states portrayed as international outcasts. Even when interests align, support often comes with political costs. This dynamic is reinforced in international forums, where Israel faces a disproportionate number of U.N. resolutions compared to states engaged in similar conflicts. When Israel is singled out in ways others are not, it becomes harder for allies to stand by Israel without political backlash. As Israel is increasingly portrayed as illegitimate, allies grow more cautious, limiting Israel’s diplomatic and strategic options during crises. 

This doesn't mean Israel should be shielded from criticism. The point is that denying Jewish self-determination is fundamentally different from criticizing Israeli policy. No other state is routinely asked to justify its existence before its actions are debated. When people claim that linking anti-Zionism to antisemitism “shuts down criticism,” they’re conflating two separate arguments, one about policy, the other about existence. 

Israel needs the same legitimacy granted to every other nation-state. When Jewish self-determination is treated as illegitimate, the consequences are real. Deterrence weakens, alliances strain, and strategic freedom shrinks. The scrutiny Israel faces today reinforces the problem Zionism aimed to solve: no people can rely on promises alone for survival without the sovereignty and diplomatic legitimacy to uphold such promises.