Policy Problem

Stakeholders 

One of the prime effects of the Sudan coup is an exacerbation of the already growing humanitarian crisis due to lack of aid. The United States already announced that aid to Sudan will be halted until the civilian-led government is restored. The UN has attempted to help Sudan navigate the crisis via fostering negotiations via UNITMAS, with the goal being to foster negotiations between Sudanese stakeholders. These actions have not been well received by the pro-military supporters, who protested outside of UNITMAS’s headquarters. While the UNITMAS’s mission has been endorsed by the international community, it is far less popular in Sudan itself.

As a result of the coup, Sudan has been suspended from the African Union, and will only be allowed to return if a democratic government is created or restored. But due to the unpopularity of the UNITMAS mission, this return to a pro-democracy government is looking less and less likely by the day. 

Risk of Indifference 

Furthermore, the Sudanese coup deposed civilian Prime Minister Aballa Hamdok, which is a costly derailment of the democratic process that was started in 2019 following the ousting of President Omar Al-Bashir. As a result of the instability, the Sudanese economy is expected to worsen in the coming years. The continuation of the conflict will also likely lead to even more civilian deaths, as, according to an anti-coup movement called the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, the coup already has claimed the lives of 53 anti-coup protesters. With the failed UN negotiation attempts, the chance of a return to democracy in the immediate future is becoming less and less likely.

Policy Options

Many now see the recent democratic backslide in Sudan as an inevitable outcome. While the 2019 revolution “had reignited hope for democracy rule,” it failed to address the fundamental issues with Sudan’s military state. Still fearing accountability for previous abuses, “a military and security state with deep roots and complex economic interests” waited behind Bashir to ensure its objectives – even if that meant doing so without a figurehead. Such reflection provides guidance on how the international community may seek to avoid another Sudan, but it does little to address the current situation. Present goals, both of international actors and domestic activists alike, should be two-fold: 1) undermine and delegitimize the coup, forcing the military’s abdication, and 2) ensure the welfare of the Sudanese people in the meantime. 

Since the coup ensued, the West has moved quickly to shut off the illegitimate government from financial institutions, with the World Bank pausing economic support and “any new operations” and the U.S. freezing $700m in funds intended to aid the democratic transition. Though humanitarian continues to deteriorate, Sudanese protests support these actions as they fear the deliverance of aid would legitimize the military government. 

To this end, Washington hopes to pressure the military into allowing the resumption of the civilian-led government as the embassy intends to continue withholding aid absent the restoration of democracy. It is not clear, however, that this bargaining chip will be effective. The military leadership has minimal concerns with humanitarian violations and are increasingly switching to gold to sustain their rule. 

Continuing the popular resistance now will become near impossible if humanitarian and economic conditions considerably worsen. Independent third-party aid organizations are therefore needed to act as intermediaries, delivering aid to those in need without offering political legitimacy to the military government.

Despite the death of over 40 protestors, there remains a strong coalition of Sudanese people organizing against the military – leading “a series of nationwide protest marches, blockades, boycotts, and social media campaigns that continued in the face of a near-total internet shutdown.” Such fervent popular resistance provides hope, as leaders claim protests won’t cease until the civilian government is restored. International actors seeking to influence the situation in Sudan should work closely and listen to the Sudanese people leading domestic resistance groups, as presenting a unified front with consistent demands will be key in pressuring the military.

International actors, specifically Western financial institutions, have great control over the coup’s sustainability as debt financing and spending becomes difficult when a nation is cut off from lending institutions. While the U.S. and World Bank are enacting such pressures currently, they should also put the squeeze on Sudan’s main benefactors – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – who are, fortunately, broadly aligned with the U.S. on other issues. These gulf states risk providing the military government with access to capital, allowing the coup to evade the economic pressure of benign cutoffs from the international economy